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99TH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

COMPILATION OF SPEECHES

(NOVEMBER 4, 1986—DECEMBER 20, 1986)

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On November 4, 1986, the 35 signatory nations to the Helsinki Final Act convened in Vienna for the third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

During the six weeks that have followed the opening of the Conference, there has been a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, as well as discussions for the next phases of review of the Helsinki process.

The United States delegation to the Vienna Review Meeting has made significant contributions in detailing the human rights abuses of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries in their many speeches in both the plenary sessions and in various subsidiary working groups. We are pleased to provide you with a complete compiliation of the US delegation speeches presented during the opening session of the Conference.

We hope you find this information useful.

Sincerely yours,

STENY H. HOYER
CO-CHAIRMAN

ALFONSE D'AMATO
CHAIRMAN

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PLENARY STATEMENTS

OFFICIAL TEXT

VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ

November 5, 1986

CSCE'S PROMISE

WE THANK THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRIA FOR THEIR GENEROUS HOSPITALITY AS HOSTS FOR THIS CONFERENCE. WE HAVE ALL APPRECIATED THE SPECIAL WARMTH AND COURTESY OF THEIR WELCOME.

WE ARE GATHERED TOGETHER - THIRTY-FIVE NATIONS OF VARIOUS AND DIFFERING POLITICAL SYSTEMS, BELIEFS, AND CIRCUMSTANCES - IN A COMMON EFFORT TO BUILD A MORE DURABLE FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF EAST AND WEST. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PROVIDES US WITH GUIDELINES FOR OUR WORK. IT SETS FORTH THE PROMISE OF A MORE SECURE PEACE AND GREATER COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES -- A PROMISE THAT CAN BE REALIZED ONLY THROUGH AN EXPANSION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL.

OUR COMMON TASK SHOULD BE TO FULFILL THAT PROMISE -- TO MEET THE COMMITMENTS TO SECURITY AND FREEDOM CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. AND TO DO SO, WE MUST LOOK TO THE PAST AND THE PRESENT AS WELL AS TO THE FUTURE. WE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT PASS LIGHTLY OVER OUR EXPERIENCES AND OUR DISAPPOINTMENTS OF THE LAST DECADE. WE MUST EXAMINE THOSE OCCASIONS ON WHICH GOVERNMENTS HAVE FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLES THAT THEY HAVE VOLUNTARILY UNDERTAKEN TO UPHOLD IN THE FINAL ACT.

SUCH CRITICAL REVIEW IS NECESSARY IF THE CONFERENCE IS TO MAKE GENUINE PROGRESS IN REDUCING DISTRUST AND BUILDING CONFIDENCE.

BUT AT THE SAME TIME, THE CONFERENCE ALSO OFFERS US AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK FORWARD. IT GIVES US THE CHANCE TO SHAPE A FUTURE THAT WILL RELEASE THE CREATIVE ENERGIES OF ALL OUR PEOPLES.

THE WORLD IS ENTERING A PERIOD OF DRAMATIC TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, ONE IN WHICH OLD WAYS OF THINKING AND PAST PATTERNS OF EFFORT ARE INCREASINGLY INAPPROPRIATE TO NEW REALITIES. THE TRADITIONAL BARRIERS OF TIME AND SPACE ARE DAY-BY-DAY ERODED BY ADVANCED TRANSPORT AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, LEAVING ONLY THE BARRIERS BETWEEN PEOPLES WHICH ARE IMPOSED BY GOVERNMENTS. THE FAMILIAR MEASURES OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT -- AND BY EXTENSION, MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRENGTH - ARE LESS AND LESS CAPABLE OF CAPTURING THE REAL SOURCES OF SOCIAL VITALITY. IN THE PLACE OF PAST APPROACHES TO CENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING AND MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION-BASED TECHNOLOGIES ARE MAKING POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY GREATER DECENTRALIZATION AND INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE.

THIS TREND CAN ONLY BE A SOURCE OF HOPE TO ALL WHO VALUE HUMAN CREATIVITY. FOR THE FUTURE, THE TRUE MEASURE OF THE DYNAMISM OF A SOCIETY -- AND OF A COMMUNITY OF NATIONS -- WILL BE HOW FREELY IT

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CAN ENCOURAGE, EXCHANGE AND UTILIZE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND INDIVIDUAL INNOVATION, HOW IT CAN PROFIT FROM THE CREATIVITY OF INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE. IT IS PRECISELY THESE GOALS OF FREEDOM AND OPENNESS -- SO NECESSARY FOR PROGRESS IN THIS EMERGING NEW AGE -- THAT ARE ALREADY EMBODIED IN THE FINAL ACT. IN SEEKING TO HEAL THE DIVISIONS ARISING OUT OF THE PAST, THE FINAL ACT PROVIDES US WITH GUIDELINES AND COMMITMENTS FOR THE FUTURE. THE PAST FOUR DECADES HAVE SEEN EUROPE REBUILT. THE FUTURE GIVES US HOPE FOR A EUROPE REUNITED. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY ALL OF THE CSCE'S PARTICIPATING STATES, GIVE PROMISE OF A EUROPE VITAL AND CONFIDENT IN ITS CAPACITY FOR PROGRESS, OF A EUROPE WHOSE PEOPLES ARE SECURE IN THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM.

THE FINAL ACT RECOGNIZED THAT PEACE IS NOT SIMPLY THE ABSENCE OF WAR. AND GENUINELY CONSTRUCTIVE EUROPEAN RELATIONS MUST INVOLVE MORE THAN THE MERE FACT OF DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE. IN THE WORDS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN: "TRUE PEACE RESTS ON THE PILLARS OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION, AND RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW."

THE AMERICAN STAKE IN EUROPE

I HAVE COME TO VIENNA TO REAFFIRM THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO WORK ENERGETICALLY - AND IN CONCERT WITH OUR FRIENDS IN SUPPORT OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT. THEY ARE THE BASIS OF OUR OWN POLICIES. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FULLY SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVE OF A RE-UNIFIED, FREE AND INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY OF EUROPEAN NATIONS, EAST AND WEST. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THAT GOAL, AND NOT AS OUTSIDERS. FOR AS EUROPE'S HEIRS AND CHILDREN, WE SHARE AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ASPIRATIONS AS WELL AS THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF EUROPE. EUROPE AND AMERICA ARE BOUND TOGETHER BY TIES OF HISTORY, FAMILY, BROAD COMMON INTEREST, AND SHARED VALUES; WE CAN IGNORE THE IMPORTANCE AND STRENGTH OF THESE TIES ONLY AT OUR PERIL.

THE SECURITY AND WELFARE OF OUR PEOPLES ARE FIRMLY INTERWOVEN. WE LEARNED FROM BITTER EXPERIENCE --IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR -- THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT CUT ITSELF OFF FROM EUROPE. ISOLATIONISM WAS A COURSE TO DISASTER THAT WE ARE DETERMINED NOT TO REPEAT. IN THE YEARS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, AMERICA REJOINED THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE -- FIRST, TO DEFEAT THE SCOURGE OF TYRANNY, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, TO HELP EUROPE REGENERATE ITS STRENGTH THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN, BEGUN EXACTLY FORTY YEARS AGO.

TODAY, THE UNITED STATES EXPRESSES ITS COMMITMENT TO EUROPE IN MANY FORMS. OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN CSCE IS ONE OF THEM. WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE A POSITIVE AND IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CSCE'S OBJECTIVES. WE WILL NEITHER FORSAKE NOR DIMINISH THAT ROLE.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BELIEVE IN THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM AND OPENNESS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT. WE ARE CONFIDENT IN THE VITALITY OF OUR DEMOCRATIC VALUES, AND WE ARE PROUD TO TEST THEM IN OPEN PEACEFUL COMPETITION WITH OTHER VALUES. BUT WE DO NOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE OUR BELIEFS ON OTHERS, NOR CAN WE ACCEPT THE CLAIM OF SOME GOVERNMENTS TO AN INHERENT RIGHT TO EXPORT THEIR OWN IDEOLOGY THROUGH FORCE OR SUBVERSION. WE RESPECT THE INHERENT DIVERSITY OF OTHER SOCIETIES. BUT WE CANNOT IGNORE THE ACTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS WHICH DENY THEIR PEOPLE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. WE DO NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY FOR OURSELVES BUT NEITHER CAN WE ACCEPT THE CLAIM OF OTHERS TO A RIGHT OF SO-CALLED "EQUAL SECURITY," WHICH HAS THE RESULT OF CREATING INSECURITY FOR THEIR NEIGHBORS.

WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE SOVIET UNION, IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF ALL THE ISSUES THAT DIVIDE US. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT OUR DIFFERENCES -- SO PROFOUNDLY BASED ON CONFLICTING VISIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE -- CAN BE EASILY RESOLVED. BUT WE DO BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO BUILD GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND CONFIDENCE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, WE MAY HAVE REACHED A WATERSHED IN OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ON OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THERE CONTINUES TO BE A DISAPPOINTING LACK OF POSITIVE MOVEMENT. TO PROMOTE PROGRESSS IN ALL OF THESE AREAS, PRESIDENT REAGAN MET WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK LAST MONTH. THEY CONTINUED THEIR DISCUSSION -- BEGUN IN GENEVA A YEAR AGO -- OF THE FULL AGENDA OF EAST-WEST ISSUES. THEIR TWO-DAY MEETING OPENED A NEW STAGE IN OUR HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE. BASIC DIFFERENCES PERSIST; BUT THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY REAFFIRMED THEIR EARLIER AGREEMENT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING AHEAD IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, SEEKING TO EXPAND COMMON GROUND WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL

THERE IS NOW MUCH TO BE DONE. THE PROGRESS MADE AT REYKJAVIK NEEDS TO BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED. FOR OUR PART, AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS ARE PREPARED TO DO SO CREATIVELY AND WITHOUT DELAY. I WILL MEET WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE LATER TODAY AND AGAIN TOMORROW TO CONTINUE OUR OWN EXCHANGES.

THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG SOUGHT NOT JUST LIMITATIONS ON THE FUTURE GROWTH OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARMS, BUT THEIR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION. THEREFORE, WE WERE ENCOURAGED WHEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV REACHED THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT FOR A FIRST STEP OF 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE FORCES OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD. FOR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON EVEN DEEPER REDUCTIONS, DOWN FROM A CURRENT SOVIET TOTAL OF OVER 1300 WARHEADS TO ONLY 100 ON LONGER-RANGE INF

MISSILES WORLDWIDE ON EACH SIDE. THERE WOULD BE A CEILING ON SHORTER-RANGE INF MISSILES, AND NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE THEIR NUMBERS AS WELL.

OUR TWO NATIONS NOW HAVE AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE QUICKLY TO FORMAL AGREEMENT ON THESE REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE LOOK TO THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN US IN DOING SO. THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR A PROCESS OF IMPROVING VERIFICATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR TESTING. BOTH SIDES PROPOSED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TESTING ISSUE, AND DISCUSSED AN AGENDA THAT WOULD MEET BOTH SIDES' CONCERNS. MAJOR DIFFERENCES ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES REMAIN. THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED TO SOVIET CONCERNS BY PROPOSING THAT, FOR TEN YEARS, BOTH SIDES CONFINE THEIR STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS TO RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING ACTIVITIES PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY. THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF STEADY REDUCTIONS IN U.S. AND SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCES AND LEAD TO THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES DURING THIS DECADE, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT EITHER SIDE WOULD THEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY ADVANCED DEFENSES UNLESS AGREED OTHERWISE.

BUT AT REYKJAVIK, THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO GO FURTHER -- TO GO BEYOND EXISTING ABM TREATY PROVISIONS TO RESTRICT RESEARCH IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CRIPPLE THE AMERICAN SDI PROGRAM. THIS WE CANNOT ACCEPT. THE WEST NEEDS A VIGOROUS SDI PROGRAM AS PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY -- BOTH AS AN INVESTMENT IN, AND INSURANCE FOR, A SAFER AND MORE STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE, A BALANCE NO LONGER SOLELY DEPENDENT UPON THE THREAT OF MUTUAL ANNIHILATION. DEFENSES CAN OPEN THE WAY TO EVEN MORE AMBITIOUS REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES THAN THOSE I HAVE ALREADY DESCRIBED. BUT SUCH REDUCTIONS CAN BE REALISTICALLY ACCOMPLISHED ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING THE VERY REASONS WHY WESTERN DETERRENCE MUST BE BASED TODAY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE INCLUDE THE INSECURITY AND UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY THE WARSAW PACT'S MASSIVE CONVENTIONAL FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, INCLUDING ITS LARGE ARSENAL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TOGETHER WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO ADDRESS THIS IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WITHIN THE ONGOING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. LATE LAST YEAR, THE WESTERN SIDE PUT FORWARD A MAJOR NEW PROPOSAL IN MBFR, DESIGNED TO MEET THE STATED CONCERNS OF THE EAST AND TO OPEN THE WAY FOR AN AGREEMENT. THE EAST HAS YET TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY.

THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS OBJECTIVE CAN BE PROMOTED THROUGH INCREASED OPENNESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE, AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS. LAST MAY, THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS TASK. TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES, WE ARE EXAMINING HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS SET FORTH IN OUR HALIFAX STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

BUT ARMS CONTROL CANNOT EXIST AS A PROCESS IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER SOURCES OF TENSION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES ARE TO MAKE A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY, THEY CAN ONLY REINFORCE, NEVER SUPPLANT, EFFORTS TO RESOLVE MORE FUNDAMENTAL SOURCES OF SUSPICION AND POLITICAL CONFRONTATION. NOWHERE DOES THE PROBLEM OF DISTRUST AND DIVISION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAVE GREATER MEANING THAN IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPE. SINCE 1945, AN ARTIFICIAL BARRIER HAS DIVIDED THE CONTINENT AND ITS PEOPLES. THIS BARRIER IS NOT OF WESTERN CONSTRUCTION. THE MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE VARIOUS NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED NATIONS OF EUROPE HAVE NOT FORCED THE DIVISION OF FAMILIES NOR DENIED OUR CITIZENS THE RIGHT OF FREE MOVEMENT. WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO CUT OUR SOCIETIES OFF FROM COMPETING IDEAS - THROUGH PRESS CENSORSHIP, RADIO JAMMING, OR OTHER MEANS. WE HAVE NOT USED THREATS OR ARMED INTERVENTION TO ENFORCE BLOC DISCIPLINE UPON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT DEAL COMPREHENSIVELY WITH THE DILEMMA OF A DIVIDED EUROPE. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THE FREEDOM OF INDIVIDUAL MEN AND WOMEN MUST BE A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. WHEN JUSTICE IS VIOLATED AND FREEDOM IS DENIED, THEN THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT INEVITABLY GROWS BETWEEN NATIONS. THE DELICATE PROCESS OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE, COOPERATION, AND SECURITY IS UNDERMINED. PRESIDENT REAGAN PUT IT BEST WHEN HE NOTED: "A GOVERNMENT THAT WILL BREAK FAITH WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO KEEP FAITH WITH FOREIGN POWERS... WE PLACE FAR LESS WEIGHT ON WORDS THAT ARE SPOKEN AT MEETINGS, THAN UPON THE DEEDS THAT FOLLOW."

THE COMMITMENTS OF THE FINAL ACT STRIKE A NECESSARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE RELATED PROBLEMS OF MILITARY SECURITY, POLITICAL CONFIDENCE, ECONOMIC COOPERATION, FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, AND CONTACTS AMONG PEOPLE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE KEEP THAT BALANCE. WE SHOULD WELCOME AND ENCOURAGE PROGRESS IN ALL OF THESE AREAS. BUT WE SHOULD NOT IMAGINE THAT ANY SINGLE ELEMENT ALONE IS SUFFICIENT TO CARRY THE WHOLE. A FAILURE ON OUR PART TO PURSUE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT -- OUR ACQUIESENCE IN SELECTIVE ADHERENCE TO THESE COMMITMENTS -- WOULD UNDERCUT FURTHER EFFORTS TO SECURE A MORE STABLE PEACE. IMPATIENCE WITH THE DIFFICULTIES OF SECURING COMPLIANCE SHOULD NOT DRIVE US INTO SUCCESSIVE NEW NEGOTIATIONS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE. WE MUST RESIST THE NOTION THAT CONSENSUS-BUILDING REQUIRES COMPROMISES THAT WOULD DISTORT OR DENY THE RIGHT PROMISED BY THE FINAL ACT. ESCAPE FROM THE VIOLATION OF EXISTING COMMITMENTS CANNOT BE FOUND IN THE FLIGHT TO NEW COMMITMENTS. AS WE BEGIN OUR REVIEW OF THE FINAL ACT'S IMPLEMENTATION IN RECENT YEARS, WE CAN NOTE SOME IMPORTANT RESULTS. OVER THE PAST DECADE, THE CSCE UMBRELLA HAS SHELTERED A REMARKABLE EXPANSION OF HUMAN CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IT HAS SUPPORTED THE TWO-WAY FLOW OF ORDINARY PEOPLE ACROSS A STILL-DIVIDED EUROPE. BUILDING UPON THE FINAL ACT, THE MADRID

CONCLUDING DOCUMENT HAS ADDED IMPORTANT NEW COMMITMENTS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, TRADE UNION FREEDOMS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES, AND THE REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES.

THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ALSO LAID DOWN AS A BASIC PRINCIPLE THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF SUPPORTING TERRORISM, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. IT CALLED FOR GREATER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COMBATTING THIS MENACE. SADLY, THE EVENTS OF PAST MONTHS HAVE ONLY UNDERSCORED THE PRESSING NEED FOR SUCH COOPERATION.

IN STOCKHOLM, OUR NATIONS HAVE ADOPTED AN ACCORD ON MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. IF FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED, THIS AGREEMENT WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE, MAKING MILITARY ACTIVITIES MORE PREDICTABLE AND INHIBITING OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION.

BUT SUCCESS AT THE STOCKHOLM MEETING EARLIER THIS FALL ONLY HIGHLIGHTS THE DISAPPOINTING LACK OF PROGRESS IN OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. IN PARTICULAR, WE CONTINUE TO SEE A TRAGIC HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION WITHIN THE NATIONS OF THE EAST THE LIST OF CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IS ALL TOO LENGTHY. WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION, 41 MEMBERS OF A CITIZEN'S GROUP ESTABLISHED TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKK FINAL ACT -- AMONG THEM ANATOLIY MARCHENKO AND ANATOLIY KORYAGIN (CORE-YAH-GEN) -- LANGUISH IN DETENTION. THERE ARE MANY MORE SUCH SOVIET CITIZENS INCARCERATED FOR TRYING TO EXERCISE THEIR BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. THESE INCLUDE RUSSIANS, UKRAINIANS, BALTS, JEWS, AND MEN AND WOMEN OF OTHER NATIONALITIES. ONE OF THAT COUNTRY'S MOST DISTINGUISHED CITIZENS, DR. ANDREI SAKHAROV, REMAINS INCOMMUNICADO, CUT OFF FROM THE WORLD IN THE CLOSED CITY OF GORKY. THE HELSINKI ACCORD AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ARE SOLEMN AGREEMENTS, VOLUNTARILY SIGNED BY THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH PROVIDE FOR THE RIGHT OF EMIGRATION. YET SPOUSES OF OUR CITIZENS ARE DENIED EXIT VISAS. AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOVIET JEWISH CITIZENS - AS WELL AS ARMENIANS, GERMANS AND OTHERS - ARE DENIED PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE.

ELSEWHERE IN THE EAST, MEMBERS OF CHARTER 77, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND THE JAZZ SECTION OF THE MUSICIANS' UNION HAVE BEEN EITHER HARASSED OR IMPRISONED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. COURAGEOUS ACTIVISTS OF SOLIDARITY HAVE SUFFERED SIMILARLY IN POLAND. THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND EXERCISE CULTURAL AND NATIONAL RIGHTS FREELY CONTINUES TO BE LIMITED FOR MANY MEN AND WOMEN IN VARIOUS EASTERN COUNTRIES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY THE CASE FOR RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL OR ETHNIC MINORITIES -- AS EVIDENCED BY THE RECENT PROGRAM OF FORCED CULTURAL ASSIMILATION OF BULGARIA'S TURKISH CITIZENS.

WHILE THE MAJOR VIOLATIONS OF THE HELSINKI COMMITMENTS ARE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA, THE UNITED STATES SEEKS BALANCED PROGRESS AMONG ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS. DURING THE VIENNA MEETING WE WILL WORK WITH ALL INTERESTED STATES TO ACHIEVE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL

ACT, THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, AND THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT.

IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WE WILL WORK FOR FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMITMENTS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN BY ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES OF THE FINAL ACT. WE SEEK STEPS THAT WILL BRING US CLOSER TO REALIZING THE GOALS SET FORTH IN PRINCIPLE VII AND BASKET THREE.

IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS, WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPLORE NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FINAL ACT'S PROVISIONS.

IN INFORMATION, WE WILL SEEK TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATIONS, SPECIFICALLY,THE JAMMING OF RADIO BROADCASTS -- A VIOLATION, DOCUMENTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT --MUST BE STOPPED.

IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY, WE WELCOME THE POSITIVE OUTCOME AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE UNITED STATES WILL PROMPTLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENT THE TERMS OF THE STOCKHOLM ACCORD. WE URGE ALL OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE. FULL COMPLIANCE BY THE SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY WITH THE VERIFICATION PROVISION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, WILL BE AN IMPORTANT GAUGE OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE PROGRESS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL.

BUT THE DETAILS OF THE STOCKHOLM ACCORD ILLUSTRATE THAT THERE IS STILL CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE AREA OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING. THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS -- CENTRAL TO ANY EFFORT TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF SURPRISE ATTACK -- HAS YET TO BE FULLY PUT INTO PRACTICE. THUS, THE CSCE HAS AN IMPORTANT TASK STILL BEFORE IT -- TO ENCOURAGE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CDE AND TO EXAMINE WAYS OF CARRYING ON THE WORK BEGUN IN STOCKHOLM TO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.

THE STRENGTH OF OUR OWN COMMITMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS FOLLOW-UP MEETING HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN THE EXCEPTIONAL DEGREE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS IN PREPARATIONS FOR THIS MEETING. OUR DELEGATION IS LED BY ONE OF OUR MOST ABLE VETERANS OF CSCE DIPLOMACY, AMBASSADOR WARREN ZIMMERMANN. HE HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE AMERICAN CSCE COMMISSION, UNDER THE ABLE LEADERSHIP OF SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO AND CONGRESSMAN STENY HOYER. HISDELEGATION INCLUDES A NUMBER OF DISTINGUISHED PRIVATE CITIZENS. IT HAS CONSULTED WITH A BROAD RANGE OF AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. THIS DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DIVERSITY OF AMERICA AND OFAMERICA'S ROOTS IN EUROPE. ITS VOICE TRULY REFLECTS THE HOPES AND CONCERNS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THE FUTURE

MR. CHAIRMAN, I SPOKE EARLIER OF THE PAST -- WITH ITS LEGACY OF DIVISION -- AND OF THE FUTURE -- WITH ITS PROMISE OF A RE-UNIFIED EUROPE. THE CONTINUING DIVISION OF EUROPE HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF TENSION, WHICH AT TIMES HAS THREATENED US ALL--BUT MOST

IMPORTANTLY, IT HAS MEANT A DEADENING REPRESSION OF PLURALISM, OPENNESS AND FREE INQUIRY AMONG THE PEOPLES AND SOCIETIES OF THE SOME OF THE STATES REPRESENTED HERE. BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO IMPOSE BARRIERS ON OUR OWN PEOPLES, THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE, OF NORTH AMERICA - AND OF EAST ASIA AND OTHER REGIONS AS WELL -- HAVE SEEN A RECONCILIATION OF FORMER HOSTILITIES AND A DRAMATIC EXPANSION OF PROSPERITY AND INVENTION. THEIR SUCCESS -- THE EXCITEMENT OF THEIR ADVANCES -- IS BUILT UPON THE IDEA AND VALUES CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, INCLUDING A BELIEF:

-- IN HUMAN PROGRESS,

-- IN INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM,

-- IN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, AND

-- IN THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND CREATIVE GENIUS INHERENT IN INDIVIDUAL MEN AND WOMEN.

WE IN AMERICA LOOK TO A TIME WHEN ALL THE PEOPLES IN THE COMMUNITY OF CSCE CAN SHARE IN THIS SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND CREATIVITY AND CAN PARTICIPATE IN A SIMILAR RELEASE OF INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL ENERGY. OUR GOAL IS A FUTURE IN WHICH THE PEOPLES OF ALL THE STATES REPRESENTED HERE, BOTH LARGE AND SMALL, CAN FLOURISH -- AND BY DOING SO, CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE SECURE PEACE AND AN EXPANDED FREEDOM. THAT IS THE PROMISE OF HELSINKI. IT IS OUR COMMON COMMITMENT TO SEE THAT IT IS FULFILLED.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Plenary Session

November 10, 1986
Vienna, Austria

Mr. Chairman:

Today we begin a critically important stage of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting - the review of implementation. This review permits us to measure how well, or how badly, the participating States have complied with the commitments which they undertook of their own free will on August 1, 1975. It provides us an opportunity to look backward and inward - to assess how far we have come so we can know how far we still have to go. As Secretary Shultz said in this hall last Wednesday, "To meet the commitments to security and freedom contained in the Helsinki Final Act...we must look to the past and the present as well as to the future. We cannot and should not pass lightly over our experiences and our disappointments of the last decade."

Since the beginning of the Helsinki process, it has been the policy of the United States to speak out about the violation of commitments. It remains our policy today. Openness and candor can identify problems, focus concerns, and point the way to solutions. Speaking out also keeps faith with those who are restrained or even prevented from speaking out themselves - those who are the victims of the very abuses we must condemn at this meeting. As Elie Wiesel, Nobel Laureate and chronicler of the Holocaust, has said, "Silence never helps a victim."

Today, Mr. Chairman, I will set forth the general American view of human rights and their importance, of the disappointing record of Eastern compliance, of the vital relationship between human rights and security, and of how improvement in the future might be possible. In a statement later this week I will return to a more specific examination of these topics. And tomorrow the Vice Chairman of the U. S. Delegation, Congressman Steny Hoyer, will continue our presentation. He brings to this effort the perspective of an elected representative of the American people and of the Co-Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The relationship between the individual and the state is a critical part of the Western tradition itself. Nearly two and a half millennia ago, Aristotle, in his Nichomachean Ethics, said, "If liberty and equality...are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost." That relationship was at the heart of the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and the other English and French philosophers who had such a profound effect on the American Revolution. Thomas Jefferson, the author of our

Declaration of Independence, believed that "the care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government." This Western tradition of individualism found a response in the East as well. Lev Nicolayevich Tolstoy wrote, "The subject of history is the life of peoples and of humanity."

There is not one of the 35 participating States whose political traditions do not reflect, at least to some degree, a recognition of the responsibilities of the state toward the individual. There is not one of us who can truthfully argue that the prerogatives of the state should override the rights of its citizens. The Final Act is proof of that. It is a profoundly individualistic document. It is about people: their aspiration for peace, their yearning for a fuller life, their desire for closer contact with each other, their rights.

And yet, in overwhelming measure, the record contradicts the commitments of the Helsinki document and the promises of certain of its signatories. Human rights are being massively violated.

-- First, in Afghanistan over 100,000 Soviet troops invaded and occupied a sovereign country in violation of nearly every principle of the Final Act and in the face of the consistent condemnation of the world community. That condemnation was expressed just last week by 122 members of the United Nations.

The brutality of this Soviet action - and the total lack of remorse, repentance, or restitution - recalls the similarly unrectified incorporation by force of the free republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union in 1940.

-- Second, men and women who believed in the Helsinki commitments of their governments have been made to suffer for their beliefs. No fewer than 41 Helsinki Monitors are incarcerated in the Soviet Union. Similar punishment has been visited on members of the Group for the Establishment of Trust between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., whose genuine aspirations for peace were not satisfied by the committee established by the Soviet government to propagate the official Soviet position on peace. Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner are under house arrest in the closed city of Gorky. In Czechoslovakia the more than 1,000 people who signed Charter 77 are still subjected to harassment, persecution, and sometimes arrest; only weeks before this Vienna meeting began, seven members of the Jazz Section, a group dedicated to spreading independent culture, were detained. Yesterday, November 9, marked the tenth anniversary of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, the largest of the Soviet Helsinki groups. Of the 37 members of this group, all but one has been imprisoned or exiled.

-- Third, human contacts provisions of the Helsinki document are consistently honored in the breach, particularly by the Soviet

Union. Spouses and other close family members are denied the right to join relatives and are deprived of work and sustenance because they want to join them. Cancer victims are cruelly denied the opportunity of alternative treatment in other countries, even when they have relatives there and even when their lives may depend on it.

-- Fourth, national minorities - whether they be Jews, Turks, Hungarians, Germans, or others - are denied their identity, including their national culture, religion, and customs. In North America and most of Europe diversity is seen as a blessing and a strength, not as a challenge or a threat. Why not everywhere?

-- Fifth, the right to emigration - guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose provisions are incorporated in the Helsinki Final Act - is callously manipulated by the Soviet Union at a tragic cost to human beings. Jews, Armenians, Germans, and others have found their hopes for emigration dashed by Soviet visa officials, who replicate the tyranny of the petty bureaucrats in Gogol's satires and who act on orders from above. Travel is relatively unhindered in several Communist allies of the Soviet Union. why not in the country which claims preeminence among them?

-- And sixth, tens - perhaps hundreds - of millions of people in the Soviet Union and parts of Eastern Europe are deprived of means of communication which are sanctioned by the Final Act and other international agreements. Mail is delivered - or not delivered - at the whim of the censors, who first violate its private and personal character by reading it. The effect on the Soviet people of radio broadcasts in Russian and other Soviet languages of the Voice of America, the BBC, and Deutsche Welle is so feared by the authorities that they jam them at a cost which exceeds the cost of the broadcasts themselves. Free societies have no such fear of Radio Moscow, which can reach anybody with a short-wave radio, easily available in the West at a cost of about $30.00.

These violations speak for themselves. They must be reversed because they are a threat to the Helsinki process. They must be reversed because they contradict the tradition of respect for citizens' rights which has been the glory of the European political tradition. They must be reversed because they will make it impossible for the violating states to have the kind of dialogue and relationship which they profess to want with their Western neighbors. Positive action to reverse them will find a positive response from the American people and the American government.

Mr. Chairman:

We have grown accustomed in the Helsinki process to hearing the assertion from the Soviet side that Western countries have exaggerated the importance of human rights at the expense of security. Now we have begun to hear a more realistic view: that human rights and security are linked. We welcome Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement at the United Nations that "a comprehensive system of international security is inconceivable without wide-ranging and open cooperation in the humanitarian field." And we welcome his statement in Vienna that "the Soviet Union attaches paramount significance to the seventh principle of the Helsinki Final Act."

The United States has always considered human rights and security as inextricably linked. Our own revolutionary tradition is founded on the proposition that "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are a fundamental guarantee of our national security. We believe that peace is a basic human right. That belief is at the heart of President Reagan's vision of drastic reductions in nuclear weaponry. It informed his approach to Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva and Reykjavik; it informed Secretary Shultz's approach to Mr. Shevardnadze here last week.

We believe also that there is a vital connection between a state's approach toward human rights domestically and its conduct internationally. If a state is pathologically distrustful of its own citizens, is it not prone to a certain paranoia in its foreign policy? If a state does not earn the trust of its own citizens, should it have the confidence of other states? If a state is a threat to its own people, can it fail to present a potential threat to peoples beyond its borders?

The dilemma is an old one. In 1851, the great political theorist and revolutionary Alexander Herzen described from exile his country, the Russia of Tsar Nicholas I: "Russia's future will be a great danger for Europe and a great misfortune for Russia if there is no emancipation of the individual."

The world is at a moment in history when its peoples understand as never before the fragility of their security, threatened alike by the power of nuclear weaponry and the danger of regional conflict. Surely this is a time for cooperation for the sake of security, as the very title of this Conference implies. But cooperation among governments is difficult without trust. And trust is difficult without the assurance that a government will keep its word. And such assurance is difficult if governments have not kept their word in the past. That is why the violation of human rights commitments imperils security itself.

Mr. Chairman:

I have documented several major categories of human rights violations of the Helsinki Final Act. Serious as they are, they represent only a partial list. What can be done about them?

First, the human rights situation in a particular country is inevitably linked to the political conditions in that country. The great figures in the human rights movements of their countries - Sakharov, Orlov, Shcharansky, Walesa - have emphasized the necessity of changing those conditions. As Lech Walesa put it two months ago after the Polish government took the commendable step of announcing amnesty for political prisoners: "All Poles want to have a chance to work for their country, while at the same time hold their own views. In other words, only the road of social pluralism can lead to a situation in which prisons will not be refilled very soon again with political prisoners." And as Andrei Sakharov said in his letter last February to General Secretary Gorbachev: "There should not be any prisoners of conscience at all in a just society."

And second, violations of human rights cannot be set right by meetings, by promises, or by additional commitments - however valuable these may be in themselves. We welcome Mr. Shevardnadze's promise of legislative and administrative measures to resolve problems of family reunification and mixed marriages. And we note with interest his proposal for a Moscow conference on humanitarian cooperation; we will have more to say about it when the stage for new proposals arrives. But these gestures cannot substitute for compliance with commitments already undertaken at Helsinki and Madrid. The test of a country's good faith is its specific compliance with its international obligations.

Mr. Chairman:

The dialectic of history does not support those who would deny the rights of others. For freedom is an internal, as well as an external, condition. Spartacus, though a slave, died a free man. Christ, though martyred on the cross, liberated millions through the convictions with which he had liberated himself. Giordano Bruno, though burned as a heretic for asserting that the sun is the center of the universe, bequeathed to future generations the heritage of free scientific inquiry. Nelson Mandela, though silent in a South African prison, speaks for us all on behalf of political freedom.

Yuri Orlov, who honored us with his presence as a guest of the American Delegation at last week's open sessions of this meeting, put it this way. Despite his nine years in a Soviet labor camp and internal exile, Yuri Orlov told us that he never felt himself a prisoner. He said that a person's freedom cannot be defined by others, that a person's freedom is what is inside himself.

Three hundred years ago, a French woman named Jeanne Guyon, a prisoner in the Castle of Vincennes in the age of Louis XIV, wrote a poem called "A Prisoner's Song." In it she said:

> "But though my wing is closely bound
> My heart's at liberty.
> My prison walls cannot control
> The flight, the freedom of the soul."

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HON. STENY H. HOYER
CO-CHAIRMAN
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
AND
VICE-CHAIRMAN
U.S. CSCE DELEGATION

CSCE SPEECH
VIENNA, AUSTRIA
NOVEMBER 11, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN, FELLOW DELEGATES . . . I COME BEFORE YOU TODAY IN TWO CAPACITIES -- AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION THAT MONITORS THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, AND AS VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. CSCE DELEGATION.

BUT WHILE I WEAR TWO HATS, I SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE -- A VOICE SHARED BY AMERICANS AND OUR FRIENDS IN EUROPE. I SPEAK WITH THE FIRM CONVICTION THAT PEACE AND SECURITY CAN BE REALIZED, BUT ONLY IF A REDUCTION IN ARMS IS ACCOMPANIED BY AN INCREASE IN CONFIDENCE BETWEEN NATIONS.

FORTY-ONE YEARS AGO, IN 1945, OUR WAR-TORN WORLD ENTERED A NEW ERA IN HISTORY. NEVER AGAIN WOULD MANKIND LIVE WITHOUT THE THREATENING SHADOW OF THE MUSHROOM CLOUD. DO AS WE MAY WITH THE WEAPONS, WE ARE FACED WITH ONE BRUTAL AND INESCAPABLE FACT:

THAT THE SAME SCIENCE WHICH HAS GIVEN US THE ABILITY TO SHAPE OUR WORLD HAS ALSO GIVEN US THE TERRIBLE POTENTIAL TO DESTROY IT.

FEW PEOPLE UNDERSTOOD THIS TERRIBLE POTENTIAL BETTER THAN ALBERT EINSTEIN. HE LIVED DAILY KNOWING WHAT COULD BE DONE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE HE HAD, IN ALL GOOD FAITH, HELPED TO DISCOVER. YET HE ALSO KNEW THAT HIS WORK WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE CRISIS. NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HE SAID, ARE NOT A NEW PROBLEM -- THEY MERELY MAKE THE SOLUTION OF EXISTING PROBLEMS ALL THE MORE URGENT. AND THAT REMAINS THE SITUATION TODAY.

LAST MONTH, A RAY OF HOPE SEEMED TO BREAK THROUGH THE NUCLEAR SHADOW AS WE WATCHED TWO LEADERS IN REYKJAVIK SPEAK OF ELIMINATING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND WHILE MUCH MORE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE, I KNOW I SPEAK FOR MANY IN SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE A DARK MOMENT IN HISTORY IF WE DID NOT SEIZE THE POSSIBILITIES OF REYKJAVIK TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

BUT WE MUST BE CAREFUL HERE -- WE MUST HEED ALBERT EINSTEIN'S WORDS. FOR WE MUST REALIZE THAT SIGNING AN ACCORD TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MAKE PEACE. AGREEMENTS ARE NECESSARY, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT. THE POTENTIAL FOR AGGRESSION AND THE THREAT OF DESTRUCTION WILL STILL EXIST. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT WEAPONS THEMSELVES DO NOT CAUSE POLITICAL TENSIONS. THEY ARE MERELY AN UNFORTUNATE RESULT OF SUCH TENSIONS. WE CAN HAVE ALL THE TREATIES WE WANT, BUT THEY MEAN LITTLE WITHOUT TRUST BETWEEN THE NATIONS THAT SIGN THEM.

ELEVEN YEARS AGO, THE HELSINKI ACCORDS OFFERED US A WAY OUT OF THIS DILEMMA. THEY DEFINED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AS MORE THAN A FUNCTION OF TANKS AND SOLDIERS. REDUCING MILITARY TENSIONS IS INDEED IMPORTANT. BUT CONFIDENCE ALSO RESTS UPON RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.

NOW CONFIDENCE CAN BE BUILT IN MANY WAYS -- THROUGH ECONOMIC COOPERATION, CULTURAL EXCHANGE, PERSON-TO-PERSON CONTACTS. WE HAVE SEEN SOME POSITIVE RESULTS IN THESE AREAS OVER THE PAST DECADE. AND RECENTLY, WITH THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT, WE REACHED CONSENSUS ON MEASURES TO IMPROVE MILITARY CONFIDENCE BY REDUCING THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

BUT WE SHOULD NOT LET THESE SMALL STEPS FORWARD AND THE RENEWED EAST-WEST DIALOGUE LULL US INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. FOR WE ALL KNOW WHAT STILL IS MISSING: PERFORMANCE IN THE ONE AREA THAT BUILDS CONFIDENCE THE MOST -- HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE HELSINKI ACCORDS WERE BUILT AROUND ONE CENTRAL IDEA: A NATION THAT DOES NOT RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME INSPIRES LITTLE CONFIDENCE THAT IT WILL COMPLY WITH COMMITMENTS ABROAD. NATIONS WITH OPEN, DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS -- WHERE INDIVIDUALS CAN TALK, THINK, AND BELIEVE WITHOUT FEAR -- THESE ARE THE NATIONS FROM WHICH WE HAVE LITTLE TO FEAR. BUT NATIONS THAT ARE CLOSED AND REPRESSIVE, WHERE LEADERS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO NO ONE BUT THEMSELVES -- THESE ARE THE MOST DIFFICULT TO TRUST.

SO TOGETHER WE HAVE COME TO VIENNA TO REVIEW THE RECORD -- WHETHER, HOW, AND IF CONFIDENCE HAS BEEN BUILT BETWEEN THE SIGNATORY NATIONS -- AND WHETHER NATIONS ARE FULFILLING THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS.

THIS IS THE REAL STORY OF VIENNA -- IT IS A STORY OF HOW NATIONS FULFILL THEIR PROMISES. IT IS A TALE OF TWO EUROPES -- OR, PERHAPS MORE PRECISELY, A TALE OF ONE EUROPE ARTIFICIALLY DIVIDED IN TWO.

IN ONE EUROPE, PEOPLE CAN FREELY TALK ABOUT ANY TOPIC AND COMMUNICATE WITH WHOMEVER THEY WISH. BUT IN THE OTHER EUROPE -- THE EUROPE OF REALITY FOR MILLIONS OF PEOPLE -- BROADCASTS ARE JAMMED, MAIL INTERCEPTED, AND PHONE CONVERSATIONS CUT OFF AND MONITORED.

IN ONE EUROPE, ANYONE CAN HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AND HAVE DISCUSSIONS THAT REVEAL A WORLD FULL OF IDEAS. IN THE OTHER EUROPE, EXPRESSING THOSE SAME IDEAS MIGHT LEAD TO SOMEONE'S IMPRISONMENT IN A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL.

AND IN ONE EUROPE, OFFICIALS TRAVEL FREELY AND SPEAK ABOUT WHAT THEIR PEOPLE NEED. IN THE OTHER EUROPE, BORDERS ARE CLOSED, NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS CRUSHED, AND ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES ARE FORCIBLY SUPPRESSED.

IT IS TIME TO RECOGNIZE THAT WHAT DIVIDES THESE TWO EUROPES -- AND WHAT KEEPS US FROM ACHIEVING TRUE SECURITY AND COOPERATION -- IS THE WAY THE EAST HAS IGNORED ITS COMMITMENT TO RESPECT HUMAN DIGNITY.

NOW THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT WE DO NOT WELCOME NEW SIGNS OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN OPENNESS. A PEARL WILL SHINE ONLY WHEN THE SHELL IS OPEN, AND WE ENCOURAGE THAT. BUT OFFERS OF GOOD WILL ARE NOT ENOUGH. WE CAN NOT LIVE BY PROMISES ALONE. FOR ELEVEN YEARS NOW, 35 SIGNATORIES HAVE AGREED TO HUNDREDS OF GOOD WORDS AND PROMISES. BUT IF SOME NATIONS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THEIR OWN CREDIBILITY -- AND ABOUT REAL PEACE -- NOW IS THE TIME FOR ACTIONS.

THERE ARE FEW THINGS THAT BETTER ILLUSTRATE THE GULF BETWEEN WORD AND ACTION THAN THE FATE OF SOVIET HELSINKI MONITORS. THESE ARE PEOPLE WHO CAUGHT THE BREEZE OF LIBERTY FROM HELSINKI, AND THEY SET ABOUT THE TASK OF FREEING THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS FROM THE TYRANNY OF THE STATE. TO THEM, THESE ACCORDS MEANT HOPE -- THEY WERE MORE THAN EMPTY PROMISES UNDERTAKEN FOR CYNICAL REASONS.

SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY TOLD THE TRUTH, NOT ONE SOVIET HELSINKI MONITOR HAS BEEN SPARED HARASSMENT AND SUFFERING. FORTY-ONE REMAIN CONFINED IN THE LONELY, COLD, AND GRAY OF THE GULAG. ANATOLY SCHARANSKY'S FORMER CELLMATE -- VIKTORAS PETKUS, THE FOUNDER OF THE LITHUANIAN GROUP -- REMAINS IN

PRISON, SERVING A 15-YEAR SENTENCE. ANATOLY MARCHENKO, A DEAR FRIEND OF YURI ORLOV AND A MOSCOW HELSINKI MONITOR, HAS ENTERED THE FOURTH MONTH OF A HUNGER STRIKE TO PROTEST WORSENING CONDITIONS FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS. SOME, LIKE THE THREE UKRAINIAN MONITORS WHO DIED IN CAMP, WILL NEVER MAKE IT OUT.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, THEIR TREATMENT DOES NOT INSPIRE MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

FOR THESE PEOPLE -- THESE HELSINKI MONITORS -- THEIR ONLY CRIME WAS SEEING THINGS AS THEY COULD BE, AND ASKING "WHY NOT." AND SO IT IS IN THEIR BEHALF THAT THE REST OF US WHO LIVE IN FREEDOM MUST SPEAK OUT AND, FOR THEM, ASK "WHY NOT." WE MUST INSIST UPON ANSWERS. WE ASK WHY THE HELSINKI HUMAN RIGHTS PROMISES -- WHICH THE SOVIET AND EAST BLOC COUNTRIES ENTERED INTO FREELY -- HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED. WE CANNOT BE NUMBED BY THE CHILL OF NON-COMPLIANCE. IF THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO BUILD TRUST WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD, WE ARE FORCED TO ASK WHY -- AND WHY NOT.

ONLY THREE YEARS AGO, AT THE MADRID MEETING, ALL 35 SIGNATORY NATIONS ADOPTED NEW HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS, ADDING TO THE ONES MADE IN HELSINKI. BUT IN THOSE THREE YEARS, DESPITE THE NEW PROMISES, WE HAVE SEEN LITTLE CHANGE FROM WHAT EXISTED BEFORE.

IN FACT, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND

EASTERN EUROPE HAVE CONTINUED AND IN SOME CASES WORSENED. RARELY HAVE WE HAD CAUSE TO WELCOME THE REUNIFICATION OF A FAMILY, THE RELEASE OF A PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE, OR IMPROVEMENTS IN CIVIL OR NATIONAL RIGHTS. INSTEAD, THE AUTHORITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO DIVIDE FAMILIES, ARREST DISSIDENTS, AND PASS EVEN MORE ORWELLIAN LEGISLATION THAT GIVES THE AUTHORITIES THE RIGHT TO PERPETUALLY IMPRISON THOSE WHO DISAGREE.

THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES MUST BE HELD PARTICULARLY ACCOUNTABLE. THEY CONTINUE TO DENY FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE, AND HAVE ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO DENY HUMAN AND NATIONAL DIGNITY TO THEIR NEIGHBORS. FROM MOSCOW TO AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIET UNION PROMISES LIBERATION BUT DELIVERS MISERY.

JUST CONSIDER THE PLIGHT OF THE 78 SOVIET PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE THE U.S. DELEGATION NAMED AT THE MADRID MEETING. FOUR DIED FROM INHUMANE TREATMENT, A MAJORITY ARE STILL IN PRISON, NINE WERE RETRIED AND RESENTENCED, AND MOST WHO HAVE FINISHED THEIR SENTENCES NOW LIVE IN HARDSHIP.

TO THOSE OF US WHO APPRECIATE FREEDOM, THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF ALL THIS CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS CRUEL. AND SO WE ASK WHY. WHY MUST BABIES BE BORN APART FROM THEIR FATHERS? WHY MUST THE FAITHFUL HIDE THEIR PRAYERS OR FACE IMPRISONMENT? WHY MUST PEOPLE WHO WANT TO LEAVE BE KEPT IN AGAINST THEIR WILL? HEARTFELT QUESTIONS, HEARTLESS ANSWERS.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT BEEN THE ONLY COUNTRY TO TIGHTEN INTERNAL CONTROLS SINCE MADRID. OTHERS CONTINUE TO VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THEIR CITIZENS -- THOUGH NON-COMPLIANCE VARIES IN DEGREE FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. TO OUR EARS THE FAMILIAR LITANY OF ABUSES CAN BE DEADENING. BUT TO EACH VICTIM EVERY BLOW TO HUMAN DIGNITY IS SHARP AND PERSONAL.

IN BULGARIA, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENT SPENT THE YEAR FOLLOWING MADRID ENGAGING IN A BRUTAL CAMPAIGN TO FORCIBLY ASSIMILATE ETHNIC TURKS -- A CAMPAIGN THAT HAS NOT ENDED.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA -- WHICH CONTINUES TODAY TO PERSECUTE AND IMPRISON ACTIVISTS FROM CHARTER 77 AND VONS -- IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO SILENCE THE JAZZ SECTION.

ROMANIA -- A NATION THAT HAS ALLOWED MANY TO EMIGRATE -- STILL OBSTRUCTS THE FREE MOVEMENT OF ITS PEOPLE. SOME STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THE AREA OF RELIGION. YET THE U.S. CONGRESS CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED WITH HUMAN, RELIGIOUS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN ROMANIA, AND HAS URGED THAT THESE ISSUES BE RAISED HERE IN VIENNA.

IN POLAND, WHILE NO GENUINE DIALOGUE YET EXISTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS PEOPLE, THE RECENT RELEASE OF 225 PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE WAS A WELCOME STEP FORWARD. BUT LEGISLATION CONTINUES TO RESTRICT HUMAN, CIVIL AND TRADE UNION

RIGHTS. AND IN THE POST-MADRID PERIOD, SOLIDARITY AND OPPOSITION ACTIVISTS HAVE BEEN THE TARGETS OF DISCRIMINATION, ABUSE AND IMPRISONMENT.

ANOTHER COUNTRY MAINTAINS BARRIERS -- BUREAUCRATIC AND PHYSICAL -- THAT SEPARATE ITS CITIZENS FROM THEIR RELATIVES AND FRIENDS, AND OBSTRUCT THE SHARING OF THEIR COMMON CULTURE.

IN YET ANOTHER -- WHERE COMPLIANCE WITH MADRID AND HELSINKI PLEDGES IS RELATIVELY GOOD -- THE POST-MADRID YEARS HAVE NEVERTHELESS SEEN HARASSMENT OF INTELLECTUALS ENGAGED IN UNOFFICIAL PUBLISHING.

NOW THESE BROAD BRUSHSTROKES COMBINE TO MAKE A VERY GRAY PORTRAIT OF LIFE IN THE EAST. THERE ARE GLIMMERS OF HOPE -- IN SOVIET PROMISES, FOR EXAMPLE, THOUGH WE'VE HEARD THEM BEFORE. AND SOMEHOW, OUT OF THE RUBBLE OF DESPAIR, BRAVE MEN AND WOMEN CONTINUE TO RISK THEIR SAFETY TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. WE ALSO GAIN INSPIRATION FROM THE COMMITTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD WHO SELFLESSLY GATHER EVIDENCE AND KEEP THE FLAME OF HELSINKI ALIVE.

SO THE QUESTION IS -- KNOWING ALL THIS, KNOWING THE GRIM FACTS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

FIRST, WE MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION WANTS TO REDUCE TENSION AND BUILD CONFIDENCE WITH THE OTHER

NATIONS OF THE WORLD, THEY MUST MAKE BOLD STEPS TO FULFILL THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS. AND THAT MEANS NOW, NOT TOMORROW, NOT DEPENDENT ON FUTURE DISCUSSIONS.

AND WE MUST ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT THEY CANNOT SIMULTANEOUSLY SEEK COOPERATION WITH THE WEST WHEN IT SERVES THEIR INTERESTS, AND IGNORE THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS THAT SPLIT US APART. THE HELSINKI PROCESS CANNOT SUSTAIN SUCH AN IMBALANCE.

WE IN THE WEST -- IN THE U.S. -- WE BELIEVE IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS AS A BALANCED APPROACH TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. BUT SOVIET AND EAST BLOC NON-COMPLIANCE DEFIES THIS HOPE. IT HAS EVEN FORCED SOME TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WHOLE PROCESS.

IF THE SOVIET UNION WANTS TO MAKE HELSINKI WORK -- TO MAKE PEACE WORK -- IF THEY WANT REAL DISARMAMENT -- THEN THEY MUST FIRST RESPECT HUMAN ASPIRATIONS, FREEDOMS, AND DIGNITY.

THANK YOU.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WARREN ZIMMERMANN
CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING

VIENNA, AUSTRIA NOVEMBER 14, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN:

EARLY THIS WEEK I SPOKE IN BROAD TERMS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE -- AND THE LACK -- OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. TODAY I WILL TALK ABOUT SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO ARE THE VICTIMS OF THIS LACK OF COMPLIANCE -- PEOPLE WHO ARE SUFFERING NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE TRAITORS, SPIES, OR CRIMINALS, BUT BECAUSE THEY HAVE SPOKEN OUT FOR THEIR OWN RIGHTS AND FOR THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS.

I DO THIS BECAUSE, IN ALL THE DISCUSSIONS OF LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS, OBLIGATIONS, AND PROMISES, WE CAN EASILY FORGET THE HUMAN FACTOR. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS ABOUT PEOPLE. THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT TO FOCUS OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE ON

INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE AND ON WHAT THE VIOLATION OF HELSINKI COMMITMENTS CAN MEAN TO THEM. I WILL ALSO REFER TO SOME POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING SOME OF THESE PEOPLE WHO HAVE SPOKEN OUT. UNFORTUNATELY, THE NEGATIVE RECORD STILL OVERWHELMS THE FEW POSITIVE SIGNS.

IN THE SOVIET UNION, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE ARE TYPICALLY SENTENCED TO A PERIOD IN A LABOR CAMP, FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD IN INTERNAL EXILE. WHAT IS THE REALITY OF THESE WORDS "LABOR CAMP" AND "EXILE"? I CITE A CAMP IN SOVIET MOLDAVIA DESCRIBED LAST WEEK HERE IN VIENNA BY A WOMAN WHO WAS SENTENCED THERE FOR HER ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE DIET IN THE CAMP WAS TWO MEALS OF A CEREAL WITHOUT SUGAR OR FAT, A CEREAL SO GLUEY THAT IT WAS USED AS A PASTE TO FILL THE CRACKS IN THE BARRACK WALLS, AND ONE MEAL OF A THIN GRUEL AND BREAD. ON THIS DIET, THE WOMEN WORKED IN BADLY LIT, FREEZING BARRACKS, SEWING SOLDIERS' UNIFORMS AND GLOVES. THEY WERE PERMITTED TO WASH THEMSELVES ONLY EVERY TEN DAYS. THEIR UNIFORM WAS A SCANTY COTTON DRESS THAT HAD TO LAST SIX MONTHS, AND A KAPOK COAT. ANOTHER WOMAN DESCRIBED A MEDICAL EXAMINATION BY A CAMP DOCTOR DURING WHICH SHE LAY NAKED ON AN EXAMINATION TABLE TAUNTED BY MALE GUARDS. ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKY HAS TOLD OF BEING HANDCUFFED TO A WALL WHILE GUARDS BEAT HIS HEAD UP AND DOWN AGAINST THE CEMENT FLOOR. YURI ORLOV, WITH HIS METICULOUS REGARD FOR EXACTNESS, TOLD ME THAT

IN HIS CAMP HE WAS NOT BEATEN BY GUARDS, BUT RATHER BY THE BETTER FED, BETTER CLOTHED CRIMINAL PRISONERS WHILE THE GUARDS STOOD BY AND WATCHED.

AN EXILE IS ONLY SLIGHTLY BETTER OFF. HE OR SHE IS TYPICALLY SENT TO A FREEZING, DESOLATE, ISOLATED PLACE, A TOWN OR VILLAGE WITH SHORT FOOD SUPPLIES AND POOR ACCOMMODATIONS. THE POLICE WARN OFF KINDLY PEOPLE WHO MIGHT SEEK TO BEFRIEND HIM. ORLOV DESCRIBED HAVING TO LIVE IN A DORMITORY, WITH ITS FILTH, DRUNKENNESS, AND CONSTANT UPROAR. HE DESCRIBED THE HARASSMENT BY THE LOCAL KGB, THE SLANDER THEY SPREAD TO KEEP HIM ISOLATED FROM NORMAL CITIZENS. HE WAS IN AGONY FROM HIS TEETH, BROKEN AND ROTTING FROM HIS TREATMENT IN THE CAMP. BUT THERE WAS NO DENTIST IN HIS DISTRICT AND HE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO GO TO THE NEAREST CITY TO FIND ONE.

THE WORDS "LABOR CAMP" AND "EXILE" SHOULD NOT PASS THROUGH THE MIND WITHOUT CALLING UP IMAGES SUCH AS THESE.

NOW LET ME TALK ABOUT PEOPLE. YOU MUST THINK OF EACH ONE OF THESE PEOPLE BOTH AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND AS A SYMBOL FOR OTHERS IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS. I BEGIN WITH ANATOLIY MARCHENKO, WHO CO-FOUNDED THE MOSCOW HELSINKI MONITORING GROUP IN 1976. SENTENCED IN 1981 TO TEN YEARS' LABOR CAMP AND FIVE YEARS' EXILE FOR THE PUBLICATION OF SAMIZDAT ARTICLES AND HIS MEMOIRS, MARCHENKO HAS BEEN BEATEN, DENIED VISITS AND CORRESPONDENCE, AND PUT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT. SERIOUSLY ILL, HE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM A LABOR CAMP IN PERM IN OCTOBER 1985 TO EVEN HARSHER CONDITIONS IN CHISTOPOL PRISON. IN AN APPEAL TO THIS VIENNA MEETING, HE ANNOUNCED A HUNGER STRIKE ON AUGUST 4 OF THIS YEAR AND DEMANDED THE PUNISHMENT OF THE GUARDS WHO ATTACKED HIM. ALSO IN CHISTOPOL PRISON, AND ALSO ILL AND MALTREATED, IS POET VIKTOR NEKIPELOV, CONVICTED BECAUSE HIS POETRY CONTAINED "SLANDEROUS PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS."

IVAN KOVALEV AND HIS WIFE, TATIANA OSIPOVA, WERE CONVICTED FOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS THEY HAD MADE AS MEMBERS OF THE MOSCOW HELSINKI GROUP. ANDREI SAKHAROV'S LETTER LAST FEBRUARY TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV DESCRIBED THEIR CASE IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

> "THE PLIGHT OF THIS YOUNG COUPLE, SEPARATED FOR MANY YEARS, ILLUSTRATES THE ILLEGALITY AND CRUELTY OF THE PERSECUTION OF PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE. AN AFFIDAVIT ABOUT KOVALEV ISSUED BY THE CAMP AUTHORITIES STATES THAT HE WAS REPEATEDLY CONFINED IN A PUNISHMENT CELL AND SUBJECTED TO OTHER PENALTIES BECAUSE HE DID NOT CHANGE HIS BELIEFS. WHAT IDIOTS THE CAMP OVERSEERS ARE! DURING TANYA OSIPOVA'S PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION, HER INTERROGATOR THREATENED THAT SHE WOULD NOT RECEIVE NEEDED MEDICAL CARE AND THUS WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO BEAR CHILDREN UNLESS SHE COOPERATED AND ALTERED HER BELIEFS."

AFTER LONG TERMS IN LABOR CAMPS, THEY ARE NOW IN INTERNAL EXILE BUT AT LEAST TOGETHER.

DR. ANATOLIY KORYAGIN, PSYCHIATRIST, DESERVES OUR SPECIAL ATTENTION FOR HIS FIGHT AGAINST A PARTICULARLY DEGRADING VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY AND MIND-ALTERING DRUGS TO REPRESS DISSENT. HIS COURAGE WON HIM SEVEN YEARS IN THE CAMPS AND FIVE IN EXILE. BUT PUNISHMENT DID NOT SILENCE HIM. FROM THE LABOR CAMP HE SMUGGLED OUT AN APPEAL TO THE WORLD, NOT FOR HIMSELF BUT FOR VICTIMS OF SOVIET ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY. HE SAID:

> "THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE TURNED OUR MOST HUMANE BRANCH OF MEDICINE INTO AN INSTRUMENT FOR ACHIEVING A MAIN AIM OF THEIR INTERNAL POLICY -- THE SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT IN OUR COUNTRY. PSYCHIATRY IN THE TOTALITARIAN SOVIET STATE BRINGS NOT ONLY HELP TO THE ILL BUT ALSO HARM TO THE HEALTHY ... WE MUST BRAND, BRAND WITH SHAME, THOSE WHO OUT OF SELF-INTEREST OR ANTI-HUMANITARIAN MOTIVES TRAMPLE ON THE IDEALS OF JUSTICE AND ON THE DOCTOR'S SACRED OATH."

DR. KORYAGIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO AN ADDITIONAL TWO YEARS FOR "RESISTING CAMP AUTHORITIES." HE TOO WAS TRANSFERRED TO CHISTOPOL PRISON, WHERE HE TOO IS ILL.

DR. KORYAGIN WAS SPEAKING OUT FOR PEOPLE LIKE NINA KOVALENKO, AN ARTIST AND PEACE ACTIVIST, WHO WAS SENT TO THE KAS-CHENKO PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL JUST SEVEN WEEKS AGO FOR PUBLICLY SUPPORTING THE ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT NICHOLAS DANILOFF. SHE IS A SLIGHT, SOFT-SPOKEN WOMAN OF 47, WITH NO HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS; YET THIS IS THE SECOND TIME THIS YEAR THAT SHE HAS BEEN PUT IN A MENTAL INSTITUTION. THIS TIME SHE WAS FORCIBLY ADMINISTERED FOUR DIFFERENT DRUGS IN SEVEN DAILY SESSIONS.

MS. KOVALENKO IS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP TO ESTABLISH TRUST BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA, AN INDEPENDENT PEACE GROUP OF CONCERNED SOVIET CITIZENS. THE OFFICIAL SOVIET VIEW OF THIS GROUP'S NON-PARTISAN, EVEN-HANDED, NON-POLEMICAL APPROACH TO THE DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL IS UNFORTUNATELY ILLUSTRATED IN THE TREATMENT RECEIVED BY MRS. KOVALENKO. IT IS A STUNNING QUESTION WHY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WHICH MAINTAINS AN OFFICIAL GROUP OF ITS OWN TO PROPAGATE ITS APPROACH TO PEACE, SHOULD PERCEIVE AN UNOFFICIAL ORGANIZATION OF PEACE ADVOCATES AS DANGEROUSLY SUBVERSIVE.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE BEEN DESCRIBING PEOPLE WHO HAVE SUFFERED FOR THEIR DEFENSE OF IDEALS: HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF CONSCIENCE, PEACE. OTHERS, WITH MORE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES, FARE

NO BETTER; FOR EXAMPLE, THOSE WHO SPEAK OUT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THEIR OWN NATIONAL MINORITY AND THOSE WHO FIGHT FOR FREEDOM TO PRACTICE THEIR RELIGION:

-- ALL THE CRIMEAN TATARS, A NATION OF ALMOST A QUARTER OF A MILLION PEOPLE, WERE SENT IN SEALED CATTLE CARS TO EXILE IN SIBERIA IN 1944 - AN ACT WHICH KILLED NEARLY HALF OF THEM. THEY ARE STILL REFUSED PERMISSION TO LIVE OR WORK IN THEIR NATIVE CRIMEA. MUSTAFA DZHEMILEV HAS GIVEN HALF HIS LIFE - SIX LABOR CAMP TERMS SINCE 1966 - DEMANDING THE RIGHT FOR HIS PEOPLE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND. HE SHOULD FINISH HIS SIXTH TERM IN TWO WEEKS' TIME BUT HE HAS NOW BEEN INDICTED FOR INSUBORDINATION, WHICH COULD LENGTHEN HIS TERM ARBITRARILY FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER TWO YEARS.

-- FOUR UKRAINIAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, OLEKSY TYKHY, YURI LYTVYN, VASYL STUS AND VALERY MARCHENKO HAVE DIED IN THE CAMPS SINCE THE MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING ENDED. LEV LUKIANENKO, MYKOLA HORBAL, IVAN KANDYBA, AND MYKHAYLO HORYN ARE STILL ALIVE, BUT ALL ARE ILL AND ALL ARE SERVING LONG SENTENCES FOR THEIR POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

-- LITHUANIAN HELSINKI MONITOR VYTAUTAS SKUODYS, AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AND ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BELIEVERS, IS IN A LABOR CAMP -- AS IS GEORGIAN MONITOR TENGHIZ GUDAVA, SENTENCED THIS PAST JUNE TO A SEVEN-YEAR TERM (PLUS THREE YEARS' INTERNAL EXILE).

-- ESTONIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST MART NIKLUS IS

REPORTED TO BE DANGEROUSLY ILL WITH UNTREATED RADICULITIS IN A SOVIET PRISON.

-- ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1983 -- JUST NINE DAYS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE MADRID MEETING -- LATVIAN HUMAN AND NATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATE GUNARS ASTRA WAS ARRESTED, CHARGED, AND LATER SENTENCED FOR "ANTI-SOVIET AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA" FOR ALLEGEDLY HARBORING SUCH "ANTI-SOVIET LITERATURE" AS GEORGE ORWELL'S 1984 AND BOOKS ABOUT THE HISTORY OF LATVIA.

-- AT THE MOMENT, ABOUT 400 RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS ARE KNOWN TO BE IMPRISONED IN THE SOVIET UNION. THEY INCLUDE ABOUT 150 BAPTISTS, AS WELL AS CATHOLICS, SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS, RUSSIAN ORTHODOX, MUSLIMS, UKRAINIAN UNIATES, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, AND HARE KRISHNAS. PASTOR VIKTOR WALTER, A PENTECOSTALIST, IS IN A LABOR CAMP FOR LEADING HIS COMMUNITY'S ATTEMPTS TO EMIGRATE.

SOVIET JEWS HAVE SUFFERED PARTICULARLY SEVERE TREATMENT OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, WITH A NEW CRACKDOWN ON JEWISH CULTURAL ACTIVISTS BEGINNING IN THE SUMMER OF 1984, AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE MADRID MEETING. THERE IS NOW A TOTAL OF ABOUT TWENTY SUCH PRISONERS, INCLUDING HEBREW TEACHERS YULIY EDELSHTEIN, IOSIF BEGUN, VLADIMIR LIFSHITS AND ALEXEI MAGARIK. EDELSHTEIN HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY BEATEN AND FELL FROM A LADDER IN FEBRUARY, SUFFERING A BROKEN LEG AND TORN URETHRA. ALEXEI

MAGARIK, WHOSE FATHER MANY OF US MET HERE IN VIENNA, IS A 27-YEAR-OLD CELLIST AND UNOFFICIAL HEBREW TEACHER FROM MOSCOW. HE WAS ARRESTED THIS MARCH FOR DRUG POSSESSION - DRUGS WHICH RELIABLE WITNESSES MAINTAIN WERE "PLANTED" IN YOUNG MAGARIK'S SUITCASE. HE IS NOW SERVING A THREE YEAR SENTENCE IN A CAMP WHERE HE HAS ALREADY BEEN SEVERELY BEATEN. I HAPPENED TO BE WITH ALEXEI'S FATHER IN LOS ANGELES LAST JUNE WHEN HE RECEIVED THE NEWS OF HIS SON'S SENTENCING. THE FATHER CARRIED OUT A ONE-WEEK HUNGER STRIKE HERE IN VIENNA TO PROTEST ALEXEI'S TREATMENT IN CAMP.

THE CASE OF THE GREAT NOBEL LAUREATE ANDREI SAKHAROV AND HIS WIFE ELENA BONNER, EXILED IN GORKY, IS A UNIQUE ONE. SINCE MRS. BONNER RETURNED FROM THE WEST, WHERE SHE WAS PERMITTED BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO RECEIVE IMPERATIVE MEDICAL TREATMENT, THE COUPLE HAS BEEN CONSTANTLY AND OVERTLY UNDER SURVEILLANCE. THEY LIVE WITH TENSION AND UNCERTAINTY. BOTH ARE HEART CASES DEPENDENT ON NITROGLYCERINE. DR. SAKHAROV HAS REFUSED TO SEE DOCTORS IN GORKY EVER SINCE HE REALIZED THAT THE KGB WAS FILMING HIM UNCLOTHED, IN THE DOCTOR'S EXAMINING ROOM, WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF THE DOCTOR HIMSELF. THE ONLY PLACE HE FEELS SURE OF DECENT MEDICAL CARE IS IN THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES HOSPITAL IN MOSCOW. THEIR SON, ALEXEI SEMYONOV, NOW AN AMERICAN

CITIZEN, CAME TO VIENNA LAST WEEK TO URGE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO LET THE COUPLE RETURN TO MOSCOW OR AT LEAST TO RECEIVE THEIR FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN GORKY. ANDREI SAKHAROV LIVES FOR OTHERS; MANY OF THE PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE I HAVE DESCRIBED TODAY WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE MOVING AMNESTY APPEAL HE MADE TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV EARLY THIS YEAR. YET HIS OWN SITUATION IS WORSENING.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

SOME PEOPLE CHOOSE TO REMAIN IN THEIR COUNTRY AND SPEAK OUT. OTHERS, BELIEVING THAT THEY CAN FIND FULFILLMENT ONLY BY LEAVING, SEEK TO EMIGRATE. THE RIGHTS OF BOTH GROUPS ARE FULLY GUARANTEED BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. BUT IN EACH CASE THOSE RIGHTS ARE BEING VIOLATED.

MANY OF US IN THIS HALL HAVE STORIES TO TELL OF RELATIVES OF THEIR OWN CITIZENS WHO ARE PREVENTED FROM JOINING THEM. IN MY OWN CASE, I CAN CITE FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE:

-- SIXTY-SEVEN YEAR OLD GALINA GOLTZMAN-MICHELSON, WHO HAS BEEN SEPARATED FROM HER AMERICAN CITIZEN HUSBAND FOR OVER 30 YEARS; THIS IS THE LONGEST-STANDING UNRESOLVED U.S.-SOVIET FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASE.

-- SEVENTY-FOUR YEAR OLD ABE STOLAR, AN AMERICAN CITIZEN WHOSE PARENTS TOOK HIM TO THE SOVIET UNION AS A CHILD IN 1931 AT WHAT SEEMED TO SOME A MORE HOPEFUL TIME. HIS WISH TO RETURN TO AMERICA HAS BEEN APPROVED, BUT HE MAY NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS OWN SON'S FAMILY.

-- ELENA BALOVLENKOV, A NURSE FROM BALTIMORE, WHOSE SOVIET HUSBAND, A COMPUTER PROGRAMMER, IS PREVENTED FROM EMIGRATING; HE HAS NOT YET SEEN HIS SECOND CHILD.

FORTUNATELY, MANY OF OUR BILATERAL FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES RECENTLY HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. BUT THIS IS NOT TRUE IN THE MORE GENERAL AREA OF EMIGRATION. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH IS INCORPORATED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, PROVIDES THAT "EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING HIS OWN, AND TO RETURN TO HIS OWN COUNTRY." FOR MANY, THAT COMMITMENT IS SIMPLY IGNORED.

VLADIMIR SLEPAK, IGOR OGURTSOV AND IDA NUDEL HAVE SERVED PRISON SENTENCES FOR THEIR BELIEFS. NOW THEY WISH TO EMIGRATE BUT CANNOT. REFUSENIKS, PARTICULARLY WELL-KNOWN ONES, LIVE ALWAYS WITH THE FEAR OF INTERROGATION. THEY ARE OFTEN SOCIAL OUTCASTS; NEIGHBORS ARE WARNED AWAY FROM THEM. BECAUSE OF THEIR APPLICATION TO EMIGRATE THEY ARE DEPRIVED OF WORK IN THEIR CHOSEN PROFESSIONS. THEY ARE STRANDED BETWEEN TWO WORLDS, FINDING A HOME IN NEITHER.

ONE SAD CATEGORY OF REFUSENIKS, FOR WHOM APPEALS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE MARGINS OF THIS MEETING, IS A GROUP OF CANCER PATIENTS -- ALL WITH RELATIVES ABROAD, AT LEAST SOME OF WHOM MAY BE SAVED IF THEY CAN GET TREATMENT IN THE WEST. THIS GROUP INCLUDES BENJAMIN CHARNY, RIMMA BRAVVE, AND LEAH MARYASIN. IT ALSO INCLUDES A WOMAN WHOSE STRENGTH OF CHARACTER HAS HAD AN INSPIRATIONAL AFFECT ON ALL WHO KNOW HER (INCLUDING MY OWN FAMILY).

HER NAME IS INNA MEIMAN. INNA IS DYING. SHE IS DYING OF DESPAIR. FOR FOUR YEARS SHE HAS FACED CANCER WITH GALLANTRY, COURAGE, AND GAIETY, AND WITH THE FAITH THAT SHE COULD AND WOULD BE CURED. BUT UNLUCKILY FOR INNA THE FEW SPECIALISTS WHO CAN TREAT HER PARTICULAR SORT OF TUMOR LIVE AND WORK IN THE WEST.

ALTHOUGH HER HUSBAND NAUM HAS A DAUGHTER IN THE UNITED STATES, PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN DENIED. NAUM KNEW THAT AS A FORMER HELSINKI MONITOR NEITHER HE NOR HIS FAMILY COULD EXPECT MUCH SYMPATHY FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. WHEN HE WAS TOLD THEY COULD NOT EMIGRATE, EITHER TO JOIN HIS DAUGHTER OR FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR INNA, HE BEGGED THAT SHE ALONE BE ALLOWED TO GO ABROAD FOR A SHORT VISIT AS A TOURIST -- AND HE WOULD GUARANTEE HER RETURN. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL REPLIED: "OF COURSE WE WILL NOT ALLOW THAT. SHE MIGHT BE CURED."

MR. CHAIRMAN:

MY STATEMENT TODAY IS INTENDED TO PUT A HUMAN FACE ON THE RECITATION OF CASES AND CATEGORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS. EVERY SINGLE PERSON I HAVE MENTIONED TODAY IS GUARANTEED RIGHTS UNDER PRINCIPLE VII, PRINCIPLE IX, OR THE THIRD BASKET OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. EVERY SINGLE ONE IS DENIED THOSE RIGHTS. I HAVE TRIED TO DESCRIBE A MEASURE OF THE SUFFERING THAT HAS ACCOMPANIED THIS FLOUTING OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS BY THE SOVIET UNION.

THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT THE PICTURE IS NOT UNIFORMLY BLACK. WE RECOGNIZE THAT POETESS IRINA RATUSHINSKAYA HAS BEEN RELEASED FROM PRISON, ALTHOUGH SHE HAS BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO TRAVEL ABROAD FOR NEEDED MEDICAL CARE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT HELSINKI MONITORS YURI ORLOV AND ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKY, JEWISH ACTIVIST BENJAMIN BOGOMOLNIY, CANCER VICTIM TATIANA KHAIFETZ, BLOOD DONOR INNA FLEROVA, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE ACTIVIST IRINA GRIVNINA, SOME MEMBERS OF THE TRUST GROUP, SEVERAL OF THE DIVIDED SPOUSES, AND SOME FEW OTHERS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE. WE HOPE THAT THIS IS A HARBINGER FOR THE FUTURE. WE HOPE THAT THE PROMISED SOVIET EMIGRATION LEGISLATION WILL ACTUALLY HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON EMIGRATION. WE WELCOME THE INCREASED SIGNS OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF A LEGITIMATE

INTERNATIONAL CONCERN FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SOVIET CITIZENS, A CONCERN EXPRESSED BY VIRTUALLY EVERY SPEAKER AT THIS VIENNA MEETING. AND WE HOPE THAT THE INCREASED OPENNESS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT -- AND OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION HERE -- TO A DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS WILL RESULT IN GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND BETTER COMPLIANCE.

THE SOVIET UNION CAN ONLY GAIN BY A RESOLUTION OF THE CASES I HAVE MENTIONED AND OF THE MANY, MANY OTHER CASES WHICH THEY SYMBOLIZE. THEIR RESOLUTION WOULD NOT THREATEN OR UNDERMINE SOVIET POWER; INDEED IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET UNION'S MORAL AUTHORITY IN THE WORLD. OLD TRADITIONS DIE HARD; BUT A NEW LEADERSHIP CAN BRING A NEW APPROACH - AN APPROACH BASED ON TOLERANCE, HUMANITY, AND RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL. I CAN IMAGINE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE WELCOMED BY THE SOVIET PEOPLE. I CAN GUARANTEE THAT IT WOULD BE WELCOMED BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. AND I CAN PREDICT THAT IT WOULD BE WELCOMED BY THE PEOPLE OF ALL THE OTHER STATES REPRESENTED HERE.

STATEMENT BY WARREN ZIMMERMANN
HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION
TO THE VIENNA MEETING OF THE CSCE

NOVEMBER 21, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE MY DELEGATION'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBSIDIARY MEETINGS MANDATED BY THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

FIRST, WITH RESPECT TO THE ATHENS EXPERTS' MEETING ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. UNFORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE ATHENS MEETING (NOR THE EARLIER MEETING IN MONTREUX IN 1978) MADE MUCH PROGRESS IN ELABORATING A GENERALLY-ACCEPTED METHOD FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. FURTHERMORE, THE ATHENS MEETING GAVE LITTLE INDICATION FOR PROGRESS IN THIS AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE GIVEN THE WIDE DIVERGENCIES IN VIEWS, PARTICULARLY IN THE MATTER OF THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT. IT MAY BE PRUDENT TO PUT THIS QUESTION ASIDE FOR AWHILE UNTIL A MORE PROPITIOUS TIME.

NEXT, THE VENICE SEMINAR ON ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS USEFUL AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE VALLETTA EXPERTS MEETING. HAVING HAD TWO MEETINGS IN THE CSCE ON THIS ISSUE, WE SHOULD EVALUATE WHETHER ANOTHER MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE USEFUL IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT FOR A TIME.

THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS' MEETING PRODUCED A LIVELY AND USEFUL DISCUSSION IN DEPTH OF THE CRITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS WHICH BESET AND UNDERMINE THE CSCE PROCESS. ISSUES RANGING FROM REPRESSION OF HELSINKI MONITORS, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE, RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION TO SUPPRESSION OF NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS AND TRADE UNION FREEDOMS DOMINATED THE DISCUSSION.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE OTTAWA MEETING DID NOT PRODUCE ANY CONCRETE RESULTS IN TERMS OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONDITION OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS FAILURE LIES WITH A SMALL GROUP OF PARTICIPATING STATES, WHICH REFUSED TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY OTTAWA TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE THE CONDITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEIR COUNTRIES.

HOWEVER, ONE IMPORTANT LEGACY OF THE OTTAWA MEETING FOR VIENNA WAS A COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENT PUT FORWARD BY SEVENTEEN WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH REFLECTED THEIR COMMON HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA.

WE ASSESS THE RESULTS OF THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM POSITIVELY EVEN THOUGH IT, LIKE OTTAWA, DID NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON A FINAL DOCUMENT. WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE HOST AUTHORITIES DID NOT LIVE UP TO EXPECTATION IN

PROVIDING NORMAL CONDITIONS FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER PRIVATE CITIZENS - A FACT WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN WE COME TO A CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE MEETINGS PROPOSED BY EASTERN COUNTRIES. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT AT BUDAPEST SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES ORGANIZED BY THESE GROUPS DID TAKE PLACE ALBEIT UNDER STRESSFUL CONDITIONS.

AS TO THE FORUM ITSELF, IT PROVIDED A UNIQUE INTERNATIONAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS OF CREATION, DISSEMINATION AND COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CULTURE. FRANK EXCHANGES TOOK PLACE ON ISSUES SUCH AS IMPRISONED CULTURAL FIGURES, THE SUPPRESSION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE, CENSORSHIP AND JAMMING, AND THE CONTRIBUTIONS THAT NATIONAL MINORITIES AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES MAKE TO CULTURE. WE LIKED THE PARTICIPATION IN THE FORUM OF CULTURAL FIGURES THEMSELVES RATHER THAN BUREAUCRATS. THE CULTURAL PERSONALITIES WHO PARTICIPATED INTRODUCED TO THE MEETING A WELCOME, SPONTANEOUS ELEMENT WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE REPEATED, AS APPROPRIATE, IN FUTURE MEETINGS OF ONE TYPE OR ANOTHER.

THE WESTERN DOCUMENT PUT FORWARD AT THE BUDAPEST MEETING OFFERS A RICH STORE OF IDEAS FOR THE VIENNA MEETING TO CONSIDER FURTHER.

THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS THAT THE BERN MEETING PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS IN SEVERAL WAYS. IT PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR A DETAILED, IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF THE RECORD IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN CONTACTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION, FAMILY VISITS, BINATIONAL MARRIAGES AND RELIGIOUS CONTACTS. THE BERN MEETING WAS ALSO MARKED BY THE RESOLUTION OF A NUMBER OF BILATERAL CASES INVOLVING A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF PEOPLE. WE PARTICULARLY WELCOME THIS LATTER DEVELOPMENT IN HOPES THAT IT MAY REPRESENT A NEW AND MORE ENLIGHTENED POLICY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION AND SOME OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES WHICH WE HOPE TO SEE CONTINUED AND EXPANDED. IN THE SAME SPIRIT, WE WERE PLEASED TO HEAR THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE YESTERDAY CONCERNING OTHER CASES, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEWS THAT THEY AND OTHERS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN REUNITED WITH THEIR FAMILIES.

OUR GDR COLLEAGUES, AND OTHERS, HAVE NOTED THAT THE ACTIONS OF ONE STATE - NO DOUBT THEY MEAN ~~WERE~~ MY OWN - PREVENTED ADDITIONAL USEFUL COMMITMENTS IN THE HUMAN CONTACTS AREA. I MUST POINT OUT THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY IS BY NO MEANS LOST. MY COUNTRY, AND OTHERS, INTENDS TO INTRODUCE A NUMBER OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INITIATIVES FROM BERN. SO THIS VIENNA MEETING WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRODUCE A BETTER RESULT IN THE AREA THAN THE PROPOSED CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AT BERN WOULD HAVE DONE.

IN SUM, THE RECORD OF EXPERTS MEETINGS SINCE MADRID HAS BEEN BASICALLY POSITIVE, PARTICULARLY TO THE DEGREE THAT THEY PROVIDED A FORUM FOR A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MAJOR ISSUES, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN CONTACTS. IN FUTURE WE MIGHT THINK ABOUT WHETHER FINAL DOCUMENTS ARE REALLY DESIRABLE IN SUCH SHORT MEETINGS. IN ANY CASE, IT IS THE VIEW OF THE U.S. THAT WHAT IS MAINLY NEEDED IS NOT NEW DOCUMENTS SO MUCH AS COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ONES.

PLENARY ADDRESS BY
AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION
TO THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ON
THE SOVIET INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN
NOVEMBER 28, 1986

Mr. Chairman:

Mr. Chairman, in less than one month the world will commemorate the seventh anniversary of the invasion by Soviet armed forces of the sovereign, non-aligned Islamic nation of Afghanistan. The events leading up to the invasion are well known. The Soviet fabrications about being "invited" into Afghanistan have been so thoroughly discredited that we rarely hear them in public anymore. Nor are Soviet claims that Afghanistan is an independent, sovereign country taken seriously. Soviet officials occupy controlling positions in the government ministries, the armed forces, and the security apparatus. Soviet authorities now either directly make, or are deeply involved in making, all significant political, military, and socioeconomic decisions in the country. For all intents and purposes, the Soviet Union today rules Afghanistan and Soviet authorities are morally and politically responsible for everything that transpires there. A few weeks ago 122 United Nations member states once again reiterated the General Assembly's demand for an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces.

What I wish to focus on today are the consequences of the continuing occupation of Afghanistan for the people of that country -- individual human beings who have the same inherent rights as the nationals of every State participating in this CSCE process. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan represents a renewal of the ferocity and brutality of warfare, directed largely against the civilian population. The tale of death and destruction is well-known by now, as documented by neutral observers:

-- tens of thousands of Afghans have been killed;
-- entire villages have been burned to the ground;
-- men, women and children have been executed;
-- aerial bombardments have been deliberately targeted against the civilian population and the agricultural infrastructure;
-- in an exodus that speaks louder than any words, five million Afghans, representing one third of the entire Afghan population, have fled their country, not to the Soviet Union, but to Islamic Pakistan and Iran; countless others have been driven from their homes;

-- and, as confirmed in a recent report by Amnesty International, Afghan political prisoners have been regularly tortured -- sometimes in the presence of Soviet personnel.

Kurt Lobek, a film journalist who spent two and a half years in Afghanistan, has described some of the horror on the basis of personal experience. He testified:

> "I have witnessed and unfortunately personally felt the effect of searing napalm dropped upon the people of Afghanistan. I have seen hundreds of children missing hands or feet as a result of butterfly and toy bombs designed to attract children's attention and then explode in their faces. I have witnessed sustained bombing attacks on civilian houses which leave entire villages uninhabitable..."

The rest of Lobek's eyewitness account is too graphic to recount in this hall. Our delegation is prepared to provide it to any delegation interested in reading it.

A member of the Islamic resistance put it this way:

> "The Communists...have used everything except nuclear bombs. Tens of thousands of people have

> been maimed by these mines, mostly innocent children...Many more have been imprisoned for political purposes, given electric shocks, and tortured severly. They have suffered permanent physical and mental damage. Many more have been jailed without charges.
>
> "The Soviets have destroyed the agricultural infrastructure and irrigation system of my country. They have killed the livestock so that the people are going hungry."

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is a subject we must confront in this forum: it stands as sad testimony to the Soviet Union's basic lack of respect for its solemn commitments in the Helsinki Final Act, as a violation of each and every one of the principles guiding relations between participating States.

Since our Madrid Meeting ended in 1983, the United Nations General Assembly has continued to adopt annual resolutions which lay out the framework for a solution to the tragedy in Afghanistan:

-- withdrawal of foreign troops;
-- restoration of an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan;
-- self-determination for the Afghan people;
-- return of the Afghan refugees in safety and in honor.

The United States and the community of nations seek no advantage in Afghanistan. Our only purpose is to stop the suffering and the killing and to secure a political environment in which the Afghan people can determine their own destiny. The United States firmly supports United Nations efforts to achieve a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan. Setting a firm, unequivocal schedule for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops would be a first step along this road.

Since our Madrid Meeting, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has also taken a more active interest in the situation in Afghanistan -- focusing primarily on the humanitarian rather than the political aspects of the situation. In 1984, despite vigorous objections from the Soviet Union, the Commission decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur. The appointment of the distinguished Austrian law professor Felix Ermacora assured the world that it would receive an objective and comprehensive report.

The Soviet Union was also aware of this fact, and it conducted a shameless campaign designed to impugn the integrity of Professor Ermacora and to discredit his report. The personal campaign against Professor Ermacora has largely been abandoned, but only because the Soviets were reminded of their previous, lavish praise for his work -- when it concerned other states.

In the event, Professor Ermacora's original report and his periodic updates have clearly documented the abuses of human rights and human decency I referred to at the outset of my remarks. In his most recent report to the UN General Assembly this fall, Professor Ermacora chronicled new abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. He recorded a number of new eyewitness accounts of the growing tragedy.

One witness reported a brutal military reprisal against civilians in the village of Garabad, in Konduz Province, in August -- just three months before this Vienna Meeting convened. The witness reported that he himself had lost 14 family members, three of whom had been killed by bayonets and 11 crushed under the rubble when their house was destroyed by fire.

In another "particularly horrible incident" that came to Professor Ermacora's attention, "several persons had their throats slit with knives" in the village of Siyawachan, in Herat Province, in March 1986. Professor Ermacora also reported first-hand that he "had occasion to witness the result of atrocities against those seeking refuge." He continued:

> "I was present at the Afghan border near Miramchar when tractors were transporting the bodies of women and children who had just been killed as they fled their country. This is indeed a depressing experience and is an eloquent illustration of the proportions of the human rights situation."

Mr. Chairman, these examples are not pretty. But what is happening in Afghanistan under Soviet occupation is not pretty; it is ugly and disturbing, and silence will not bring the suffering to an end.

Perhaps the most ominous conclusion drawn by Professor Ermacora in a report issued earlier this year was that:

> "the continuation of the military solution will lead inevitably to a situation approaching genocide."

I regret to say that no signs are anywhere apparent of a change in Soviet policy that would challenge his tragic assessment.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union has been doing its best lately to tell us that the situation in Afghanistan is not really so bad after all, but merely the figment of Western imagination. If that is indeed the case, why does the Soviet Union make it impossible for objective observers, such as Professor Ermacora, to visit Afghanistan to see for themselves? Why are reporters prevented from seeing more than those parts of the country which the regime wishes to show -- at times and under conditions chosen by the regime?

Why are other reporters who seek to enter Afghanistan held incommunicado under inhumane conditions, and then held up as examples to anyone else who seeks a clear view of events in the country? Where is the Soviet policy of "glasnost" here? There is no area where it is more urgent to test this new policy -- to see whether there is any substance to it or merely feathers.

If the situation in Afghanistan is not really so bad after all, why does the Soviet Union feel constrained to periodically introduce additional combat units for the sole purpose of withdrawing them later to carefully choreographed and publicized self-congratulations? If the situation in Afghanistan is not really so bad after all, why doesn't the Soviet Union anounce a timetable for the prompt withdrawal of all its troops?

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union's conduct in Afghanistan calls into question its commitments to every one of the solemn pledges it made in signing the Helsinki Final Act. On a more profound and basic human level, it calls into question Soviet respect for human life and simple human decency. The killing and the suffering have gone on long enough. For the sake of all the men, women and children of Afghanistan, we urge the Soviet Union to stop it now.

We know that the Soviet Union will dispute much of what I have said today. But beyond all the arguments and counterarguments about Afghanistan, a simple truth remains. There is one country which is responsible for the continuing human tragedy there and one country which can stop it. All the other arguments are irrelevant. This is the overriding truth of Afghanistan.

THE BENEFITS OF AN OPEN ECONOMY

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WARREN ZIMMERMANN, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING

DECEMBER 1, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN,

IN BASKET II OF THE FINAL ACT, THE SIGNATORIES FORESAW "THAT COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF TRADE, INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT WOULD PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE". IN PRINCIPLE VII THE SIGNATORIES ALSO RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF "PROMOTING AND ENCOURAGING THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF CIVIL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND OTHER RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ALL OF WHICH DERIVE FROM THE INHERENT DIGNITY OF THE THE HUMAN PERSON AND ARE ESSENTIAL FOR HIS FREE AND FULL DEVELOPMENT".

WE ARE CONVINCED, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN BASKET II CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY AN OPEN EXCHANGE OF GOODS, SERVICES AND IDEAS WITH FULL RESPECT FOR ALL THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS. IT IS THROUGH SUCH EXCHANGES THAT ECONOMIC PROGRESS OCCURS. WE CANNOT FORGET THE FACT THAT WE REPRESENT HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF INDIVIDUALS WHOSE GOAL IS TO DO MORE THAN SIMPLY TO SURVIVE. THROUGH THE CENTURIES MEN AND WOMEN HAVE STRUGGLED TO MAKE A BETTER LIFE FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES. THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO CREATE PROSPEROUS COMMUNITIES IN WHICH THEY CAN USE THEIR CREATIVE TALENTS TO REACH THEIR FULLEST POTENTIAL.

IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES REPRESENTED HERE IN VIENNA THAT WE ENCOURAGE AS MUCH CONTACT AS POSSIBLE AMONG OUR SOCIETIES, AND AMONG OUR PEOPLE DIRECTLY. ECONOMIES AND SOCIETIES GENUINELY THRIVE AND PROSPER WHEN PEOPLE ARE FREE TO EXCHANGE IDEAS AND OPINIONS WITHOUT CONTRAINTS OR FEAR. WE NEED TO THINK HARD ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PEOPLE OF OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. DO WE WANT THEM TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITIES TO FULFILL THEIR POTENTIALS AS THEY WISH; OR DO WE WANT TO HOLD THEM BACK?

CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS STILL SEEM TO FEAR EXPOSING SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF THEIR PEOPLE TO AN OPEN ECONOMIC SYSTEM, EVEN AT THE COST OF DEPRIVING THEM OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE CREATED BY THAT SYSTEM. YET EXPERIENCE AROUND THE WORLD HAS SHOWN THAT OPEN SOCIETIES WHICH ENCOURAGE FREE SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY AND INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE ARE THE ONES WITH THE BEST POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS IN THIS POST-INDUSTRIAL AGE.

WE OFTEN HEAR THE COMPLAINT THAT THE LACK OF TECHNOLOGY IS WHAT IS KEEPING SOME ECONOMIES FROM REACHING THEIR FULL POTENTIAL. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS NOT A LACK OF TECHNOLOGY BUT THE INABILITY OF RIGIDLY CONTROLLED ECONOMIES TO ASSIMILATE TECHNOLOGY WHICH UNDERMINES THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. THE RIGID CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND INITIATIVE IN NON-MARKET ECONOMIES HAS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO ADAPT TO RAPIDLY CHANGING MARKET CONDITIONS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES.

COMMAND ECONOMIES ARE BASED ON MAXIMIZING THE BENEFITS TO

THE STATE OF ECONOMIC ACTIONS. THE RESULT IS A SEVERE RESTRICTION ON ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND AN INFLEXIBLE SYSTEM WHERE CHANGE IS A THREAT RATHER THAN A CHALLENGE FOR IMPROVEMENT. THE INABILITY TO ADAPT TO CHANGE POSES A MAJOR THREAT TO COMPETITIVENESS.

SLOWNESS TO INNOVATE IS AN ENDEMIC FEATURE IN NON-MARKET ECONOMIES. EVERY INNOVATION HAS TO BE INTRODUCED INTO EXISTING PRODUCTION FACILITIES. MOREOVER, THOSE WHO OPERATE THESE FACILITIES ARE INTERESTED, FIRST AND FOREMOST, IN FULFILLING OUTPUT TARGETS FOR THE CURRENT PLANNING PERIOD. EVEN IF AN INNOVATION MIGHT RESULT IN INCREASED PRODUCTION, THE RISK OF LONG DELAY WHILE THE TECHNOLOGY IS MASTERED, AND CONSEQUENT DISTURBANCE OF PRODUCTION SCHEDULES, STRONGLY MILITATES AGAINST SUCH A MOVE.

FURTHERMORE, PRICES, THE KEY TO ALL FORMS OF EXCHANGE, DO NOT REFLECT THE ADVANTAGES OF INTRODUCING NEW TECHNOLOGIES WHEN THEY ARE NOT DETERMINED BY SUPPLY AND DEMAND. WITHOUT THE THREAT OF COMPETITION AND POSSIBLE FINANCIAL FAILURE, MANAGERS IN COMMAND ECONOMICS PREFER TO AVOID RISK. INNOVATION BECOMES THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE.

WE HAVE READ AND LISTENED WITH INTEREST ABOUT PROPOSED CHANGES IN SEVERAL EASTERN ECONOMIC STRUCTURES. SOME EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS SEEM AWARE OF THE DILEMMA THEY FACE AND HAVE BEEN MOVING SLOWLY IN THE DIRECTION OF FREER MARKETS AND OF

EXPANDING TRADE TIES WITH THE WEST. HOWEVER, MUCH MORE THAN SELECTED FIRM-TO-FIRM CONTACTS WILL HAVE TO BE PERMITTED IF THESE OVERRIDING HANDICAPS ARE TO BE DEALT WITH.

FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IS CRUCIAL BOTH WITHIN SOCIETIES AND BETWEEN SOCIETIES. THIS IS KEY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH. SCIENTISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS MUST COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER ON AN OPEN BASIS IF IDEAS AND THEORIES ARE TO BECOME PRACTICAL, APPLIED MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY. SCIENTISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THEY SHOULD BE FREE TO TRAVEL - IF NECESSARY, STAYING ABROAD FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME - SO THAT THEY CAN FURTHER REFINE THEIR OWN THINKING AND LEARN THE IDEAS OF OTHERS.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE CREATIVE ELEMENTS OF SOCIETIES (THE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY IN PARTICULAR) ONLY BREED ISOLATIONISM AND AUTARKY. IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ERA, ISOLATIONISM AND AUTARKY ARE A GUARANTEE OF ECONOMIC FAILURE.

FOR THE PAST TWO HUNDRED YEARS OUR SOCIETIES HAVE EXPERIENCED NUMEROUS REVOLUTIONS, REVOLUTIONS FOR BASIC FREEDOMS BEGINNING WITH THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONS, AN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND SEVERAL SO-CALLED POST-INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS. TODAY WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF A TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION. THIS REVOLUTION IS BASED ON THE INNOVATIVE AND CREATIVE ENERGY OF MILLIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND IS NOW SWEEPING THE WORLD. IT IS

REALLY A REVOLUTION OF HOPE THAT WILL LAUNCH THE WORLD INTO A NEW AGE OF PRODUCTIVITY, PROSPERITY AND GROWTH, AN AGE AS FAR ADVANCED OVER OUR OWN AS THE INDUSTRIAL AGE OVER THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL.

IN THIS REVOLUTION THE INNOVATIVE RECORD OF WESTERN-TYPE ECONOMIES STANDS OUT. IN THE UNITED STATES, FOR INSTANCE, TENS OF MILLIONS OF NEW JOBS HAVE BEEN CREATED, MAINLY IN INDUSTRIES WHICH WERE NOT DREAMED OF TEN YEARS AGO. IT HAS BEEN THE SMALL BUSINESSMAN WHO HAS TAKEN CHARGE OF HIS DESTINY AND HAS FOLLOWED HIS VISION FOR A BETTER FUTURE. THESE ENTREPRENEURS HAVE ALSO BEEN INNOVATORS - THEY HAVE NOT BEEN AFRAID TO TAKE TECHNOLOGY AND PUT IT TO NEW USES. AT THE SAME TIME THEY HAVE CREATED NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO SOLVE PROBLEMS FACED IN THIS RAPIDLY CHANGING AGE.

THESE MEN AND WOMEN ARE RISK TAKERS BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT THERE ARE REWARDS WAITING FOR THEM. ONE OF THE CONSISTENTLY MOST PRODUCTIVE FIGURES IN HISTORY IS THE INDIVIDUAL TRYING TO IMPROVE HIS STATUS. WHETHER HE IS A PEASANT TILLING HIS LAND OR A BUSINESSMAN BUILDING A COMPANY, THE INCENTIVE TO PROSPER IS A POWERFUL FORCE.

THE FREE MARKET IS NOT A NEAT, ORDERLY SYSTEM. THIS UNRULINESS MEANS THAT IT WILL ALWAYS BE SUBJECT TO SWINGS OF BOOM AND BUST. BUSINESS FAILURES AND BANKRUPTCIES CAN EVEN BE A SIGN OF A HEALTHY RATHER THAN A WEAK ECONOMY, PROVIDED OF COURSE THAT THE STATE ASSUMES SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE IN REAL ECONOMIC

DISTRESS. THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION IN MY COUNTRY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WERE SUCCESSES NOT ACCOMPANIED BY FAILURES.

THE POINT IS THAT A SYSTEM BASED ON OPENNESS AND INITIATIVE PRESENTS THE CONSTANT OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S LOT. MEN AND WOMEN ARE DRAWN TO FREE ENTERPRISE, WHICH LETS THEM LOOSE SO THAT THEY PURSUE THEIR OWN ECONOMIC GOALS.

IT IS NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH FIND HOPE IN FREE ENTERPRISE. MORE AND MORE COUNTRIES ARE TURNING TO THE FREE MARKET AS THE WAY TO ACHIEVE FASTER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. THE FOUNDATION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IS ALREADY FIRMLY ESTABLISHED IN THE COUNTRIES ALONG THE PACIFIC RIM, WHICH HAS BEEN THE WORLD'S FASTEST GROWING REGION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS. STRESSING EDUCATION, REWARD FOR HARD WORK AND THE ROOM TO EXCEL AND COMPETE, THESE NATIONS HAVE PRODUCED EXPORTS THAT FUEL DEVELOPMENT.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR BEHIND THE RAPID GROWTH OF THESE COUNTRIES IS THEIR OPENNESS TO THE WORLD. PERHAPS MORE THAN OTHER NATIONS, THEY HAVE REALIZED THAT IN A WORLD OF INSTANT COMMUNICATIONS, COUNTRIES HAVE NO PLACE TO HIDE. THESE COUNTRIES KNOW THEY MUST FIND WAYS TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE; THE ALTERNATIVE IS STAGNATION. RATHER THAN CLOSING THEMSELVES IN AND TRYING TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THEY HAVE AGGRESSIVELY GONE AFTER A WORLD MARKET AND HAVE BECOME PLAYERS IN

A GLOBAL ECONOMY.

THE DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL SECTORS OF SOCIETY INTERACT WITH INCREASING POWER IN A WORLD OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND ELECTRONIC INTIMACY. THE FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM LOOKS TO THE INDIVIDUAL, NOT THE STATE, AS THE MAIN ACTOR IN ECONOMIC LIFE, AS THE MAIN SOURCE OF ECONOMIC DYNAMISM. TODAY MORE AND MORE COUNTRIES ARE LOOKING TO THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE FREE MARKET AS SOURCES FOR CREATING WEALTH.

THE BENEFITS OF MORE OPEN ECONOMIC RELATIONS CAN AFFECT BOTH THE WELL-BEING OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE ECONOMIES OF EVERY COUNTRY REPRESENTED HERE. AN OPEN ECONOMIC SYSTEM, ONE THAT IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, IS IMPORTANT FOR EVERY PARTY INVOLVED.

BETTER ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES ARE NOT THE PRODUCTS OF SIGNED CONTRACTS OR THE EXPORT OF PIECES OF MACHINERY. BETTER RELATIONS ARE THE RESULT OF FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS, CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLES IN WAYS THAT BUILD TRUST AND CONFIDENCE, AND MUTUAL BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

AS LONG AS CERTAIN SOCIETIES AMONG US OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF CONTROLLING INFORMATION, OPPORTUNITIES, CONSUMER CHOICES, AND THE ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH BOTH FELLOW-CITIZENS AND FOREIGNERS, QUESTIONS WILL BE RAISED ABOUT THE INTEREST THESE SOCIETIES PROFESS IN GREATER PARTICIPATION IN A WORLD ECONOMY WHICH FUNCTIONS ON PRINCIPLES OF OPENNESS.

OPPORTUNITIES ABOUND IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR TRADE AND JOINT VENTURES BASED ON MUTUAL BENEFIT IN AN OPEN ECONOMIC SETTING. PRACTICAL BUSINESSMEN WILL SEEK THEIR FUTURE IN SUCH A SETTING, RATHER THAN IN A CLOSED SOCIETY WHERE EXPERIENCE HAS PROVEN THAT DYNAMIC ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IS CONSTRAINED.

IT IS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF EVERY STATE TO DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IT CONSIDERS TO BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ITS CITIZENS. BUT THERE ARE OBLIGATIONS TO THOSE CITIZENS ENSHRINED IN MANY OF OUR INSTITUTIONS; THEY ARE CERTAINLY ENSHRINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. AS I NOTED AT THE OUTSET, THOSE OBLIGATIONS TO INDIVIDUALS INCLUDE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AMONG THEM THE RIGHT TO PURSUE AS THEY WISH THEIR ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

WE THEREFORE URGE ALL PARTIES HERE IN VIENNA TO EXAMINE THE BENEFITS OF AN OPEN ECONOMIC SYSTEM, ONE WHERE NOT ONLY GOODS AND SERVICES, BUT PEOPLE AND IDEAS CAN MOVE FREELY. AMERICAN BUSINESS IS FACING INCREASED COMPETITION FROM THOSE PACIFIC RIM AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES I HAVE MENTIONED ABOVE. WE WELCOME THIS COMPETITION. IT WILL LEAD TO CONTINUED CHANGE AND PROGRESS. INDEED, COMPETITION UNFETTERED BY THE BONDS OF STATE CONTROL IS THE ESSENCE OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS. IN THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT IS AN IMPORTANT LESSON OF HISTORY.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION

Plenary Meeting

December 3, 1986
Vienna, Austria

Mr. Chairman:

A significant part of the Final Act deals with communication. The document speaks of the aims of facilitating "freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively," and "the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds." Communication expands human experience and individual ties. Communication enables us, in the words of a current American advertisement, to "reach out and touch someone." Conversely, breaking the lines of communication breeds ignorance, xenophobia, mistrust.

Today, I want to talk about three forms of communication - by mail, by telephone, and by radio. All three forms are protected by the Final Act. Yet all three are grossly tampered with by the Soviet Union - at significant cost to the happiness of its own citizens, to its international reputation, and to understanding between its peoples and those of other countries.

Mr. Chairman:

There is a famous scene in that greatest of all Russian poems and operas - Pushkin's "Yevgeniy Onegin." Tatyana, who has fallen in love with Onegin, hesitantly writes him a letter professing her love and, after much soul-searching, decides to send it to him. With the mails being what they were in Pushkin's time, she consigns it to the surest delivery service available - her nurse, who faithfully delivers it unopened, its fateful message read only by sender and receiver.

Today the technical problems of mail delivery in the Soviet Union have been solved. Not so the political problems. In 1874, long after Pushkin's death, the Universal Postal Union began helping countries to maintain postal communications between individuals, even in time of conflict. As a member of the UPU and as a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act - which pledges participating states to fulfill obligations under agreements to which they are parties - the Soviet Union has committed itself to supporting and promoting communications between individuals across national boundaries. In addition, Article 56 of the Soviet Constitution guarantees the privacy of correspondence to its citizens. Yet the Soviet Union is today the only member of the UPU about which there are significant complaints regarding the treatment of mail sent to citizens.

The following types of problems, documented by the U.S. Postal Service, occur regularly in mail traffic with the Soviet Union:

-- Soviet postal authorities return mail to the sender, falsely claiming that the addressee is unknown or has moved, or that the address is incorrect.

-- Soviet postal officials falsify delivery receipts to give the impression that mail has been delivered when it has not been.

-- Soviet authorities arbitrarily seize mail and return parcels because they allegedly violate Soviet prohibitions and restrictions, even when there is no evidence of any violation of published Soviet prohibitions.

The patterns of complaint are too consistent, too frequent and too widespread for this problem to be attributed to isolated "accidents" by postal workers, or merely "technical problems."

Moreover, many of the problems occur with mail to Soviet citizens who have applied to emigrate, who have relatives who have emigrated, or who have, for whatever reason, been labelled as "dissidents." It must be concluded from this pattern therefore that these problems are not accidental and are tied to political considerations.

Let me cite a specific example of this abuse. Out of 57 registered letters sent in a concerted mailing to Andrei Sakharov in Gorky last year, only one was delivered to Dr. Sakharov. Five were returned to their senders. The remaining 51 letters were reported by Soviet postal authorities as having been delivered; Dr. Sakharov's wife Elena Bonner, during her visit to the United States this year, confirmed that none of them were. One American Congressman who had sent a letter received a signed notice that his letter had been delivered but also had his letter returned for having the incorrect address. When the Soviet post office can cause a letter to be delivered to its addressee and also returned to the sender, it has certainly come a long way from the days of Tatyana's nurse.

It might be argued that mail is so ordinary that the problems I have cited are not important. But the ordinariness of mail is exactly what makes these problems critically important. All of us in this room have the luxury of taking the mail for granted - including the members of the Soviet Delegation, not one of whom, I imagine, is plagued by the difficulties I have mentioned. Yet I ask the delegates here to put themselves in the place of Soviet citizens who are plagued by these difficulties, Soviet citizens who have friends or relatives abroad. Picture yourself as the victim of the capricious delivery - or non-delivery - of mail sent to you, and you will understand the degree of deprivation and anxiety that must cause.

Mr. Chairman:

In addition to interference with international mails, the Soviet Union has also taken steps to reduce telephone contacts with the West. I happened to be in Moscow in 1982 when it was announced that direct dialing, which became operational in 1980, would be discontinued "for technical reasons" - a remarkable example of technology running backwards. Even conceding that the Soviet telephone system was somehow able to go "back to the future," there was no explanation why, if direct dialing had been dis-invented, it nevertheless remained available to certain favored Western businesses.

As with mail, there is a sharp political edge to this telephone tampering, an edge which cuts into the well-being of people who have displeased Soviet authorities.

- When the members of the unofficial "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the USA" invited fellow peace activists in the West to call them, their telephone was disconnected before anyone could get through.

- Jewish refuseniks are often victimized by telephone cut-offs for calling abroad. Beyond this, we know of 40 cases of politically-motivated disconnections of telephone service carried out against Soviet citizens in the last year and a half.

- Arrests and mugging of people trying to call abroad have been recorded recently. Just yesterday I received a letter from a Jewish organization in the United States recounting several specific instances of telephone interference. In one case Mila Volvovsky of Gorky was knocked to the ground by an unknown assailant after she had made a phone call to Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel. When she returned from the hospital, she discovered that her phone had been removed from her apartment.

- Finally, there would have been much less anxiety in Ukrainian communities in both America and Europe - and much less anguish in Ukraine - if Kiev had still had its direct-dialing service at the time of the Chernobyl disaster. Ukrainian-Americans in the United States have told me that they were unable to contact relatives in Ukraine for weeks after the explosion.

Mr. Chairman:

No form of communication has greater possibilities for reaching large numbers of people than radio broadcasting. For that very reason, international radio broadcasts are a singularly effective means of meeting the need, envisaged in the Final Act, "for an even wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating States." In fact, the Final Act expresses the hope for continued "expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio."

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and several other governments not only ignore but abuse this injunction through their jamming of Western radio broadcasts. Jamming violates not only commitments in the information section of the Final Act but also explicit provisions of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Telecommunication Union Convention, and the World Administrative Radio Conference Convention.

Formerly the Soviet Union, in contradiction to the evidence of the ears, denied that it was jamming Western broadcasts. Today that defense is no longer possible, if it ever was. This year a study, conducted by the International Radio Frequency Registration Board of the ITU - with a Soviet chairman - determined that jamming transmitters located in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were causing harmful interference to 37 frequencies of the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe, as well as to short-wave broadcasts from other Western nations.

The main means of jamming is a transmitting station of high intensity, consisting of three transmitters and located near an urban area, where it transmits on the wave-length of a Western broadcast in order to blot it out. There are estimated to be 2,500 such jammers in the Soviet Union. When I lived in Moscow, I could see one of them from my apartment window. Its appearance symbolized its mission: an ugly tower of electronic knuckles, an affront to the landscape, to the hearing, and to civilized conduct.

The Soviet Union has argued on many occasions that the program content of the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe is anti-Soviet, mendacious, and inflammatory. Even if this were true - which it is not - it is irrelevant. Every Soviet leader since Lenin has proclaimed the existence of an ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. Why does the Soviet Union insist that only its side of that struggle should be heard? Any American with a short-wave radio can listen to Radio Moscow in English; the reverse is not true.

We have heard complaints from the Soviet side that Radio Moscow does not have many listeners in America. The problem, I would argue, is to be found in the quality of the programs, not in the availability of receiving sets. The choice of what to listen to -- or not listen to -- should lie between the individual and the off-on switch of his radio, not with bureaucrats or censors or those jammers that deface the sky.

The Soviet Union claims that it jams to prevent the spread of lies. The evidence is stronger that it jams to prevent the spread of truth. In any case, why can't the Soviet government trust the Soviet people to distinguish lies from truth? Why does it fear information which is at variance with the official version of reality, or which contradicts it, or which casts new light on it? The Soviet government's fear of this information must be very great, for it costs much more to jam a broadcast than to transmit it.

But are Western radios really so dangerous? There were periods - from July 1963 to August 1968, and again from September 1973 to August 1980 - when the Soviet Union did not jam the Voice of America. There is no evidence that the political stability of the Soviet Union was in any way threatened during these periods. Hungary and Romania virtually ceased jamming over 20 years ago, with no discernible ill effects. Most citizens of the German Democratic Republic can watch television from the Federal Republic, again apparently without negative consequences. Why can't the Soviet Union, with its newly-proclaimed self-confidence, take a step which reflects that self-confidence?

Mr. Chairman:

Actions I have described to cut lines of communication - mail, telephone, radio - do not speak well for the Soviet government's newly proclaimed "openness." The test of an open society is its toleration of diversity and criticism. No government which prevents mail from being delivered, telephone calls from being made, and radio broadcasts from being heard can meet that test. I would leave our Soviet colleagues with two questions. Why not let in the mail, the phone calls, the broadcasts? What are you afraid of?

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

December 5, 1986

Cultural Freedom

Mr. Chairman:

The Helsinki Final Act devotes considerable attention to culture. In the third basket, it speaks of the need to improve and expand cultural exchanges and cooperation. It also, in Principle VII, places culture in the context of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Freedom of thought is listed as a basic human right. And the participating states are enjoined to "promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms."

The U.S. Delegation will address culture in the first sense - cultural exchange - in the Basket Three group. It is culture in the second sense - cultural freedom - about which I will speak today.

In the language of the Final Act, cultural rights and freedoms "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development." Most participating states accept this philosophy. Intellectuals and artists come, go, communicate and associate freely. Governments often help, for example in providing funds for research, writing, or performances. But artistic creation remains in the hands of artists themselves.

By contrast, in the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, individual cultural expression is closely monitored and controlled. The philosophy is different. Let me illustrate with one example. The young East German poet Lutz Rathenow was sent to prison in 1980 for publishing a book abroad. Following his release, his play "No Tragedy" was cancelled before its opening, after he wrote to the Minister of Culture protesting restrictions on literary freedom. When he was invited to a writers' program at an American university, the GDR authorities denied him an exit permit. Their stated reason is a stunning revelation of the official view of culture: "We are interested in having GDR writers and artists appear abroad who have demonstrated in their literary works and artistic creations that they recognize and respect our state's politics and cultural policy and are personally committed to promoting the image of the German Democratic Republic."

Similar problems occur in other countries. Take the case of Vaclav Havel, a Czechoslovak playwright whose creative efforts earned him this year's Erasmus Prize. Because he served as a founding spokesman for Charter 77, his plays - even earlier ones - can no longer be performed in Czechoslovakia, although they are performed in many other participating states. What should have been some of his most productive years, from 1979 to 1983, were spent in prison. Last year, when he took a trip across his own country to refresh his intellectual experience, batteries of policemen followed him, took note of the people he visited, and arrested him twice during his journey.

The harassment and ultimate arrest three months ago of the leaders of the Jazz Section of the Czechoslovakian Musicians' Association is a sad reflection on the state of culture in Czechoslovakia. The Jazz Section was dedicated to enriching the general cultural consciousness of its thousands of members. What was apparently worse to the authorities, it operated independently of the established cultural bureaucracy. On the eve of their trial, the Jazz Section has appealed directly to this Vienna meeting, saying: "The goal of our entire work and efforts is to continue in the many-sided cultural activity which helps to create and develop the free thought of each citizen. But we feel threatened by the possibility that our fight for the freedom of cultural existence will - in contradiction to the Helsinki Final Act - be regarded as anti-state activity of a political character."

In the Soviet Union, drama, opera, ballet and other art forms are well developed, even brilliant. However, these all exist under the constant observation and control of state and party, which punish those who challenge the prevailing wisdom. The result is best described as "cultural apartheid." Artists who dutifully keep their creativity within the boundaries set by the state enjoy a privileged position. But an underclass, consisting of those who have dared to be different, suffers ostracism, censorship, and even arrest.

Over the years some of the Soviet Union's greatest talents have either suffered repression at home, or fled to other societies where they could find greater freedom. The list is a distinguished and depressing one. It includes the names of Mandelshtam, Pasternak, Tsvetayeva, Prokofiev, Akhmatova, Shostakovich, Kopelev, Vladimov, Nureyev, Vishnevskaya, Baryshnikov.

The issues posed here are of course age-old. Writers, artists, and musicians are rarely team players. For them criticism is neither antithetical nor peripheral to the creative process; for them criticism is essential to the creative process. The exiled Soviet writer Vassily Aksyonov recently explained why he had helped to create an unapproved literary almanac - an action for which he was deprived of his Soviet citizenship. He said: "Our intentions were limited: To open a few windows. To air out the musty house of Soviet literature. To give people a chance to breathe something other than 'socialist realism.'"

Just as artists and writers are defined by their criticism, so is a political system defined by its reaction to criticism. A political system that is truly open will also be open to criticism, will tolerate it, will even learn from it. A political system that is closed can stifle criticism, but only at a cost, not only to the targets of its repression but also to itself. Let me cite three reasons:

- First, our colleague, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, said last week, "A state that cannot stand criticism must do without culture." Moreover, repressive systems often ennoble what they seek to destroy. Nowhere is the power of ideas more fully recognized than in societies which try to stamp them out. The secret policeman, in his very effort to stifle critical works, betrays the respect he holds them in. Censorship is the tribute dictatorship pays to creativity.

-Second, no repressive government can hope to enhance international security and win trust abroad. Intolerance of intellectual diversity at home is linked to intolerance of influences from abroad. A state which does not understand its own people's desire for cultural freedom will not understand the actions and motivations of other cultures and political systems. The result is suspicion, xenophobia, hostility. In such a climate trust cannot flourish; and without trust there can be no real security.

-Third, the work of the police and the censor can never fully succeed. It has never been possible to definitively stamp out cultural freedom. It was tried unsuccessfully by the Russian Tsars; it is being tried unsuccessfully by their heirs. In the long run the creative artist will win. Irina Ratushinskaya put it well when she addressed the authorities in a poem written in a labor camp:

> "Who do you flinch from all of a sudden?
> Though you deny it, take refuge in illusion,
> Put all the blame on those who have been killed --
> I will still come and stand before you
> And look into your eyes."

I would like to conclude by bringing down to human terms the waste to humanity and to culture that accompanies the denial of cultural freedom. I want to tell the story of my friend Vladimir Feltsman. Vladimir - or Volodya - is in his early 30's. When he was in his early 20's, he was considered one of the few young Soviet pianists who might inherit the mantle of the great Richter. He had won prizes in the Soviet Union, he had performed in the major concert halls, he had played abroad. But where he played and what he played were always under state control. Seven years ago, he became fed up and applied for emigration to Israel in order to develop his talent in his own way.

At once he became a victim of "cultural apartheid." The Moscow and Leningrad halls were closed to him. Record contracts ceased. His concerts, when he could get them at all, were relegated to provincial cities and to small halls.

Possibly as a result of international appeals, Volodya was finally offered a Moscow concert. But there was no advertising. The hall chosen was tiny, was on the outskirts of the city, and was notorious for its bad acoustics. The poster outside the hall misspelled Volodya's name; the piano he was given to use was poor in quality. On two other occasions the American Ambassador offered his residence for concerts by Volodya; on the morning of the second concert the piano strings were slashed.

Volodya Feltsman is a man of extraordinary talent, extraordinary warmth, and extraordinary spirit. On October 28 he wrote an open letter to General Secretary Gorbachev. I will make the full letter available to all interested delegations, but would like to quote a part of it here. It portrays with clarity and eloquence the plight of an artist in a repressive society.

"How many more people have to be lost before our leadership understands the necessity of breaking with outmoded and ossified ideological dogmas, understands the need for change in its approach to culture and art in general and to people in creative fields in particular. The time has come to get rid of those barriers and limitations which confront people who wish to leave the USSR for reasons which are creative, scientific, or simply out of curiosity. The time has come to abolish the state's humiliating guardianship over these questions.

"You have spoken of the need for and deficit of trust in connection with international affairs. But trust is essential, above all, in one's own people. Only in such circumstances will the creative potential of the Soviet people be realized in full measure. So far our society has achieved democracy for bureaucrats, but not for the creative intelligentsia, and this has led to ugly phenomena in our cultural life, to the triumph of greyness and ignorance.

"The time has come to understand the simplest truth, that no matter where Rakhmaninov and Stravinskiy, Chaliapin and Glazunov, Bunin and Nabokov lived and died, they are all the pride of world and Russian culture. The time has come to understand the objective reasons for the fact that such prominent representatives of our culture as Tarkovskiy and Rostropovich, Brodskiy and Lyubimov, Neizvestniy and Aksyonov, are now living in the West. If these reasons, which are still in effect, are not eliminated, all the hopes for a spiritual recovery of our society will remain only hopes."

Volodya Feltsman's recitation of the Russian experience speaks for the American experience as well. American culture has been enhanced by the fact that Americans like Herman Melville, Henry James, James McNeill Whistler, Jack London, Mary Cassatt, Ernest Hemingway, Edith Wharton, T.S. Eliot, John Dos Passos, Gertrude Stein, and William Faulkner all lived, studied, and worked abroad.

We have taken note that, in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, there are new signs of awareness on the part of governments. We hope that they will lead to a widening of cultural freedom in place of its continuing restriction. There can be no greater cultural enrichment, in the spirit of the Final Act, than that an artist should be permitted to follow his muse and his conscience wherever they lead him, either geographically or spiritually. Governments which assist this artistic odyssey can only bring credit on themselves, both at home and in the eyes of the world.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

HUMAN RIGHTS DAY

Plenary Meeting

December 10, 1986
Vienna, Austria

Mr. Chairman:

A year ago today several human rights activists gathered on Pushkin Square in Moscow. They tried to hold a demonstration to mark Human Rights Day, commemorating adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. Like many foreign diplomats in Moscow, I have attended such demonstrations in the past. Typically, the demonstrators gather around the statue of Aleksandr Pushkin, not only a great writer but a human rights activist - a member of the Decembrist movement against the repressive rule of Tsar Nicholas I.

I do not know exactly how many demonstrators went to Pushkin Square last year, nor do I know all of their names. For most, the extent of the "demonstration" is to take off their hats in silent tribute to the victims of human rights abuse. Last year's gathering was reported to have attracted over 100 observers, including numerous KGB agents. More than a dozen people were detained, including one man who said he wanted to read poetry and another who threw leaflets at the foot of Pushkin's statue.

Two activists in the Moscow Group to Establish Trust between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., Nina Kovalenko and her daughter, were among those detained that day at Pushkin Square. Mrs. Kovalenko was beaten, struck on the head, and taken away for questioning to the militia. As I have noted earlier, she has since been incarcerated in psychiatric institutions for activities similar to the Human Rights Day demonstration -- that is, for activities that would be regarded as normal in any free society.

It is appropriate that on Human Rights Day we should recognize here the brave individuals who have given of themselves to defend the rights of others. They include Nina Kovalenko and many others who have sought to celebrate Human Rights Day in Pushkin Square during recent years. They include people struggling for human rights throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, many whose names and stories remain unknown. And they include the countless members of non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, a Nobel Peace Prize recipient which this year celebrated its twenty-fifth year of work on behalf of human rights around the world.

I begin with a story which unfolded even before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. It is the story of Raoul Wallenberg. This young Swedish diplomat set out from his peaceful and neutral homeland in 1944 to take up an assignment in Nazi-occupied Budapest. Confronting Hitler's Holocaust, Wallenberg repeatedly risked himself to rescue 100,000 Jews from extermination. His work in Budapest makes him one of our century's most heroic figures.

But as the war ended in 1945, Raoul Wallenberg was abducted by Soviet occupation troops in Budapest. The reasons for his abduction and the exact circumstances remain unclear. Wallenberg disappeared; all subsequent efforts to discover his fate and to secure his release from Soviet captivity have failed.

The American people have not forgotten this twentieth century hero. To underline my country's continuing concern for the unexplained fate of Raoul Wallenberg, it conferred honorary United States citizenship upon him in 1981.

The United States, Sweden, and other interested governments have repeatedly asked the Soviet Union to provide all available information on Wallenberg's fate. We have asked our questions both publicly and privately, through bilateral as well as multilateral channels. We asked for an accounting when the 35 participating States met in Madrid. Our questions have gone unanswered. As President Reagan has said, "we will continue to insist that the Soviet Union has a moral obligation to answer, once and for all, the questions we have about his fate." So I repeat the questions at this Vienna meeting. What has happened to Raoul Wallenberg? Where is he now?

While the fate of Raoul Wallenberg remains unknown, the fate of Anatoliy Marchenko, a Soviet citizen who like Wallenberg has fought for the rights of others has - tragically - just become known. Anatoliy Marchenko is reported, we believe accurately, to have died in Chistopol Prison, where he was in the seventh year of a 15-year sentence. Marchenko fought for human rights all of his adult life. He was a founder of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, but had received his first prison sentence for political activity 15 years before the Final Act was signed. In chronic ill health, he told a friend in 1968 that he was willing to die for human rights because it was a cause worth giving up one's life for. His friends describe him as a man who was peaceful, balanced, and incapable of telling a lie - "a true knight" as one of them put it. To the end he was thinking of others: the main charge at his last trial was that he wrote a letter to a prominent Soviet scientist asking him to protest the illegal exile of Andrei Sakharov to Gorky.

Marchenko had a close connection to this Vienna meeting. He sent a letter to the delegates here protesting the abuse of prisoners in Soviet jails and his own pummellings by Soviet guards; and he announced a hunger strike beginning August 4. He also demanded the resumption of visits by his family. His wife, Larissa - herself a courageous human rights advocate - had been illegally prevented from seeing him for three years.

Many appealed to the Soviet government for the release of Marchenko. On behalf of the United States, I made appeals privately both to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Soviet Delegation here in Vienna. There was no response. Now Marchenko is dead. How ironic that a man whose writings expose the barbarities of prison conditions in the Soviet Union from the Khrushchev period to the present should be tortured and allowed to die in a Soviet prison. How ironic that on this Human Rights Day the representatives of the regime which imprisoned him have just introduced a proposal purporting to deal with human rights. One can imagine what Anatoliy Marchenko would have said about the sincerity of the commitment to human rights which we have heard the Soviet Union profess at this meeting.

The principles for which Anatoliy Marchenko fought continue to produce champions and martyrs in the Soviet Union and other countries. On this Human Rights Day let me note several of them:

- Anatoliy Koryagin was a practicing psychiatrist in the Soviet Union who watched his profession being abused for political purposes. He might have looked the other way, as do many other Soviet psychiatrists. But people were suffering. So in 1979 he began to collaborate with the Working Commission to Investigate the Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, an affiliate of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group to which Marchenko belonged. He examined people committed or threatened with commitment to psychiatric hospitals and reported honestly that none were in need of hospitalization. The police soon searched his apartment and confiscated his writings. But Dr. Koryagin was undeterred. He wrote articles describing how political dissenters, religious believers, and others are committed to hospitals for the insane. For this he received sentences totalling nine years.

- Sergei Khodorovich, a mathematician and computer programmer, was forced to work as a janitor for years because of his activity in support of human rights. In 1983 he took responsibility for the so-called "Solzhenitsyn Fund," which offers financial assistance to the families of political prisoners. Khodorovich knew that every previous director of the Fund had gone to jail. The same fate soon befell him. He was arrested and sentenced to three years in a camp for his work with the Fund; he was also cited for signing human rights petitions and circulating samizdat literature. Earlier this year, he was rearrested in camp and given an additional three years.

- Ida Nudel has become an almost legendary figure for her fifteen years of work on behalf of Jewish refuseniks and prisoners of Zion in the Soviet Union. She has taken seriously the epigram of the Roman philosopher Epictetus - "I go where I wish; I come from whence I wish" - and has worked to help others join their families in the country of their choice. Yet she herself has steadily been denied permission to join her own sister in Israel. In 1978, she hung a banner on the balcony of her apartment in Moscow which read "KGB, give me a visa!" For this she received four years in Siberian exile for "anti-Soviet agitation." Even after her term of exile formally expired in 1982, Soviet authorities prevented her from taking up residence in her apartment in Moscow, although she had the legal right to do so. She finally found refuge in Bendery, Moldavia, a small, remote town near the Romanian border. Visitors are discouraged; just last week U.S. embassy officers were prevented by the police from seeing her. And she cannot leave; in October she was dragged from a bus as she attempted to travel to Moscow to see Elie Wiesel -- who today in Olso will receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his human rights activities.

- Jiri Wolf, a Czechoslovak worker and Charter 77 signer, was sentenced in 1978 to three years' imprisonment for "subversion." In 1983 he was again charged with subversion, this time for "jeopardizing state secrets;" apparently his real crime was disseminating information about prison conditions in Czechoslovakia. His sentence this time was six years' imprisonment and three years' "protective supervision." If released at the end of his sentence, 34-year-old Jiri Wolf will have served about one-half his adult life in detention for his human rights activities.

- Khalil Ibishev was a member of the Bulgarian National Assembly for ten years. But, after he was forced to change his Turkish name, he gave up his seat in the Assembly and left Bulgaria. Finally able to speak freely about the situation of his fellow ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, Ibishev confirmed the oppressive nature of the Bulgarian Government's policies and the fact that there is broad opposition to them among ethnic Turks. Had Ibishev remained silent, he could have continued to live as a member of the Bulgarian elite. Instead, he chose to defend publicly the Helsinki rights guaranteed to all persons belonging to national minorities.

- Father Jerzy Popieluszko, a Polish priest, spoke out in his sermons against the imposition of martial law in Poland. The authorities responded with police interrogations and a defamation campaign against him. On October 19, 1984, Father Popieluszko was kidnapped and murdered by secret police employees of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. Four persons were convicted and sentenced for the crime; their trial turned into a vehement attack on the Catholic Church and Father Popieluszko himself.

- Andrei Sakharov is too well known to the delegates at this meeting for me to add anything to the story of this extraordinary Soviet scientist who has given so much to humanity. Indeed many delegates have used the Vienna forum to urge the Soviet government to grant him his modest wish to be allowed to return to Moscow. It is fitting on this Human Rights Day to quote from Andrei Sakharov's appeal to General Secretary Gorbachev for the release of prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union. One of the prisoners for whom Sakharov appealed was Anatoliy Marchenko. Sakharov said:

> "There are so few prisoners of conscience in relation to our population, but their release would have real humanitarian, moral, political and, I dare say, historical significance. It would substantially increase our country's prestige. It would make all international contacts easier. It would advance the openness of our society, international confidence and the cause of peace. It would gain the support of a significant part of the Soviet intelligentsia. It could change the psychological atmosphere in our country, and thereby open the way for a solution of the problems facing us. It would bring happiness at last to the prisoners' families after many years of undeserved suffering. And this wise, humanitarian act would certainly evoke a positive response throughout the world."

In closing, let me return to the figure of Aleksandr Pushkin. The Decembrists, with whom he was associated, drew some of their inspiration from the American Founding Fathers. They envisaged a Russia with several of the federal characteristics enacted in the United States Constitution. One of the Decembrists was a young military officer named Aleksandr Frolov. When the Decembrist plot was uncovered, Frolov was arrested in 1826, put on trial without the right of defense, and sentenced to 20 years' hard labor followed by eternal exile in Siberia.

Exactly 160 years after the arrest of Aleksandr Frolov, Frolov's great-great-grandson, the American journalist Nicholas Daniloff, was arrested in Moscow by the Soviet KGB. Like his great-great-grandfather, Daniloff was permitted no defense counsel. Unlike Frolov, Daniloff was not held in isolation; an informer was assigned to share his cell with him. Daniloff, a highly professional journalist with an objective desire to understand the country of his ancestor, holds the respect of all who know him well - and I am one. His arrest and 13-day detention in a KGB jail was a blatant, unjustified, and unprovoked Soviet effort to enable a KGB agent, caught in the act of espionage in New York City, to escape justice. In such circumstances, the Soviet Union has no right - as Izvestiya did just last week - to accuse Nicholas Daniloff of espionage, to impugn his professionalism, and to threaten reprisal if he persists in speaking out about his ordeal.

In describing the parallel ordeal of his great-great-grandfather, Nick Daniloff recalls that Aleksandr Frolov, upon arrest, asked a fellow-Decembrist what would happen to them. The friend replied, "France, Austria, and England will intervene to save us." Such intervention was not, of course, forthcoming. But the link between political prisoners and the sympathy of others for their cause has survived to this day.

Prisoners of conscience and other victims of human rights abuse are not alone. There are courageous people who will speak out for the rights of oppressed minorities, of those unlawfully in prison or in mental institutions, of those suffering in confinement, of those who desire to emigrate, of those who wish to practice their religion freely, of those who want to enjoy the rights guaranteed them by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Final Act. There are champions, like Wallenberg, Marchenko, Khodorovich, Koryagin, Nudel, Wolf, Ibishev, Popieluszko, and Sakharov.

And there are supporters among and within all states which take seriously the obligations of Principle Seven of the Final Act. Repressive regimes, as Sakharov said, can ignore such support only at a cost to their policies, their objectives, and their reputations. There is a bond, invisible but indestructible, which links this Vienna meeting to brave people like Anatoliy Marchenko, like Andrei Sakharov, and like those who - a few hours from now - will take off their hats in Pushkin Square.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

SOLIDARITY AND TRADE UNION FREEDOM

Plenary Meeting

December 12, 1986
Vienna, Austria

Mr. Chairman:

The active role of free trade unions is a key safeguard of democracy in the United States. Workers' efforts to make our society more just are a leitmotiv of American history from the time of the Industrial Revolution, through to the immigrant sweatshops of the early part of this century, to the great struggles to organize and establish humane labor laws and safe working conditions in the twenties and thirties. Labor unions continue to serve as strong and beneficent independent forces on the U.S. political scene. Given their own history, American unions empathize deeply with workers elsewhere in the world who attempt to know and act upon their rights as set forth in the International Labor Organization Conventions.

Important chapters of our Helsinki history as well have been written by ordinary citizens in Eastern Europe who attempted to form free trade unions in their own countries in defense of workers' rights. Sadly, every such attempt has met with severe repression.

Aleksei Nikitin, an engineer from Donetsk who exposed unsafe conditions in the coal mines, was incarcerated in a Soviet psychiatric hospital for the better part of a decade. Shortly after release in April 1984, he died. In the Soviet Union, the two attempts to form independent labor unions, the Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers (AFTU), established in 1977, and the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers (SMOT), created in 1978, were repressed out of existence. AFTU founder Vladimir Klebanov has been in psychiatric hospital for close to a decade. The KGB launched an all-out campaign against SMOT in 1983. At present, eleven SMOT members are imprisoned or in psychiatric hospitals. SMOT members Valery Senderov and Viktor Yanenko were sentenced to a total of twelve years' imprisonment, Lev Volokhonsky received a nine-year sentence, and Rostislav Evdokimov and Vyacheslav Dolinin were sentenced to 5 years of camp plus four years' exile and four years of camp plus two years' exile, respectively. SMOT activist Mark Morozov died this year in a Soviet prison camp.

Cruel ironies abound at our meeting this week. Anatoliy Marchenko is also inscribed in the history of workers' rights advocacy in the Soviet Union. A worker himself, Marchenko wrote extensively as a Moscow Helsinki Monitor about social concerns and inhumane working conditions, appealing in open letters to foreign trade unions about this issue. He was prevented by Soviet authorities from attending the AFL-CIO's national convention in 1977. In commemoration of the tragic death of Anatoliy Marchenko, I intend to use one minute of this intervention as a silent tribute to this great advocate of human rights. I invite all delegations to turn their thoughts to Anatoliy Marchenko during this minute. In one minute I will resume speaking.

Mr. Chairman, I resume my discussion of trade unions.

Romania's suppression in 1978 of an attempt to establish an independent trade union, SLOMR (Sindicatul Liber al Oamenilor de Munca din Romania) is the subject of a complaint, lodged with the ILO. The ILO has criticized Romania for failure adequately to respond to the allegations.

And, Mr. Chairman, there is the well-known case of Poland. At the beginning of the Madrid Meeting only six years ago, many delegations, including my own, pointed to the rise of Solidarity as an indication that Poland was a country where Helsinki ideas had taken root and flourished in the popular consciousness. Indeed, we still regard Poland as such a place. As a direct legacy of Solidarity, participating States are now committed to (1) the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions; (2) the right of trade unions freely to exercise their activities and other rights as laid down in relevant international instruments; (3) recognition that these rights will be exercised in conformity with the State's obligations under international law; and (4) encourage, as appropriate, direct contacts and communication among freely established and joined unions and their representatives.

Five years ago in plenary, U.S. Ambassador Max Kampelman said that the Solidarity period in Poland had been "a living demonstration for the world of the vitality of the process launched at Helsinki." He spoke in the wake of the devastating news of the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981. He deplored any reversal of the movement of the Polish people towards a more open and just society. He stated that such a reversal inevitably would damage the vital process launched by the Final Act and would be a tragedy for the Polish people. And so it was---and is.

Our Madrid Meeting chronicled the cataclysmic conditions that prevailed in the immediate aftermath of martial law's imposition five years ago tomorrow. Five years ago, Ambassador Kampelman called Solidarity "the legitimate expression of the yearning of Polish working men and women for dignity"--the only independent trade union that has enjoyed a legal existence in the Eastern Bloc. In Madrid we witnessed the formal lifting of martial law in July 1983. At the same time, we have seen the Polish government enact and enforce legislation to tighten the machinery of internal control. At Ottawa, Budapest and Bern we have addressed the violations of human, civil and trade union rights that have occurred in the post-Madrid years.

The International Labor Organization appointed a Commission of Inquiry which concluded that the Government of Poland had violated its obligations under ILO conventions to respect trade union rights to freedom of association. Poland expressed its intention to withdraw from the ILO shortly after it took note of this finding, and other East European states have since engaged in an unseemly campaign against the Organization and its Director-General.

The single recent event which emphasized in the most striking manner the crucial role and current strengths of Solidarity is its affiliation to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labor (WCL) announced on November 19, 1986. "In making this exceptional decision for the simultaneous affiliation to the two international confederations, the statutory governing bodies of the ICFTU and WCL wish to proclaim their recognition of, and special support, to the peaceful struggle of the Polish workers and their trade union organization, NSZZ 'Solidarnosc', for democracy and trade union freedom in Poland", their joint statement said.

It is only fitting on the eve of the tragic events of December 13, 1981, to pay tribute to those in Poland who have lived out these tumultuous and difficult years. People have lost their lives, have been physically attacked, have been imprisoned, and suffer discrimination in the workplace and at the university for championing trade union and other rights and freedoms. These are dark chapters in recent Polish history, chapters which have been chiseled in the minds of this generation of Poles and of the generations to come. But there are brighter passages as well. The Solidarity Union and the Church have successfully acted to preserve and assert their roles as independent forces within Polish society. A pervasive independent culture has blossomed from the roots of the Solidarity era. International attention has remained focussed on events in Poland, so that any developments which occur--whether positive or negative, whether amnesties, such as the one we witnessed in September, or arrests, which we hope will be a thing of the past--are fully known to the world public.

We have recently reengaged Poland in dialogue as our response to the Polish Government's September amnesty for political prisoners. We have made clear that we are ready to increase high level contacts and expand scientific, commercial and cultural exchanges with Poland. Through renewing dialogue, we seek to elicit from the Polish Government reforms that meet the concerns of trade union and human rights activists, reflecting the genuine pluralism of Polish society. In accordance with the step-by-step policy announced by the President in December 1982, we will respond to steps towards authentic national accord between the government and the Polish people with significant steps of our own.

My delegation sincerely hopes that our meeting in Vienna will assist the cause of strengthening respect for trade union rights and other human rights for the people of Poland and of other lands. And, we hope that the implementation record at the next CSCE follow-up meeting will chronicle genuine movement toward reconcilation and dialogue between the independent social elements in Poland and the Polish Government.

In closing, I have just received an appeal from Solidarity directed to all CSCE delegations via the union's Coordinating Office Abroad in Brussels. It reads, in part: "Your support for Solidarity in its peaceful struggle for collective and individual rights is vital not only for us but also for lasting and just peace. What you say is important, but it is what you do that counts. Please keep these points in mind as you participate in the CSCE Review Meeting here in Vienna as well as in all your dealings with the human rights issue."

I pledge my Delegation to do so.

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Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

Plenary

December 12, 1986
Vienna, Austria

Mr. Chairman, in my remarks today I wish to correct a misunderstanding that may have crept into our debate during the past several weeks. Many of the Western delegations gathered here, my own included, have spent considerable time reviewing Soviet and Eastern violations of civil and political rights. Rather than respond directly to these criticisms, our Soviet and Eastern colleagues have counterattacked by raising alleged Western violations of social and economic rights. They have charged us with permitting poverty, umemployment and homelessness. They have even accused us of racial prejudice.

This difference in emphasis might tempt someone unfamiliar with the true nature of our respective societies to conclude that social and economic issues are less important to us than they are to our Soviet and Eastern neighbors, and that we don't do as good a job in this area. This is the misunderstanding I wish to correct.

My government's view is that the Soviet and Eastern record on social and economic issues is at least as bad as its record on civil and political rights. We have not emphasized these issues here because we do not believe they concern matters of basic human rights. Rather, these "quality of life" issues concern basic human goals and aspirations. As individuals we seek to provide happy, meaningful lives for ourselves and our families, free from fear and want. As governments we seek to foster conditions in which more and more of our people can lead better and better lives.

Soviet and Eastern governments would have us believe that these basic human goals and aspirations can best be met by centralized planning and various kinds of social guarantees. In the West we favor pluralist, mixed-market systems, which stress both social welfare and individual enterprise.

While there is probably no a priori way to determine which approach is best, we do have the benefit of decades of experience to serve as a basis for comparison. In my remarks today I will compare Western and Eastern performance on social and economic issues. In so doing, I will take due account of Soviet and Eastern criticisms of Western performance.

Although my remarks will center on a comparison of U.S. and Soviet performance, the substance of what I have to say applies for West versus East generally. In our view, the problems with Eastern performance are systemic ones.

Earlier in this meeting, the representative of the Soviet

Union criticized my country for poverty and unemployment. It would be disingenuous of me to deny the substance of his remarks. Poverty and unemployment do exist in the United States. In 1985 14 percent of Americans lived beneath the official U.S. poverty line. This is an unacceptably high percentage of our population, and no U.S. government can truly be satisfied until poverty is eliminated from our country once and for all.

Poverty is, of course, a relative concept. In the United States, a family of four is considered poor if its annual income falls below 10,989 dollars per year. This level is not comparable to the subsistence level income which plagues so much of the world's population even today. It is an income which forces American families to live and eat cheaply, and to survive without the luxuries that have become commonplace in U.S. life. And even this income does not include benefits derived from such government programs as food stamps, medicare, housing subsidies, and others.

As University of Surrey Professor Mervyn Matthews has shown, if the U.S. definition of poverty were applied to the Soviet Union, a majority of the Soviet population would fall beneath the official U.S. poverty line. The average Soviet citizen, by standards the United States applies to itself, would be poor. This is not surprising given the fact that Soviet per capita consumption is currently only one third the U.S. level.

Unemployment also exists in the United States, as it does in all mixed-market economies. Currently seven percent of U.S. workers are unemployed. This figure is too high, though much lower than in the early 1980's; and President Reagan's administration is seeking to lower it further. But it should be kept in mind that nearly half of U.S. unemployment results from voluntary movement out of, or within, the labor force, as workers leave or change their jobs. Moreover, of these, nearly 50 percent find a new job within five weeks and 90 percent within six months. Of those out of work due to involuntary causes, more than two-thirds secure new jobs within six months. Unemployment in the United States does not mean abandonment. Virtually every worker in the U.S. is eligible for some form of unemployment benefits. Each year the U.S. Government spends hundreds of millions of dollars on such benefit programs.

No one would deny that unemployment is a necessary evil of market economies, but its impact must be kept in perspective. Unemployment provides market economies with a flexibility essential in accelerating economic growth. While unemployed people suffer a temporary lowering of living standards, the average American family with an unemployed worker still earns an income of 20,000 dollars a year. A Soviet family with this kind of income would number among the Soviet economic elite. In unemployment, as with poverty, everything is relative.

It is not my intention to minimize the problems caused by poverty and unemployment in my own country. But it is my intention to compare systems. The United States is a nation where most people are quite comfortable, and where poverty is relatively rare. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is a country where people are considerably less comfortable and where poverty is quite common.

Markedly lower Soviet living standards, moreover, are not an accident of history, but reflect the systemic inflexibility of a centrally planned economic system which breeds bottlenecks and inefficiencies. Pervasive shortages of consumer goods, including formal and informal food rationing, are common features of Soviet life. These shortages have created an enormous black market in scarce commodities. An estimated 25 percent of Soviet GNP finds its way to the black market every year. The black market has in turn led to widespread corruption, as officials with administrative control over scarce commodities divert them for personal gain.

These problems and more are shared to varying degrees by most Eastern countries. Their living standards lag far behind those of their Western neighbors, and their low relative rates of productivity give them small hope of ever catching up. We in the West have our economic problems, but they pale in comparison to those of our neighbors to the East.

Quality of life is not simply a function of per capita consumption. Social values and the content and character of social policy and social life are also important. The Soviet representative, in his earlier remarks, accused my country of a number of social failings, including racism, a high crime rate, homelessness, inadequate medical care and even genocide. As I stated earlier, my country is not perfect and has many problems. It has social problems as well as economic ones. But once again let us compare.

In many ways the charge of genocide against our indigenous population is both the most serious and the most ludicrous charge. It is true that the Indian population of North America was once greater than it is today. But the great reduction in the native American population occurred not in this century or even in the 19th century, but in the first centuries following the arrival of Columbus, when up to 90 percent of the Indian population in some areas perished through war or pestilence. In fact, over the past 100 years the U.S. Indian population has increased more than fivefold, from 274,000 to the current 1.5 million.

If the Soviet representative wishes to find more recent examples of large-scale depopulation, he would do better to look to the 1930's in his own country, when millions died in Stalin's purges and millions more in the deliberately induced Ukrainian famine.

The charge of racism leveled against my country is also a serious one, but one that does not withstand serious analysis. Racist attitudes do persist in my country. Such attitudes unfortunately persist in all our countries, including the Soviet Union. As is well known, in my country, our black population has been particularly victimized by such attitudes. Over the past twenty-five years, however, enormous progress has been made in eliminating racial prejudice and extending equal opportunities to all. The number of blacks in U.S. universities has increased from 7 to 19 percent. The number of black elected officials has increased to 6000, including 23 congressmen and the mayors of 4 of our 10 largest cities. Black incomes have increased at almost twice the rate of white incomes. Last year the adjusted medium incomes of black families grew by five percent, greater than any other racial group. Today, the most popular program on U.S. television is about a black family. Our most popular movie star is black, as are many of the top names in American popular music and in American sport.

While we still have a long way to go, we are encouraged by our progress. Throughout this struggle, the U.S. government and the American judicial system, have played a leading role in increasing opportunities for blacks and other minorities and in fighting the scourge of racism. This is in stark contrast to the behavior of the Soviet government, which has deliberately fanned the flames of Soviet anti-Semitism in its attempt to discredit the Jewish emigration movement.

Crime is also a serious problem in my country, although the crime rate has fallen somewhat over the past several years. Increasing crime rates appear to be an unwelcome concomitant of urbanization and industrialization throughout our world. Some societies, largely for cultural reasons, seem to have escaped relatively unscathed. A number of European countries are in this category. The Soviet Union, however, is not among them. Soviet authorities have grudingly admitted to a steadily increasing crime rate, and the Soviet Union's prisoner population is estimated to be 4 times higher than that of the United States. Since Soviet authorities do not publish their crime statistics, we can only guess at the true situation. But it hardly seems fair for them to criticize us while shrouding their own performance behind a veil of secrecy.

Guaranteed housing and free medical care are two of the most highly publicized cornerstones of the Soviet social system. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet representative would criticize my country for tolerating homelessness, or cast aspersions on our health care system.

Homelessness does exist in America. The number of homeless is not 2 million or 3 million, as Soviet representatives asserted on separate occasions, but aproximately 350,000. The majority of these homeless people are either mentally ill, alcoholic or both.

Shelters are available at no cost to each and every one of them. Ninety-five percent of these shelters are open year-round and provide meals free of charge. For the most part, those who spend the night on the streets do so through free choice. They cannot be simply cleared from the streets or incarcerated in mental institutions because our courts have ruled such treatment a violation of their rights. Like it or not, in my country people have the right to sleep on grates.

In the Soviet Union official homelessness does not exist. But people find themselves squeezed into the most cramped housing in the industrialized world. There are two persons for every room in the Soviet Union, compared to two rooms for every person in the West. Twenty percent of all urban families still share kitchen and toilet facilities with strangers. Five percent more live in factory dormitories. Young people must wait years for housing of their own. At the current rate of housing construction, the per capita space available to Soviet citizens will begin to approach the Western standard in 150 years.

Soviet statistics reveal that in 1985, 29 percent of all state-owned urban housing had no hot water, 22 percent was without gas, 17 percent without indoor baths, 11 percent without central heating, 10 percent without sewage and 8 percent without water. This is the best Soviet housing. In the countryside the situation is incomparably worse.

Medical care in the United States can be expensive, but comprehensive health insurance is widely available and heavily subsidized for retired persons. The quality of the care is among the highest in world. In the Soviet Union, the situation is markedly different. Although health care is free, Soviet citizens often get what they pay for. Doctors are poorly trained, and among the lowest paid workers in Soviet society. Medical equipment and even the most basic medicines are in chronic short supply. One third of all Soviet hospitals, for example, do not have adequate facilities for blood transfusions. Unsanitary conditions result in 30 percent of all post-operative patients developing infections. Three percent is considered high in the West.

The Soviet health care system is, in fact, in the midst of a crisis of potentially catastrophic proportions. Over the past two decades there has been a dramatic increase in Soviet death and morbidity rates. Infant mortality has increased by over 25 percent, and is now almost 4 times higher than the U.S. rate. Male life expectancy over the period has decreased by more than four years, from 66 in the mid-1960's to less than 62 years today. Never before has a developed, industrialized nation suffered such a precipitous decline in these demographic indicators in time of peace.

The cause of these dramatic reversals can be traced to the inability of the Soviet health care system to deal with the diseases of contemporary urban life. This is not surprising given the fact that the proportion of Soviet national income devoted to health care has been decreasing since the mid-1950's. Currently, the Soviet Union spends only a third as much on health care as the United States.

I have not heard our Soviet colleagues criticize the American educational system, so there is no need to draw a comparison in this area. I am proud of the quality of American education. Nevertheless, I want unilaterally to compliment the Soviet Union on the quality of its own primary and secondary education. My three children have attended a typical Moscow school, in which each was the only foreign child in his or her class. I can report that their experience was a positive and enriching one, and I am glad in this forum to have the opportunity to say so.

In my remarks today I have compared the United States and the Soviet Union on a variety of social and economic issues. I have conceded that the U.S. has serious problems in a number of areas, but I have argued that these pale by comparison with Soviet social and economic problems, which are of an altogether different order of magnitude. I have suggested, moreover, that these Soviet problems are shared by several of their Eastern allies, since in large part they result from difficulties inherent in the Soviet Communist system. President Kennedy once remarked: "Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put up a wall to keep our people in."

Most of my discussion has focused on specific issues. In concluding my remarks I would like to say something more basic about the difference in the quality of life between West and East. Western societies, for all their problems, are vibrant, growing organisms. There is food to eat, things to buy, places to go, and things to do. Competition continues to move our societies forward. Men and women continue to improve their lot in life and in so doing enrich the society around them. We combine tradition and change in ways that make our lives both more convenient and more chaotic.

Eastern societies, by comparison, tend to be shabbier and drearier. Buildings are more dilapidated, and there are more potholes in the streets. There is less to eat, less to buy, fewer places to go, fewer things to do. Since competition is for the most part disdained, there is little incentive to work harder, and little upward mobility. People drink more to pass the time. In the Soviet Union, drinking has become a social problem of epidemic proportions, as has been commendably recognized by General Secretary Gorbachev. Young people continue to dream the dreams of youth, but their music and fashions come from the West. While revolutionary exortations still appear everywhere, the dominant impression is one of stagnation and malaise.

In recent months, however, there have been signs of change in the East. The new Soviet leadership has acknowledged, at least to some extent, the social and economic crisis facing the Soviet Union. There have been calls from the very top for fundamental reform. My government has watched these developments with interest and sympathy. We hope that Soviet concern will result in better living conditions for the Soviet people. To date, there has been more talk than action, but we understand that there is massive inertia which must be overcome. Whatever the future may hold, however, of this much we can be certain. If the Soviet Union does someday hope to match the social and economic performance of the West, then it must move its system dramatically, fundamentally, in the direction of the openness, competitiveness, and freedom characteristic of the Western system.

I explained at the outset of my remarks that I wished to correct a misunderstanding. I did not want to convey the impression that my delegation or other Western delegations believed that social and economic issues were unimportant. They are crucially important. Above all, I did not wish to leave our Soviet and Eastern colleagues with the feeling that these were their issues. These are not their issues; they are our issues. And if they persist in raising them, we will be more than happy to compare.

SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO
CHAIRMAN,
U.S. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
PLENARY SPEECH
December 15, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN:

THE IDEAL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN IS AS OLD AS HUMAN CIVILIZATION ITSELF. IT HAS REACHED ITS MOST ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION AND CONTINUES TO BE THE MOST COMPELLING IDEA OF OUR TIME. NOTHING WILL KILL THIS IDEAL. HUMAN RIGHTS CANNOT BE DEFINED AWAY OR DENIED. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT EMBODIES THIS IDEAL.

WHEN THE LEADERS OF THE THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES SIGNED THE FINAL ACT IN HELSINKI ON AUGUST 1, 1975, THEY "DECLARED THEIR DETERMINATION TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS . . ." THEY GAVE THEIR WORD THAT THEY WOULD KEEP THE PROMISES THEY MADE IN THE FINAL ACT. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY SIGNATORY WAS DECEIVED INTO PARTICIPATING OR THAT ANY SIGNATORY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE TERMS OF THE FINAL ACT OR THE MADRID DOCUMENT.

WE ARE NOW APPROACHING THE END OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. MANY DELEGATIONS, MY OWN INCLUDED, HAVE SPOKEN IN DETAIL ABOUT VIOLATIONS OF THOSE PROMISES. THEY HAVE SPOKEN ELOQUENTLY ABOUT THE HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY SUCH VIOLATIONS. THIS REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION HAS PRODUCED THE MOST FRANK AND COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF NON-COMPLIANCE EVER TO OCCUR IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS. IT HAS SOMETIMES BEEN PAINFUL AND EMBARRASSING.

WE ARE NOW AWARE OF MANY SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH HAVE BEEN COMMITTED SINCE THE LAST FOLLOW-UP MEETING. THE COMPLIANCE RECORD OF SOME SIGNATORY STATES HAS MEASURABLY WORSENED SINCE THE END OF MADRID.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? IT MEANS THAT SOME STATES' WORDS CANNOT BE TRUSTED. IT ALSO MEANS THAT THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED AND SOME HAVE DIED BECAUSE THESE PROMISES WERE NOT KEPT.

A UNIQUE ASPECT OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS IS THAT IT IS ABOUT PEOPLE -- IT IS ABOUT US. IT IS ABOUT OUR HOPES AND DREAMS FOR A PEACEFUL AND SECURE FUTURE FOR OURSELVES AND OUR CHILDREN. IT IS ABOUT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, INCLUDING THE FREEDOM OF

THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, RELIGION, OR BELIEF. IT IS ABOUT CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES, BROADER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION, CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLE, AND THE SOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS.

VIOLATIONS OF THESE COMMITMENTS MEAN PERSECUTION, BEATINGS, STARVATION, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE, TORTURE, IMPRISONMENT, AND DEATH. BUT THESE WORDS ARE ABSTRACT. THE VICTIMS, HOWEVER, ARE REAL PEOPLE -- LIKE YOU AND ME. THEIR LIVES ARE DEVASTATED, THEIR HEALTH IS DESTROYED, THEIR FAMILIES ARE DIVIDED, AND THEIR HUMAN DIGNITY IS MOCKED AND DEGRADED.

DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, MANY NAMES HAVE BEEN NAMED AND MANY FACTS HAVE BEEN SET FORTH FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE DELEGATES GATHERED HERE. I WILL NOT REPEAT THAT REVIEW BECAUSE I KNOW YOUR MEMORIES ARE FRESH.

INSTEAD, I WANT TO DISCUSS THE CREDIBILITY OF SOVIET PROMISES -- A TOPIC WHICH GOES TO THE HEART OF OUR WORK. AMBASSADOR WISE, IN A SPEECH BEFORE THE SECURITY WORKING GROUP LAST THURSDAY, STATED THE UNITED STATES' VIEWS ON PRINCIPLE VII. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS, IN FACT, A STATE IN WHICH THE POWER OF THE RULING ELITE IS ABSOLUTE. REGARDLESS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION AND SOVIET LAWS, SOVIET OFFICIALS ROUTINELY BRING CHARGES AGAINST ANYONE WHO DOES

NOT OBEDIENTLY FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN ALL MATTERS. THEY EXERCISE POWER WITH DISDAIN FOR THE DIGNITY OF MAN.

WE MUST CONFRONT THIS CENTRAL FACT IN OUR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THE HELSINKI PROCESS. IF SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE NO REGARD FOR THEIR OWN CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, HOW CAN WE EXPECT THEM TO RESPECT THEIR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS? THEIR ATTITUDE IS THAT LAWS ARE TOOLS OF THE STATE AND NOT GUARANTEES OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS. THEIR CONTINUING MASSIVE VIOLATIONS OF THEIR HELSINKI HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS SHOWS THAT THIS ATTITUDE GOVERNS THEIR POLICIES IN THIS CONTEXT, TOO.

LET ME RECALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT AND THE SECTION WHICH SPECIFICALLY PLEDGES SIGNATORIES TO GIVE "SPECIAL ATTENTION . . . TO REQUESTS FOR FAMILY REUNIFICATION OF AN URGENT CHARACTER - SUCH AS REQUESTS SUBMITTED BY PERSONS WHO ARE ILL OR OLD." I RAISE THIS ISSUE BECAUSE HUMAN LIVES ARE IMMEDIATELY AT STAKE AND TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. HAD THIS PROVISION BEEN HONORED, ANATOLY MARCHENKO MIGHT STILL BE ALIVE TODAY.

WE KNOW OF FIVE CANCER PATIENTS WHO HAVE CLOSE RELATIVES IN THE U.S. AND WHO HAVE REQUESTED PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE U.S.S.R. THE FIVE CANCER PATIENTS ARE

TATYANA BOGOMOLNY, RIMMA BRAVVE, INNA MEIMAN, BENJAMIN CHARNY, AND LEAH MARYASIN. TATYANA BOGOMOLNY WAS ALLOWED TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES IN NOVEMBER. THE OTHER FOUR REMAIN IN THE SOVIET UNION.

THESE CASES CAPTURE THE ESSENCE OF THE HUMAN IMPACT OF VIOLATIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. I ALSO RAISE THEM BECAUSE THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE OF THE SOVIET UNION STATED IN HIS SPEECH IN THIS HALL ON NOVEMBER 20TH THAT ONE OF THESE CASES, THE CASE OF RIMMA BRAVVE, HAD BEEN RESOLVED. THE WAY THE BRAVVE CASE AND THE OTHER CANCER PATIENTS' CASES HAVE BEEN HANDLED FROM THEIR INCEPTION TELLS US MANY THINGS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION'S "DETERMINATION" TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL PROMISES.

MRS. RIMMA BRAVVE IS A SOVIET CITIZEN, A VICTIM OF CANCER, A PERSON WHO SOUGHT TO EXERCISE HER PROMISED RIGHT FREELY TO LEAVE AND RETURN TO HER COUNTRY, AND A PERSON WHO SEEKS, FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, TO BE REUNITED WITH HER MOTHER AND HER SISTER IN THE UNITED STATES. HER CASE IS DESPERATE. EVERY WEEK THAT HER ACCESS TO SPECIALIZED MEDICAL TREATMENT IS DELAYED DECREASES HER CHANCES OF SURVIVAL.

ON NOVEMBER 20TH, OUR DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE AMBASSADOR KASHLEV SAID, AND I QUOTE, "SEVERAL DAYS AGO A FORMER SOVIET CITIZEN APPEALED TO US TO ALLOW HER ILL

DAUGHTER, RIMMA BRAVVE, TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE U.S. THE DAUGHTER RECEIVED EXIT PERMISSION YESTERDAY." LET US EXAMINE THE PROGRESS OF THE RIMMA BRAVVE CASE AND HOW IT WAS HANDLED BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES.

IT HAS BEEN THREE WEEKS AND FIVE DAYS SINCE OUR DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE AMBASSADOR KASHLEV'S REMARKS BEFORE THIS BODY. UNTIL WEDNESDAY OF LAST WEEK, MRS. BRAVVE AND HER HUSBAND HAD RECEIVED NO INDICATION THAT ANYONE IN MOSCOW KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT AMBASSADOR KASHLEV'S WORDS HERE. ON DECEMBER 10TH, HER HUSBAND WAS TOLD TO VISIT THE MOSCOW VISA OFFICE ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING TWO DAYS, BECAUSE ACTION WAS GOING TO BE TAKEN ON THEIR APPLICATION FOR EXIT VISAS.

ON DECEMBER 12TH, THEY WERE GIVEN WRITTEN PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION AND WERE TOLD TO RETURN TO THE OFFICE TODAY TO RECEIVE THEIR EXIT VISAS. THEY WERE TOLD TO PLAN TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THEY RECEIVE THEIR VISAS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THEY ARE COMING TO VIENNA, AS SOON AS THEY CAN. I EXPECT TO MEET THEM HERE THIS WEEK AND TAKE THEM BACK TO THE UNITED STATES WITH ME. I HOPE THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER DELAYS TO THEIR EXIT FROM THE SOVIET UNION. I HOPE THAT THE UNEXPLAINED DELAY OF MORE THAN

FOUR WEEKS FROM THE TIME AMBASSADOR KASHLEV SPOKE TO THE ANTICIPATED DAY OF THEIR ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES DID NO DAMAGE TO HER CHANCES TO RECOVER.

THE OTHER CANCER VICTIMS HAVE NOT RECEIVED MENTION IN ANY SOVIET PLENARY SPEECHES. THEY WAIT WHILE THEIR CANCERS GROW AND THEIR CHANCES TO LIVE FADE. THEY WAIT, DIVIDED FROM THE LOVE AND COMFORT OF THEIR FAMILIES IN THE WEST AS THEY STRUGGLE AGAINST THIS DEADLY DISEASE. THEY WAIT FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO LIVE UP TO ITS HELSINKI PROMISES -- JUST AS WE HAVE WAITED SINCE 1975.

EVERY PROMISE, EVERY COMMITMENT, EVERY PROPOSAL WILL BE WEIGHED AGAINST PROOF OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE -- OR LACK OF COMPLIANCE -- WITH THEIR PAST COMMITMENTS. THE CANCER VICTIMS REMAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE SUFFERING IN PRECISELY THE KIND OF SITUATION THE FINAL ACT WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT. BENJAMIN CHARNY, INNA MEIMAN, AND LEAH MARYASIN HAVE SOUGHT PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE AND HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY DENIED. THEY HAVE CLOSE FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND HAVE REQUESTED REUNIFICATION WITH THEM. THEY ARE ILL AND REQUIRE SPECIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT. YET THEIR CASES HAVE BEEN TREATED NOT "IN A POSITIVE AND HUMANITARIAN SPIRIT . . ." AS THE SOVIET UNION PROMISED AT HELSINKI, BUT WITH A COLD AND CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR TERRIBLE SUFFERING AND WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS DISREGARD COULD CAUSE DEATH.

AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, AN INDEPENDENT LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I HAVE CHAIRED SEVERAL HEARINGS ON THE FUTURE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS. WITNESSES WERE UNANIMOUS IN THE OPINION THAT THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS IS THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND, TO DIFFERING DEGREES, ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES TO ABIDE BY THEIR HELSINKI AND MADRID COMMITMENTS.

STATES WHICH DON'T KEEP THEIR HELSINKI HUMAN RIGHTS PROMISES DENY THEMSELVES RESPECT AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD. EVERY ANATOLY MARCHENKO WHO DIES IN PRISON, EVERY BENJAMIN CHARNY, INNA MEIMAN, OR LEAH MARYASIN WHO IS LEFT TO SUFFER CANCER EVERY SOVIET HELSINKI MONITOR WHO LANGUISHES IN PRISON, IN LABOR CAMP, OR IN INTERNAL EXILE MAKES A MOCKERY OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS. THEIR FATE SHOULD SEND SHIVERS THROUGH THE HEARTS OF EVERYONE AT THIS CONFERENCE.

THE QUESTION WE FACE NOW, AS WE APPROACH THE END OF THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW PHASE OF THIS MEETING, IS WHETHER OUR FRANK AND DETAILED REVIEW OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT SHOULD HAVE ANY CONSEQUENCES. HAVING POINTED OUT ALL OF THESE ACTS

BY OFFICIALS OF SIGNATORY STATES, ARE WE THEN TO PROCEED AS IF THE SUFFERING AND DEATH WE HAVE SO CAREFULLY DESCRIBED ARE ONLY OF ACADEMIC INTEREST?

THE HEARINGS I CHAIRED IN THE UNITED STATES LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS. FOR THE PROCESS TO HAVE A FUTURE, TO RESTORE ITS CREDIBILITY, THERE MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED COMPLIANCE BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES WITH THEIR PROMISES. THE ONLY WAY THESE STATES CAN PROVE THAT THEIR ATTITUDE OF ARROGANT DISRESPECT FOR THEIR COMMITMENTS HAS ENDED IS BY MATCHING THEIR PROMISES WITH DEEDS.

FOR EXAMPLE, THEY CAN ALLOW THE REMAINING CANCER PATIENTS TO EMIGRATE SO THEY MAY BE REUNITED WITH THEIR FAMILIES ABROAD AND RECEIVE LIFE-SAVING MEDICAL TREATMENT. BENJAMIN CHARNY, A FORTY-EIGHT YEAR OLD MOSCOW MATHEMATICIAN, SUFFERS FROM SKIN CANCER AND A SERIOUS HEART CONDITION. HE WISHES TO JOIN HIS BROTHER IN NEEDHAM, MASSACHUSETTS. HE FIRST APPLIED FOR AN EXIT VISA IN 1979 AND HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY TURNED DOWN, ON THE BASIS THAT HE ONCE WORKED FOR AN ORGANIZATION INVOLVED IN CLASSIFIED RESEARCH. THE CASES OF INNA MEIMAN AND LEAH MARYASIN ARE VERY SIMILAR. MEETING THEIR HELSINKI OBLIGATIONS IN THESE CASES WOULD BE SUCH A DEED.

WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL QUICKLY CONCLUDE THAT THE PROCESS IS FATALLY OUT OF BALANCE. THEY WILL NOT BE ALONE IN THIS CONCLUSION. THEN THE FUTURE OF THE PROCESS WILL BE IN JEOPARDY.

BALANCE IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS, AS WE ALL KNOW, IS CRITICAL TO ITS CONTINUED VIABILITY. THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND OR ACCEPT THAT THE PROCESS SHOULD GO FORWARD IN ONE MAIN AREA - THE AREA OF MILITARY SECURITY - WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT AND CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN THE OTHER MAIN AREA - HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. A PROPOSAL HAS ALREADY BEEN PRESENTED HERE IN VIENNA TO MOVE INTO A GREATLY EXPANDED SECOND STAGE OF THE CDE CONFERENCE. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF TRUE SECURITY FOR OUR NATIONS AND OUR PEOPLES REQUIRES NOTHING LESS THAN EQUAL PROGRESS IN BOTH AREAS. AND WHEN I SPEAK OF PROGRESS, MAKE NO MISTAKE, I MEAN ACTIONS AND NOT MORE WORDS.

AT MADRID, WE AGREED THAT WE "CONSIDERED THAT THE FUTURE OF THE CSCE PROCESS REQUIRED BALANCED PROGRESS IN ALL SECTIONS OF THE FINAL ACT." CLEARLY, WE HAVE NOT HAD SUCH BALANCED PROGRESS. THE SECTIONS OF THE FINAL ACT WHICH HAVE SHOWN THE LEAST PROGRESS ARE THE SECTIONS DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS.

IT IS NOW UP TO THOSE STATES WHO LAG BEHIND IN THOSE AREAS TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF THE PROCESS. WILL THEY DO AS THEY PROMISED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE FINAL ACT IN HELSINKI, OR WILL THEY SEEK FURTHER TO UNBALANCE THE ACT TO GAIN ADVANTAGE? BEFORE WE LEAVE VIENNA, WE MUST HAVE ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION.

I TRUST THAT THE ANSWER WILL BE IN THE FORM OF SIGNIFICANT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS. RESOLUTION OF HEADLINE CASES WITH THE PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING WORLD OPINION IS NOT ENOUGH.

THIS IS THE ANSWER TO THE CRISIS OF CREDIBILITY IN THE PROCESS. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IS THE ONLY REMEDY TO DOUBTS ABOUT ITS FUTURE. MY GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND SO DO I. MANY MILLIONS OF PEOPLE LOOK TO THE PROCESS WITH HOPE, IMAGINING THEIR FUTURES IF THE HELSINKI PROMISES WERE KEPT. WE JOIN THEM IN THAT HOPE, HOWEVER DISTANT ITS FULFILLMENT MAY SEEM.

IN THE SPIRIT OF THE HOLIDAY SEASON, I HOPE THAT ALL OF THE DIVIDED FAMILIES, SEPARATED SPOUSES, AND CITIZENS OF DUAL NATIONALITY WILL BE REUNITED TO ENJOY ITS PLEASURES TOGETHER. I HOPE THAT ALL OF THE SOVIET HELSINKI MONITORS WILL BE RELEASED, SO NO MORE NEED SUFFER THE FATE OF ANATOLY MARCHENKO.

I WOULD APPEAL TO THE SIGNATORIES OF THE FINAL ACT TO RESPECT THEIR CITIZENS' CULTURAL, ETHNIC, AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, SO THAT OUR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PEACE, SECURITY, AND COOPERATION AMONG ALL OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, FOUNDED UPON ABIDING RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON WILL BECOME A REALITY.

THANK YOU.

STATEMENT BY SHERWOOD MCGINNIS
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
DECEMBER 17, 1986

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IS AN ISSUE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. HERE IN PLENARY I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS SOME OF OUR BROADER CONCERNS ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS, BEING DISCUSSED IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY "E," ARE A NECESSITY, BUT OUR ULTIMATE GOAL IS NOT TO SEEK MORE INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS ON THE ENVIRONMENT. OUR ULTIMATE GOAL IS TO HAVE CLEANER AIR AND WATER, PROTECTION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILDLIFE, AND MORE FERTILE SOIL FROM WHICH WE OBTAIN OUR FOOD. INTERNATIONAL FORA BY THEMSELVES CANNOT EXERT SUFFICIENT FORCE TO STOP US FROM DESTROYING THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH WE LIVE, LET ALONE ENCOURAGE US TO CORRECT THE DAMAGE ALREADY DONE.

THUS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CSCE, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IS MORE THAN A BASKET II CONCERN. ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS HAVE A RELEVANCE TO ALL THREE BASKETS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, FROM RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AS EXPRESSED IN PRINCIPLE VII OF BASKET I TO THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND EXPANSION OF HUMAN CONTACTS AS EXPRESSED IN BASKET III. ONE COULD EVEN ARGUE THAT THE SECTION OF BASKET III ON CULTURE HAS CERTAIN IMPLICATIONS, IF ONE CONSIDERS THE PRESERVATION OF HISTORICAL BUILDINGS AND MONUMENTS TO BE A MAN-MADE EXTENSION TO OUR NATURAL ENVIRONMENT.

FURTHERMORE, JUST AS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES PERVADE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF OUR HELSINKI COMMITMENTS, NOTHING HAS DONE MORE, AT LEAST IN THE LAST YEAR, TO UNITE PEOPLES OF EUROPE THAN THE FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER. IN RECENT YEARS, IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT POLLUTION, BOTH OF THE AIR AND OF THE WATER, HAS TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS. THIS POLLUTION KNOWS NO DIVISION OF EUROPE NOR ANY POLITICAL BOUNDARIES; IT IS A COMMON THREAT AND AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION AMONG STATES.

GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM AND ITS RELEVANCE TO MANY ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO IGNORE IT IN A PROCESS SUCH AS THE CSCE. IT WOULD ALSO BE A MISTAKE FOR ANY OF US TO PLEAD COMPLETE INNOCENCE TO POLLUTING THE ENVIRONMENT. WE ALL HAVE AUTOMOBILES AND FACTORIES, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS CAN HAPPEN ANYWHERE. I THEREFORE DO NOT WISH TO POINT A FINGER AT ANY ONE FOR WHAT HARM HAS BEEN DONE. WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO IS TO EXAMINE WHAT IS BEING DONE -- OR NOT BEING DONE -- TO CORRECT THE EXISTING SITUATION.

THE U.S. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE OPENNESS OF OUR SOCIETY HAS BEEN A POWERFUL FACTOR IN STRENGTHENING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EFFORTS. A FREE PRESS HAS HELPED TO SPREAD INFORMATION CONCERNING ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS. INDEPENDENT GROUPS CONCERNED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES HAVE MADE THE PUBLIC AT LARGE AWARE OF THE DAMAGE BEING DONE TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND HAVE SUGGESTED STEPS TO CORRECT THE SITUATION. FREQUENTLY THEY

HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICIES WHICH, THEY FEEL, DO NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT. SUCH CRITICISM, HOWEVER, AND THE PRESSURE IT CREATES ON PUBLIC OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS, HAVE LED TO MANY EFFORTS NOT ONLY TO LESSEN THE POLLUTING OF THE ENVIRONMENT BUT TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT IN POSITIVE WAYS.

IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, THIS PRESSURE DOES NOT EXIST. INDEPENDENT ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES ARE NOT TOLERATED ANY MORE THAN OTHER ACTIVITIES NOT OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED. IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TWO YOUNG TECHNICIANS, PAVEL SKODA AND PAVEL KRIVKA, WERE SENTENCED IN 1985 FOR TWENTY MONTHS AND THREE YEARS RESPECTIVELY FOR ACTIVITIES WHICH INCLUDED CONTACTING ECOLOGISTS ABROAD ON THE ECOLOGICAL SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, UDO ZEITZ'S PROTEST AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES LED TO HIS ARREST AND SENTENCING TO THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS IMPRISONMENT IN APRIL 1985 ON CHARGES OF "DEFAMATION OF THE GDR." IN THE USSR THIS LAST SUMMER, MEMBERS OF THE UNOFFICIAL GROUP TO ESTABLISH TRUST BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA WERE DETAINED FOR COLLECTING SIGNATURES IN MOSCOW PROTESTING NUCLEAR POWER. AND IN HUNGARY, WHERE ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS ARE REPORTEDLY GIVEN GREATER CONSIDERATION, A MARCH IN BUDAPEST BY AN UNOFFICIAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP IN FEBRUARY 1986 WAS NOT ALLOWED TO TAKE PLACE. WHEN SOME INDIVIDUALS ATTEMPTED TO MARCH WITHOUT PERMISSION, THEIR GATHERING WAS BROKEN UP BY POLICE. WHILE WE DO NOT NECESSARILY ADVOCATE THE VIEWS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS, WE CERTAINLY BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS THOSE

VIEWS. TO DENY THEM THIS RIGHT IS A VIOLATION OF HELSINKI AND MADRID PLEDGES.

WHILE WE CAN ALL TAKE BLAME FOR POLLUTING THE WORLD IN WHICH WE ALL LIVE, THE NOTION THAT CENTRALLY PLANNED SYSTEMS ARE PARTICULARLY ABLE TO ACT IN THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY AS A WHOLE IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN THE AREA OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, AS IN OTHER AREAS. THE CENTRALIZED SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE -- WHICH DENY INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES FREELY ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, PROHIBIT UNOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS FROM PLAYING THEIR RELEVANT AND POSITIVE ROLE, AND RESTRICT THE FLOW OF INFORMATION ON ECOLOGICAL CONDITIONS -- SEEM TO HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN TAKING MEASURES TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, PRODUCTION PLANS TAKE PRIORITY OVER NEEDED BUT CONFLICTING ECOLOGICAL MEASURES; ENTERPRISES DO NOT OBTAIN REWARDS FOR PRODUCING LESS SMOKE IF IT ALSO MEANS PRODUCING LESS OUTPUT.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT MEASURES TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN IN THE SOVIET UNION OR THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. NOR DOES IT MEAN THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THOSE COUNTRIES HAVE NO CONCERN OVER DESTROYING THE FORESTS, LAKES AND RIVERS OF EUROPE. THE EASTERN STATES HAVE ESTABLISHED LEGISLATION, CREATED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND TAKEN OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ECOLOGICAL SITUATION IN THEIR COUNTRIES. FURTHERMORE, SOME STATES ALLOW LIMITED

AMOUNTS OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. FOR THE MOST PART, HOWEVER, THESE MEASURES HAVE BEEN INEFFECTUAL. IN SOME EASTERN COUNTRIES, FOR EXAMPLE, EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE AT REFORESTATION, BUT THE POLLUTION THAT KILLED THE TREES IN THE FIRST PLACE IS STILL BEING EMITTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. ENTERPRISE MANAGERS SEE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN PRODUCTION TARGETS AND ANTI-POLLUTION REQUIREMENTS AND GIVE PRIORITY TO THE FORMER OVER THE LATTER. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE INCENTIVE AT PRESENT FOR ANY EXISTING MEASURES TO BE ADEQUATELY ENFORCED, PARTICULARLY WHEN THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT PRESSURE TO ENSURE THAT DESIRES FOR A CLEANER WORLD ARE GIVEN APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATION.

IMPROVED COMPLIANCE WITH THE HELSINKI AND MADRID PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS WOULD PROMOTE A BETTER, HEALTHIER ENVIRONMENT BY ALLOWING CONCERNED INDIVIDUALS FREELY TO ORGANIZE AND PRESS FOR BETTER PROTECTION OF PRECIOUS NATURAL RESOURCES. WITHOUT SUCH COMPLIANCE, WE WILL FACE A WORSENING OF OUR ENVIRONMENT WITH SIGNIFICANT HUMAN COSTS. FOR EXAMPLE, PEOPLE LIVING IN HIGHLY POLLUTED AREAS MIGHT SEEK TO MIGRATE TO BETTER REGIONS OR THEIR HEALTH MIGHT BE IMPAIRED. THE ECONOMIC RESULT IN EITHER CASE WOULD BE A SMALLER AND LESS PRODUCTIVE WORK FORCE. SOIL EROSION AND OVER-FERTILIZATION MAY MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. AND, OF COURSE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF WHOLE FORESTS WHICH CANNOT REGENERATE IS AS OBVIOUS AS IT IS OMINOUS. THE SAME HOLDS TRUE FOR FISHING AREAS NOW ENDANGERED BY INCREASED WATER POLLUTION. UNFORTUNATELY, SOME OF THESE SIGNS HAVE ALREADY

APPEARED, AND IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE FULL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSE IS MADE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, PERHAPS OF ALL EXAMPLES, THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL ATOMIC POWER STATION LAST APRIL DEMONSTRATED THE HUMAN COST OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS. HERE I WANT TO MARK THE SUCCESS SO FAR ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR SAFETY. THE WORK DONE AT THE IAEA -- IN PARTICULAR THE EXAMINATION OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT IN AUGUST AND THE AGREEMENT IN SEPTEMBER ON NOTIFICATION AND ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT -- DEMONSTRATES THAT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THIS AREA.

HOWEVER, AS REGARDS THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF HELSINKI COMMITMENTS, THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT HAD A DIRECT AND DAMAGING IMPACT ON MILLIONS OF LIVES. DESPITE THE SOVIET UNION'S PROMISE IN THE FINAL ACT TO FACILITATE CONTACTS AMONG PERSONS AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS THAT ARISE IN THAT CONNECTION, MANY PEOPLE LIVING IN THE WEST, MOSTLY UKRAINIANS, HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN CONTACTING RELATIVES IN AFFECTED AREAS AND OFTEN COULD NOT CONTACT THEM AT ALL. FURTHERMORE, ATTEMPTS TO SEND SMALL CARE PACKAGES OF POWDERED MILK, VITAMINS AND OTHER ITEMS TO RELATIVES IN THE REGION WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.

BY FAR THE MOST FREQUENTLY VOICED CRITICISM DURING THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT, HOWEVER, WAS THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH SOVIET

OFFICIALS NOTIFIED THEIR OWN CITIZENS AND THOSE IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF THE RELEASE INTO THE ATMOSPHERE OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVE IODINE, CESIUM AND OTHER HARMFUL SUBSTANCES. THE SOVIET UNION'S FIRST PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT AN ACCIDENT HAD TAKEN PLACE CAME MORE THAN TWO DAYS AFTER THE ACCIDENT. BY THAT TIME, HIGH LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES HAD CROSSED POPULATED REGIONS OF UKRAINE, BYELORUSSIA, THE BALTIC STATES, NORTHERN POLAND, FINLAND AND SWEDEN.

WHILE BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS MIGHT EXPLAIN SOME DELAY IN ANNOUNCING A WARNING, THEY CANNOT EXPLAIN THE CONTINUED LACK OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACCIDENT WELL AFTER IT WAS KNOWN TO THE SOVIET PUBLIC AND IN THE WEST. DESPITE THE NEW SOVIET POLICY OF OPENNESS, INFORMATION ON NATURAL DISASTERS OR ABOUT FIRES, EXPLOSIONS OR OTHER ACCIDENTS IS STILL TIGHTLY CONTROLLED.

ANOTHER ISSUE OF CONCERN TO US HAS BEEN THE FORCED RECRUITMENT OF SO-CALLED "RESERVISTS," PEOPLE CONSCRIPTED FOR CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER TYPES OF MANUAL LABOR, TO ASSIST IN THE CLEAN-UP OF THE PLANT SITE AND THE SURROUNDING REGION. IN PARTICULAR, MEN FROM THE BALTIC REGION WERE SAID TO BE TAKEN AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL JOBS, OFTEN AT NIGHT, ASSEMBLED QUICKLY AND ORDERED TO WORK IN THE DECONTAMINATION EFFORT. ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL ESTONIAN NEWSPAPER NOORTE HAAL, MANY ESTONIAN "RESERVISTS" COMPLAINED OF LONG HOURS, WITH FEW DAYS OFF, IN AN AREA STILL POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO HUMAN HEALTH. ORIGINALLY, THEY WERE TOLD THEY WOULD HAVE TO STAY FOR 30 DAYS, BUT, WHEN THE LENGTH OF STAY WAS INCREASED, THERE WERE WORK STOPPAGES AND

EVEN A SCUFFLE BETWEEN WORKERS AND THE AUTHORITIES.

THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL SHOULD NOT DIVERT OUR WORK FROM OTHER FORMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. CHERNOBYL WAS A SUDDEN ACCIDENT THAT RELEASED MASS AMOUNTS OF RADIATION INTO THE ATMOSPHERE, AT A COST IN DEATHS THAT IS, TRAGICALLY, STILL TO BE MEASURED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRODUCTION OF ELECTRIC POWER BY OTHER SOURCES OF ENERGY WILL INEVITABLY COST A CERTAIN NUMBER OF CASUALTIES AMONG MINERS, TRANSPORT AND OTHER WORKERS. FURTHERMORE IT WILL DAMAGE OR KILL TREES, LAKES AND LAND AND CAUSE A NUMBER OF CANCER DEATHS AS WELL. AND THESE WILL BE THE RESULTS OF NORMAL OPERATING CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT OF AN ACCIDENT. CHERNOBYL AND OTHER RECENT EVENTS HAVE MADE US PAUSE AND LOOK TO WAYS TO ADDRESS THESE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS. THE POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WHICH RESULTED FROM CHERNOBYL SHOULD ENCOURAGE US TO FURTHER OUR EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONENT.

A HUNGARIAN ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALIST ONCE SAID: "THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE ACCOMPANYING MAN ALONG THE PATH OF DEVELOPMENT ARE WAR, FAMINE, CONQUEST, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT. ONLY IF WE SUCCEED IN CONQUERING THESE THREATS CAN WE THINK MEANINGFULLY ABOUT THE DISTANT FUTURE." WHILE EVERYONE HERE ACKNOWLEDGES THE HISTORICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST THREE, I THINK WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND WHAT THE DESTRUCTIVE PATH OF THAT FOURTH HORSEMAN CAN MEAN FOR THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT OF EUROPE.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman, U.S. Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Follow-up Meeting

Plenary Meeting

Vienna, Austria
December 19, 1986

Mr. Chairman:

After we recess this evening, only one week of implementation review will remain when we return in January. This is therefore an appropriate time to take stock.

During this stage of the Vienna meeting, delegations reviewed - carefully, comprehensively, and candidly - how our governments have complied with the commitments of Helsinki and Madrid. That review has laid bare significant and troubling violations of those commitments. My delegation and many others have concentrated their review on human rights, because that is the area where the major problems lie. If this review has been painful, it has also been necessary. How else can we know the exact nature of the difficulties that must be overcome during the next stage of the Vienna meeting and in East-West relations as a whole?

This first phase of our Vienna meeting suggests some important conclusions:

- First, the human rights record of the Soviet Union and several of its allies continues to be seriously defective. The record regarding, inter alia, the Helsinki Monitors, family reunification, emigration, and radio jamming is no better than it was during the Madrid meeting six years ago; in some cases it is worse.

- Second, these Soviet human rights violations are having a major effect on the credibility of Soviet claims of a more open approach to international relations, on the image which the Soviet Union seeks to project to the West, and on the relationship which the Soviet Union asserts it wants with Western governments.

- Third, the perception which I have just described is not held only by the United States. It has infused the statements of the majority of the delegations here, whether members of an alliance or not. It thus represents an overall Western condemnation of Soviet conduct in the performance of human rights obligations.

- Fourth, the only action that will change this Western perception is a significant improvement in Soviet compliance. I welcome the announcement today by the Soviet government that Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner are being allowed to return to Moscow. This is an important step forward, an important gesture. We hope it will encourage the Soviet government to move beyond gestures, important as they may be, to a consistent practice of observing Helsinki commitments. We must not forget, for example, the plea of Andrei Sakharov himself for an amnesty for all political prisoners in the Soviet Union, one of whom - Anatoliy Marchenko - died tragically and needlessly during the course of our Vienna meeting.

- And fifth, if the new Soviet leadership can summon the wisdom and the courage to break with previous and still current practices and bring itself into compliance, it will achieve a genuinely new image in the West - an image which can only have a positive effect in promoting the more secure and more cooperative East-West relationship which the Final Act envisages, which our peoples demand, and which the cause of peace requires.

Just a few minutes ago, the leader of the Italian delegation described to this meeting the major initiative taken last week by the governments of the NATO Alliance. The NATO texts he quoted underline the Alliance's strong commitment to greater conventional arms stability at lower levels of forces. They also underline the importance of balance in the CSCE context and the necessary connection between human rights and security - within the Helsinki process and outside it. As Secretary of State Shultz has said on numerous occasions, human rights is an essential part of the fabric of the entire East-West relationship.

Before we return to Vienna, let us remember that events of relevance to this meeting will continue to unfold:

- In the Soviet Union, the trial of Mustafa Dzhemilev is in its third day. Already in prison for his work on behalf of his fellow Crimean Tatars, he will be resentenced - his seventh conviction - unless the Soviet authorities recognize the lawfulness of his human rights activity under the Final Act.

- In Czechoslovakia, four members of the Jazz Section will reportedly go on trial later this month unless the Czechoslovak authorities relent in their persecution of these innocent representatives of Czechoslovak culture.

- In the Soviet Union, new legislation on emigration will take effect on January 1. This legislation raises serious concern, since it restricts the right to leave one's country -

a right that is unrestricted in documents, including the Helsinki Final Act, which the Soviet Union has signed. We will apply the test of performance to this legislation. Will it, or will it not, result in a significant increase in emigration rates, which are currently the lowest in decades?

- In Czechoslovakia, also on January 1, Charter 77 will be ten years old. This unique champion of civil and human rights, this conservator of a rich national literature, this symbol of the values of pluralism and humanism, deserves better than the imprisonment and intimidation which its members have received. We salute the Charter and we urge the Czechoslovak government to restore to it and its signers their basic human rights.

In conclusion, I note that in his statement today the chief of the Soviet Delegation accused the United States of assuming the posture of a prosecutor of the Soviet Union. The United States may be a critic, but it is not a prosecutor. The Soviet Union is not a prisoner in the dock. It is a sovereign country, and as a sovereign country it can determine for itself the effect of its human rights violations on its credibility with its own people and on its image abroad. As a sovereign country, it can decide what it will - or will not - do to close its credibility gap and erase its image problem. As a sovereign country, it can make that choice itself. None of us can choose for it. But we can hope that, for the sake of an improved East-West relationship, its choice is the right one.

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BASKET I STATEMENTS

REMARKS BY
AMBASSADOR WARREN ZIMMERMANN
ON THE
STOCKHOLM MEETING
OF THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

NOVEMBER 21, 1986

Mr. Chairman:

One of our tasks here in Vienna is to evaluate progress in the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the CDE, which adjourned in Stockholm on September 19. My Delegation believes that it is too early to judge the full significance and effectiveness of the measures adopted in the CDE, because they have not yet been implemented. We also believe, however, that, in adopting concrete, militarily significant measures, the CDE has already taken an important step toward establishing a better foundation for increasing stability and security for Europe. As a starting point for future discussion, therefore, I would like to make some observations today about the achievement of the CDE and identify several general points we have taken from our experience in Stockholm.

For the United States, the essence of confidence- and security-building is the pursuit of greater openness concerning military activities. This fundamental objective ties the CDE to its parent, our own Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which seeks to increase openness across the spectrum of East-West relations: in political, economic, cultural and human fields, as well as in military-security matters.

The concrete, verifiable confidence and security building measures that are the heart of the Stockholm Document have strengthened the principle of openness in international affairs, which lies at the heart of the CSCE process. It is our hope that our achievement in Stockholm will also provide an important political impulse to our deliberations here and to the ongoing CSCE process. The significance of the Stockholm document is that it moved beyond simple declaratory pledges of goodwill to measures which have concrete effect and are verifiable by all the participating states.

Centered on notification and observation of significant military activities, the CDE measures are firmly based on the confidence-building measures of the Helsinki Final Act. But CDE has improved upon those earlier measures, and in key areas it has broken new ground with great potential. A few points of comparison illustrate how far CDE has gone beyond Helsinki to establish a confidence-building regime capable of making a substantive contribution to the overall arms control and security equation in the region:

-- the thirty-five participating states have made a politically binding commitment to comply with all of the measures adopted in Stockholm; many of the Helsinki measures were voluntary;

-- CDE covers the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and thus recognizes the region as a single entity in which the security concerns of all states are interrelated; the Helsinki measures excluded large parts of Europe;

-- with the annual and bi-annual calendars adopted in Stockholm, our states for the first time have made the commitment to inform one another one year or, in some cases, two years in advance about their plans for significant military activities. Such a commitment gives important substance to the principle that states have the right to know that other states' military activities are routine and non-threatening. The importance of the calendars is increased by the inclusion of a prohibition against any activities involving more than 75,000 troops which have not been announced in the calendar two years in advance;

-- with a detailed measure for inspection to verify compliance with the Accord, the CDE marked an important first step in verification within the CSCE framework; the Final Act made no provision for verification, and there was no means available to all states to resolve doubts about compliance with the confidence building measures agreed at Helsinki. Like the calendars, this is also a historic provision which could provide a solid basis for real confidence- and security-building.

-- the details of the notification and observation measures ensure that the Stockholm regime will open more military activities to scrutiny than the Final Act; this, in itself is a genuine leap beyond Helsinki.

In principle, at least, CDE in Stockholm achieved a good deal. But we are not satisfied with every detail nor do we believe that Stockholm has closed the books on confidence- and security-building measures. Of particular concern to the United States is the exchange of information about the structure and location of military forces in Europe. A full and open exchange of such information lies at the heart of the concept of confidence- and security-building because a reliable understanding of the military situation depends upon knowing what forces are normally in Europe and where they are located, as well as what they will be doing at any given time. The original Western proposals in Stockholm included a measure calling for an exchange of information about the structure and location of forces; it was not accepted because the East rejected it categorically. In any future negotiation under CDE, the United States would have as a first priority correcting this weakness in the Stockholm regime.

The United States, along with others, is weighing carefully the future of CDE. But in considering that future, we will weigh not only the Stockholm Document itself, but compliance with the measures negotiated in Stockholm and the entire range of East-West issues that affect CSCE. As my Government has said many times previously, our judgment about how to proceed will be based first of all on the fundamental need to maintain balance among all aspects of the CSCE. At this point, however, and looking ahead to detailed discussion of CDE, we can draw several lessons from Stockholm which will shape my Delegation's consideration of what is possible and desirable for the future.

First, while Stockholm demonstrated that 35 states with different security interests could negotiate significant confidence and security building measures, it also proved that this achievement was extremely difficult. Some key issues, such as information exchange, could not be resolved. The result achieved was more modest than many, especially the U.S. wanted, partly because meeting the concerns of all thirty-five proved so difficult. Any future meeting of the CDE would have to proceed very carefully and precisely. And before it even began, each participating state would have to analyze thoroughly its own willingness and ability to open its military organization, planning and practices even further to the process of international confidence- and security-building.

Second, any future meeting of the CDE would have to have a very specific mandate laying out concrete, clearly delineated objectives. Stockholm accomplished as much as it did because its mandate was clear. If the Madrid Follow-up Meeting had provided only general guidelines for topics to study or issues to explore, Stockholm would surely have failed. This is an important reminder for the future. The viability of the process can best be maintained if it proceeds step by step. Vague, sweeping goals greatly increase the risk of failure or, even worse, a result which is hollow and meaningless.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, comes the question of implementation. The United States' positive assessment of CDE is predicated entirely on the premise that both the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm accord will be faithfully implemented. Neither non-compliance nor a niggardly, legalistic interpretation of the Stockholm Document will suffice. Without full, unequivocal compliance, the ultimate result of our negotiations in Stockholm will be an increase in tensions in Europe -- not an improvement in our security.

During his press conference on Vienna's opening day, Soviet Ambassador Grinevsky said that "confidence-building was not like a salami to be sliced off in bits and pieces, but a continuum that has to continue." And several of our Warsaw Pact colleagues have urged a rapid resumption of the CDE, asserting that "success will breed success." But from our perspective success cannot be measured by the Stockholm Document itself. It can be measured only by the record of implementation of the concrete confidence- and security-building measures contained in that document.

Moreover, we cannot evaluate the CDE in a vacuum; its viability depends upon the integrity of the CSCE process as a whole. The East-West relationship cannot advance in the security field unless progress there is balanced by a substantial improvement in the Warsaw Pact's compliance with its humanitarian commitments. The process which leads us to conclusions about CDE must also take us through the whole complex of CSCE issues -- of which CDE is one part. In the final analysis, the decisions we make about CDE will depend upon the conclusions we reach about the broader process to which it belongs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE, UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE BASIS FOR HUMANITARIAN CO-OPERATION

VIENNA, AUSTRIA NOVEMBER 21, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN, EARLIER THIS WEEK MY DELEGATION SET FORTH SOME GENERAL VIEWS. LATER, AS THIS BODY REVIEWS THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD ON HUMAN CONTACTS, INFORMATION, CULTURE, AND EDUCATION, WE WILL PRESENT ADDITIONAL DETAILS. TODAY I WILL ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF WHY WE ARE HERE.

FIRST OF ALL, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES WHY IT IS NECESSARY FOR INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS CONVENED IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY TO BE DISCUSSING SUCH MATTERS OF ORDINARY LIFE AS A PREGNANT MOTHER'S DESIRE TO BE JOINED IN THE UNITED STATES BY HER SOVIET HUSBAND? WHY MUST DIPLOMATS, EVEN FOREIGN MINISTERS, DISCUSS WHETHER PEOPLE CAN SUBSCRIBE TO PUBLICATIONS AND LISTEN TO RADIO STATIONS OF THEIR CHOICE?

THE CITIZENS OF ALL OUR COUNTRIES SEEK TO EXERCISE BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, OPINION AND EXPRESSION. THIS IS NATURAL; IT SHOULD

CREATE NO PROBLEMS FOR US. NONETHELESS, FOR REASONS WHICH APPEAR NEITHER RATIONAL NOR NECESSARY, THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND SEVERAL EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES REFUSE TO RESPECT THESE RIGHTS. THIS IS THE REAL PROBLEM UNDERLYING MOST OF OUR DEBATES. INDEED, THIS IS WHY THE THIRD BASKET HAD TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL ACT. IN OUR SINCERE DESIRE TO HELP PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THIS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WHEN THEY AGREED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF BASKET I, ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE PROCESS PLEDGED THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. IN PRINCIPLE VII WE PROMISED TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH INCLUDES AT LEAST TWO ARTICLES OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE.

ARTICLE 13, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION PROVIDES THAT "EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING HIS OWN, AND TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY." AND ARTICLE 19 PROVIDES THAT "EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION" -- WHICH INCLUDES "FREEDOM TO HOLD OPINIONS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE AND TO SEEK, RECEIVE AND IMPART INFORMATION AND IDEAS THROUGH ANY MEDIA AND REGARDLESS OF FRONTIERS."

THESE WORDS IDENTIFY AREAS OF HUMAN ACTIVITY WITH WHICH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT GENERALLY INTERFERE -- AREAS IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE ABLE TO GO ABOUT THEIR BUSINESS, TO BE LEFT ALONE. THE U.N. PROVISION ON THE RIGHT TO LEAVE -- AGREED UPON BY EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE -- DOES NOT REQUIRE AN INDIVIDUAL TO SPECIFY ANY REASON FOR LEAVING HIS COUNTRY. NOR DOES THE PROVISION ON FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION SPECIFY THE KINDS OF IDEAS WHICH MAY BE HELD, EXPRESSED, SOUGHT, RECEIVED OR IMPARTED.

IF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THESE TWO ARTICLES OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, WHY DID THE DRAFTERS OF THE FINAL ACT NEED TO NEGOTIATE THE THIRD BASKET? WERE NOT THE PARTICIPATING STATE RESPECTING THESE BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUGUST, 1975? WE NEED TO BE FRANK. IF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES HAD HAD A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IF THEY HAD BEEN PREPARED TO TAKE THAT COMMITMENT SERIOUSLY, THERE WOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN OPEN BORDERS AND A FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS IN EUROPE.

HUMAN CONTACTS

FINAL ACT PROVISIONS ON HUMAN CONTACTS ELABORATE ON EVERY PERSON'S BASIC RIGHT TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY.

THEY SPELL OUT SUCH MATTERS AS FAMILY REUNIFICATION, TRAVEL FOR PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL REASONS, MEETINGS ON THE BASIS OF FAMILY TIES, AND SO ON.

IN THE YEARS SINCE 1975, WE HAVE WELCOMED RELATIVELY GOOD PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN CONTACTS PROVISIONS IN SOME EAST EUROPEAN STATES. SOME EASTERN GOVERNMENTS HAVE EASED LIMITATIONS ON TRAVEL FOR PURPOSES OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND FAMILY VISITS, AND THEY HAVE OPENED UP PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND RELIGIOUS CONTACTS.

RECENTLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A LONG TIME HAS BEGUN TO MOVE ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES IN WHICH EXIT PERMISSION WAS ORIGINALLY DENIED -- INCLUDING CASES INVOLVING PERSONS WITH CLOSE RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THOSE WHO ARE ILL. BULGARIA HAS ALSO RESOLVED SEVERAL DIVIDED FAMILY CASES INVOLVING RELATIVES OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS. HOWEVER LIMITED, WE WELCOME ALL SUCH GESTURES WHICH ALLOW INDIVIDUALS TO EXERCISE THEIR BASIC RIGHTS. BUT, WE MUST ASK, WHY DOES THE SIMPLE MATTER OF REUNIFYING DIVIDED FAMILIES SO OFTEN SEEM CALCULATED AND TIMED FOR POLITICAL BENEFIT?

TRAVEL IS REGARDED AS A PRIVILEGE TO BE GRANTED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ELITES, NOT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING. PERSONS WISHING TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY ARE THEREBY KEPT IN A CONSTANT STATE OF UNCERTAINTY, SUBJECTED TO CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES. THIS IS NOT A PROGRESSIVE POLICY. THIS IS A THROWBACK TO EARLIER TIMES WHEN COMMON PEOPLE WERE BOUND TO THE LAND BY ELITES OVER WHOSE ACTIVITY CITIZENS EXERCISED NO CONTROL.

INFORMATION

THE SAME IS REGRETTABLY TRUE WITH REGARD TO FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION. THE AMOUNT AND VARIETY OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CITIZENS OF SOME EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAS INCREASED CONSIDERABLY SINCE 1975. TO CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE PAST ELEVEN YEARS HAVE NOT RESULTED IN SUCH PROGRESS. IN RECENT MONTHS, EXPECTATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SOVIET RECORD HAVE BEEN RAISED. BUT SO FAR THE SURFACE HAS BARELY BEEN SCRATCHED, AND SOVIET SOCIETY ESSENTIALLY REMAINS A CLOSED SOCIETY. WE LOOK FORWARD EAGERLY TO A TOTALLY OPEN SOVIET SOCIETY IN WHICH ORDINARY PEOPLE ARE FREE TO SAY WHAT THEY THINK OPENLY. IT WILL BE A BETTER SOVIET UNION, WHEN ORDINARY CITIZENS NO LONGER TAKE RISKS WHEN THEY EXPRESS OR CIRCULATE IDEAS WITHOUT OFFICIAL CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL.

CULTURE AND EDUCATION

THE DENIAL OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, OPINION AND EXPRESSION IMPEDES EASTERN COMPLIANCE WITH BASKET III COMMITMENTS REGARDING CO-OPERATION IN CULTURE AND EDUCATION.

IF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES WERE TO RESPECT THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF THEIR CITIZENS TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, OUR PEOPLES WOULD TRAVEL AS OFTEN AND AS FREELY FOR CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AS THEY DO EVERY DAY IN THE WEST.

INDEED, CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND EXCHANGES ARE FLOURISHING BETWEEN CITIZENS OF MOST CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, EVEN AS GOVERNMENTS PLAY A RELATIVELY MINOR ROLE. AMONG THE FREE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, ORDINARY PEOPLE ARE ABLE TO VISIT OTHER COUNTRIES, ATTEND FOREIGN UNIVERSITIES, OR GO TO INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS WITHOUT REQUESTING THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT'S PERMISSION.

THIS IS LARGELY TRUE FOR THOUSANDS OF INDIVIDUALS FROM POLAND AND HUNGARY, WHO ARE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES WITH COLLEAGUES IN THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT NEED OF SPONSORSHIP FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS. WHY IS THIS SO DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE?

WHY CAN'T SOVIET CITIZENS, ESPECIALLY THE YOUNG, RECEIVE FIRST-HAND INFORMATION ABOUT LIFE IN OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES? WHY DO SOVIET AUTHORITIES MAINTAIN STRICT CONTROL OVER PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES BY SOVIET CITIZENS? WHY DO THEY TREAT FOREIGN TRAVEL AND ACCESS TO NEW IDEAS AS PRIVILEGES, RATHER THAN RIGHTS?

THE HELSINKI PROCESS HAS HELPED THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPACT OF HUMAN CONTACTS ISSUES IN THE WORLD. WE HOPE THEY WILL SOON RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR "OPENNESS" AMONG ALL THEIR OWN CITIZENS AND THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE, EXTENDING WELL BEYOND PRESS CONFERENCES IN VIENNA AND WELL-TIMED GESTURES ON THE "HUMANITARIAN" FRONT. UNTIL THEN, WE MUST ASK WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WILL PERMIT TRUE OPENNESS.

-- WHEN WILL THE GATES OF THE SOVIET UNION SWING OPEN TO HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF GERMANS, ARMENIANS, JEWS AND OTHERS WHO HAVE INDICATED A DESIRE TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY?

-- WHEN WILL SOVIET AIRWAVES BE CLEAR OF JAMMING, DESIGNED TO CLOSE OUT BROADCAST INFORMATION THAT MAY CONFLICT WITH THE OFFICIAL PRESS?

-- WHEN WILL THE SOVIET UNION'S MOST FAMOUS SCIENTIST, ANDREI SAKHAROV, BE FREED FROM THE ISOLATION THAT SEPARATES HIM FROM PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD?

-- WHEN WILL IT BE POSSIBLE FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO WORK IN THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT FEAR OF BEING FRAMED AND PROSECUTED FOR CYNICAL REASONS OF STATE?

-- WHEN WILL ALL PERSONS, SUCH AS A YOUNG LENINGRAD HEBREW TEACHER NAMED ALBERT BUR'SHTEIN, BE FREE TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL, INSTEAD OF BEING BEATEN BY KGB AGENTS (AS BUR'SHTEIN WAS ON NOVEMBER 6) OR SENTENCED TO JAIL FOR REFUSING TO END A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH CO-RELIGIONISTS IN NEW YORK CITY (AS BUR'SHTEIN WAS ON NOVEMBER 18)?

-- WHEN WILL IT BE POSSIBLE FOR SOVIET CITIZENS SUCH AS PETRAS PAKENAS, WHO HAS BEEN SEPARATED FROM HIS UNITED STATES CITIZEN SPOUSE FOR SIX YEARS, TO BE REUNITED WITH THEIR LOVED ONES IN THE COUNTRY OF THEIR CHOICE WITHOUT ENDURING YEARS OF SEPARATION AND UNCERTAINTY?

THE WORLD HOPES FOR MEASURES AND PRACTICES WHICH WILL TRULY RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, THUS FACILITATING HUMAN CONTACTS AND FAMILY

REUNIFICATION. THE WORLD WILL NOT BE SATISFIED WITH MORE WRITTEN EXCUSES FOR BUREAUCRATIC REFUSALS.

IN DEFENDING ITS RECORD ON TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION OR ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ISSUES, THE SOVIET DELEGATION MAY REMIND US THAT IT IS PERMISSIBLE TO PLACE REASONABLE LIMITS ON THE EXERCISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

NO RIGHT, THEY MAY TELL US, IS UNLIMITED. WE AGREE THAT SOME RESTRICTIONS MAY OCCASIONALLY BE PLACED ON THE EXERCISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOR EXAMPLE, WE TRY TO PREVENT PERSONS FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY IF THEY ARE ABOUT TO STAND TRIAL AFTER BEING CHARGED WITH SERIOUS CRIMES. BUT THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT MUST ALWAYS GO TO THE INDIVIDUALS SEEKING TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS. ARTICLE 29 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS MAKES THIS CLEAR:

> "IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, EVERYONE SHALL BE SUBJECT ONLY TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS ARE DETERMINED BY LAW SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING DUE RECOGNITION FOR THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF OTHERS AND OF MEETING THE JUST REQUIREMENTS OF MORALITY, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE GENERAL WELFARE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY."

AS WE REVIEW THE RECORD OF THE SOVIET UNION AND SOME OF ITS ALLIES OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, WE WILL BE ASKING WHETHER THE LIMITATIONS THEY PLACE UPON THE EXERCISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAN BE INTERPRETED AS REASONABLE EXCEPTIONS.

IN CLOSING I WISH TO ASSURE MY COLLEAGUES THAT THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION SEEKS PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE LIVES OF ORDINARY HUMAN BEINGS. WE WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO ACHIEVE SUCH SOLUTIONS. BUT I ALSO WANT TO STATE THAT WE WILL NEVER LOSE SIGHT OF THE PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE THE HELSINKI PROCESS. WE WILL NOT COMPROMISE THE STANDARDS TO WHICH EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE HAS ALREADY AGREED. WE WILL NOT ABANDON THE HELSINKI PROMISE.

REMARKS BY

AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. FROWICK

ON THE

PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES

IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY 'S'

NOVEMBER 24, 1986

Mr. Chairman:

Today I will present an assessment of implementation to date of the 10 CSCE principles in the Helsinki Final Act sometimes referred to as "the decalogue." They recall to the American practitioner of CSCE our own Bill of Rights, which incidentally has served as an effective, pragmatic foundation for the evolution of our political system for nearly two centuries.

As we look back to the early post-World War II period, we can well understand the firm determination of the Soviet Union never to permit a recurrence of the nightmare of all-out war. Americans recall in this regard their own major efforts to aid the Soviet struggle -- for example, through enormous sums of lend-lease aid and through complex military operations, together with other Allies, to open up a second front in the West -- thereby relieving pressure on the Soviet forces that held fast from Leningrad to Moscow to Stalingrad.

In the aftermath of war, Americans were deeply disappointed to learn from experience that diplomatic agreements reached toward war's end were not honored. Instead of the free elections promised at Yalta, Soviet power was employed to impose political systems on the Soviet model itself in one country after another in proximity to the Western frontiers of the USSR. A buffer zone was thereby forcibly established in the belief that it might protect the Soviet Union from future destabilization and even military attacks through this vast region of Eastern Europe. Our sympathies shifted from the oppressed Soviet peoples during the war to the oppressed smaller nations of Eastern Europe after the war.

Forgive me, Mr. Chairman, for reaching back beyond the inception of the Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe, but I believe a full understanding of our CSCE principles, and what they should purport to achieve, require this brief digression.

In first proposing a European Security Conference in 1954 and recurrently advocating the idea until the actual conception of our Conference in 1972-73, the Soviets in our view sought primarily to gain Western acceptance of and legitimacy for their forcibly imposed cordon sanitaire.

But the United States and its Allies devoted careful attention from 1973 to 1975 to creation of a balanced Final Act with a realistic and constructive declaration of principles at the heart of that document.

When we assess the CSCE principles, we are in many ways taking the pulse of the entire CSCE process.

Mr. Chairman, my countrymen knew when we signed the Final Act that we were embarking on a long-term political process. We regarded it as a promising prospect because it seemed to point the way over time for a true normalization of contacts between East and West in Europe; it offered hope for closed societies gradually to open up a freer flow of people, ideas, and information; it seemed to respond positively albeit cautiously to what Americans regard as the inalienable right of individuals to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In so doing, it could provide a mechanism of great long-term significance to all CSCE participants, including the Soviet Union in particular, for allowing a steadily growing satisfaction of human and national aspirations within an evolutionary process capable of ensuring overall stability. The Helsinki Final Act indeed is a unique instrument -- the only single, all-embracing political reference point we have -- for achieving these far-reaching goals. We must collectively do our utmost to realize the potential for dynamic constructive change within a framework of stability which is possible through steadfast implementation of the Principles of the Final Act.

Let us now look at the record to date of implementation of those principles.

Principle I of the Final act guarantees the sovereign equality of all states in Europe. All concerned are prepared to extend that guarantee to the Soviet Union. But the Brezhnev doctrine stands as a constant threat to the sovereignty of member states of the socialist community of nations. How can any European state feel safe when the Soviet Union's official party organs have proclaimed that sovereignty is a mere "abstract idea" which would not keep it from taking up arms against its neighbor? [Quote from Pravda 9/26/68]

Principle II pledges all of us to refrain from the threat or use of force both in our mutual relations and in all international relations. Principle II reaffirms the universal principle in the UN Charter. Concrete confidence building measures in the Stockholm Document give it effect and expression.

I wish that I could report that this pledge, made freely by the Soviet Union and its Allies, was being adhered to. As the Madrid talks were going on, the threat of force by the USSR - undermined Poland's sovereignity, and coerced the suppression of Solidarity. The Soviets made much of this principle in Stockholm; in the end we had to conclude that their real goal was not to respect this principle but to narrow it.

As we meet here in Vienna, the people of Afghanistan endure unrelieved suffering, fresh testimony to neglect of this fundamental principle of international relations.

Principle III pledges us to regard each others' frontiers as inviolable unless, as noted in Principle I, we peaceably agree to change them, and *Principle IV* pledges us to respect the territorial integrity of all participating states -- to refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation.

Concerning III and IV, I must again point to Afghanistan -- where the Soviet war against the Afghan people is about to enter its eighth year. Only this week the UN rapporteur on Afghanistan reported that chemical weapons are being used against the indigenous population and that their war against the Afghan people has produced some 5,000,000 refugees and displaced persons. These are *facts* as reported by the United Nations rapporteur.

Principle V pledges us to settle disputes among ourselves peaceably. We have met twice at the expert level at Montreux and Athens to craft third party settlement mechanisms to resolve disputes peaceably. The Soviet Union has consistently rejected such an approach -- insisting on limiting any mechanism to "consultations".

Principle VI is a solemn pledge not to intervene in the internal affairs of any participating state -- regardless of our mutual relations with that state. It is a direct repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine, to which the Soviet Union continues to cling. It admits to no exception, yet the Soviets continue to ignore this commitment in their dealings with Afghanistan and they assert the right to ignore it when dealing with the other states of the socialist community.

Mr. Chairman,

By and large, the Principles of the Final Act simply codify long-standing axioms of international law and practice. But in CSCE the true innovation in international relations since the Second World War finds perhaps its most excellent expression in Principle VII - the affirmation of human rights as an indispensable basis of security and cooperation among states. The experience of the War clearly demonstrated that a state which usurps the rights of its citizens is also likely to threaten the territory of its neighbors. When the representatives of the United Nations gathered in San Francisco in 1945, determined to eliminate the scourge of war, they included among the purposes of their new organization:

> "To achieve international co-operation in solving problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

At the time of the signing of the Final Act and since, Western nations have been criticized by some of their citizens for naivete in believing that, even after 30 years with human rights on the world agenda, some Eastern nations would actually relinquish the monopoly of the state on speech and political expression. Nevertheless, a few participating states have begun to realize the vision expressed by Principle Seven by improving respect for individual rights.

The dedicated groups of individuals in the East who took their leaders' signatures in Helsinki in 1975 as a genuine commitment were also not naive, just willing to take risks. Those who simply demanded that their governments stand by the principles they had signed were repaid with arrest, imprisonment and exile: the Helsinki monitors in the Soviet Union (here I must note tomorrow's tenth anniversary of the founding of the Lithuanian monitors' group), the Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia, KOR in Poland, and countless others whose efforts were halted before the world even learned their names.

There is another aspect of the seventh principle that distinguishes it from the preceding six, and at the same time, makes it inseparable from the others as a basis for security and cooperation: that is its specific reference to the individual. We have moved well past a period in which people are mere pawns to be commanded by a king or party. A proper appreciation of CSCE'S "human dimension" requires us to acknowledge that governments do not have absolute power to limit the rights of individuals; rather, the inherent dignity of individuals sets limits on the power of the state.

But these fundamental human rights are still denied to many. By using the term "humanitarian affairs" narrowly, some states seek to imply that a citizen's rights depend upon the generosity of the state, and not upon his human nature. The Soviet Union maintains that resolution of humanitarian issues can advance when a better political climate is created. But such an argument turns upside down the clear language of principle Seven, and I quote, "respect for [human rights] is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves". [End Quote] The United States firmly supports this language.

Principle VIII affirms the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Unfortunately, as George Orwell wrote in a book unavailable in the East, some animals are more equal than others. No violation of the Helsinki principles is more visible than the presence of 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, an army determined to crush national aspirations of the Afghan people to regain their independence. This is an example of contemporary imperialism. We support the Afghan people in their long and bitter struggle. We note that the current pathos of Afghanistan is part of a continuum of Soviet policy of armed intervention that extends back through the events in Eastern Europe which I mentioned in my right of reply on November 21, to the forced annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1940. Regrettably, once Soviet hegemony has been established in these unfortunate lands, there has never henceforth been the slightest possibility of free elections. Last week, when free Latvians around the world celebrated the anniversary of their brief twenty-one years of independence, we reiterated the United States' non-recognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic Republics into the Soviet Union. Principle Eight is violated not only with armies, but with prison keys. Those in Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and elsewhere, who peacefully advocate self-determination for their peoples, as provided for in the Soviet Constitution as well as the Final Act, are treated to harsh prison sentences.

Principle IX goes to the very heart of the Helsinki process, co-operation among states. We must discuss here in Vienna how to improve our cooperation not only on recurring issues, but also in emergency situations. Adherence to this principle would have prevented the situation that arose earlier this year, when Europe's people, East and West, remained uninformed for much too long about vital details of the Chernobyl accident for several crucial days following the accident.

Principle IX also confirms that institutions, organizations and persons have a role to play, along with governments, in enhancing co-operation. As is clear from that language, such a role must not be restricted by governments. The crafters of the Final Act wisely recognized that governments have no monopoly on wisdom, on creative energy, on dedication to our common goals. This is amply demonstrated by the presence and activism of a multitude of non-governmental organizations here in Vienna, whose freedom to speak out and to meet with official delegations is now recognized as a prerequisite for any type of CSCE meeting, and serves as a fine example of our hosts' dedication to this principle. Yet it is a principle ignored in several participating states. In the Soviet Union, in the German Democratic Republic, and in Czechoslovakia, unofficial peace groups have been systematically surpressed because they dared to suggest that private citizens could play an independent role in fostering contacts between East and West, and working to reduce tensions through mutual understanding. These governments have also made every effort to prevent members of such groups from meeting, both at home and abroad, with fellow human rights and peace activists from other signatory states.

Finally, Principle X, the fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law, addresses the full range of relations between states. While our discourse in Vienna will focus on the commitments made in Helsinki and Madrid, we cannot ignore those violations of international law and agreements that have done so much to weaken the basis of constructive cooperation. The Soviet Union and some of its allies ignore both the Final Act and international communications agreements by jamming foreign radio broadcasts. Violations of Universal Postal Union regulations have been clearly documented. All too often, violations have ceased only with the withdrawal of the offending party from the agreement itself. For example, Poland, having violated International Labor Organization agreements concerning the rights of freely formed trade unions like Solidarnosc, found it more convenient to express its intention to end its membership in that organization.

Mr. Chairman,

Our intent in reviewing these ten principles is simply to point out that the plain language of the principles has been ignored or, at best, selectively responded to by some countries. Had they been observed, our task here would be much simpler; we would need only look to the future without examining the past. But as we can clearly see, these ten principles have not yet borne the fruit they should. What is needed is steadfast, realistic, and constructive compliance with the enduring principles to which we all subscribed at the highest level in 1975.

REMARKS BY
AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. FROWICK
ON THE
CONFIDENCE BUILDING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

NOVEMBER 26, 1986

CONFIDENCE BUILDING OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

MR. CHAIRMAN,

WHEN THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THIS TABLE FIRST GATHERED IN HELSINKI IN 1975 TO CONSIDER QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE, THEY AGREED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO PROMOTE BETTER RELATIONS AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO ENSURE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THEIR PEOPLE CAN LIVE IN TRUE AND LASTING PEACE, FREE FROM ANY THREAT OR ATTEMPT AGAINST THEIR SECURITY. IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS OBJECTIVE, THE PARTICIPATING STATES ESTABLISHED THE TEN PRINCIPLES WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING OVER THE PREVIOUS THREE DAYS AND TO WHICH WE WILL RETURN IN FUTURE MEETINGS. THE DECALOGUE OF PRINCIPLES FORMS A BASIC CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER. BUT THE PARTICIPATING STATES ALSO ESTABLISHED AT HELSINKI, OTHER, MORE PRACTICAL MEASURES TO COMPLEMENT THESE PRINCIPLES, AND PROVIDE THE FIRST STEPS IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE SO THAT WE CAN ENSURE IN EUROPE CONDITIONS FREE FROM THREATS OR ATTEMPTS AGAINST THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTICIPATING STATE.

AS WE TURN OUR ATTENTION TODAY TO A DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, THE UNITED STATES THINKS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REVIEW THE REASONS THESE MEASURES WERE ESTABLISHED AND THE STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE TO WHICH WE ALL AGREED WHEN WE ADOPTED THEM AT HELSINKI ELEVEN YEARS AGO.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WHEN WE ESTABLISHED THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN HELSINKI, WE DID SO FOR PRACTICAL REASONS. FROM EARLY DAYS FOLLOWING THE SECOND WAR, A WALL OF DISTRUST AND SUSPICION HAD COME TO DIVIDE THE PEOPLES AND STATES ON THIS CONTINENT. IN THIS CLIMATE, WE RECOGNIZED THAT UNANNOUNCED MILITARY ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF LARGE SCALE, COULD CREATE TENSION AMONG STATES EVEN IN TIMES OF RELATIVELY GOOD POLITICAL RELATIONS. WE WERE DETERMINED TO FIND THE MEANS TO PROVIDE MORE OPENNESS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE CONVICTION THAT THESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES DO NOT THREATEN THE SECURITY OF ANY STATE AND TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF ARMED CONFLICT THROUGH MISUNDERSTANDINGS OR MISCALCULATIONS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

CENTRAL TO THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING CONCEPT WE ADOPTED IN THE FINAL ACT WAS THE IDEA OF NOTIFYING OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES IN ADVANCE ABOUT MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS. WHILE NOTIFICATION IN AND OF ITSELF IS NO GUARANTEE OF THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY, INFORMATION WILLINGLY PROVIDED IN ADVANCE BY THOSE CONDUCTING MILITARY ACTIVITIES COMPLEMENTS INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO STATES FROM THEIR OWN SOURCES AND THEREBY PROVIDES A CLEARER VIEW OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE APPEAR THREATENING.

THERE WERE MANY VIEWS IN THE 1973-75 GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT WHAT TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS," AND THEREFORE BE NOTIFIED. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WERE FINALLY ABLE TO AGREE THAT MANEUVERS INVOLVING 25,000 OR MORE TROOPS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. THE UNITED STATES COUNTS AMONG THE SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THE AGREEMENT TO LOWER THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD TO 13,000 TROOPS, ALMOST ONE-HALF OF THE HELSINKI FIGURE, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROGRESS WE SEEK WOULD BE ENHANCED IF THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WERE PUSHED EVEN LOWER.

THE GENEVA CONFEREES ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT FOR NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS TO HAVE THE DESIRED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING EFFECT, THEY MUST BE MADE WELL IN ADVANCE BY ASSURED COMMUNICATIONS MEANS AND SHOULD CONTAIN ENOUGH INFORMATION TO CLEARLY INFORM RECEIVING STATES ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN QUESTION. THUS, THE FINAL ACT CALLS FOR NOTIFICATION TO BE SENT THROUGH USUAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS 21-DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF THE MANEUVER OR IN THE CASE OF MANEUVERS ARRANGED AT SHORTER NOTICE, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO ITS STARTING DATE. TO GIVE THE RECEIVING STATES A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY BEING NOTIFIED, THE FINAL ACT ALSO CALLS FOR THE NOTIFICATION TO CONTAIN INFORMATION GIVING THE DESIGNATION OF THE MANEUVER, ITS GENERAL PURPOSE, THE STATES INVOLVED, THE TYPE OR TYPES AND NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES ENGAGED, THE AREA AND ESTIMATED

TIME FRAME OF ITS CONDUCT AND, IF POSSIBLE, ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE COMPONENTS OF THE FORCES ENGAGED AND THE PERIOD OF INVOLVEMENT OF THESE FORCES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE ABOVE NOTIFICATION REGIME IS THE MINIMUM STANDARD OUR CSCE PREDECESSORS AGREED WAS NECESSARY FOR INCREASING OPENNESS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE AND FOR THEREBY BUILDING CONFIDENCE AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES THAT CONDITIONS WOULD PREVAIL IN WHICH THEIR PEOPLE COULD LIVE IN TRUE AND LASTING PEACE FREE FROM ANY THREAT OR ATTEMPT AGAINST THEIR SECURITY. BUT OUR PREDECESSORS ALSO REALIZED THAT MORE COULD BE DONE TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES, SO THEY ENUMERATED SEVERAL VOLUNTARY MEASURES WHICH THEY KNEW COULD CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND INCREASING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE. THOSE MEASURES INCLUDE:

-- NOTIFYING OTHER, SMALLER-SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS;

-- INVITING OBSERVERS TO ATTEND MILITARY MANEUVERS;

-- NOTIFYING MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION;

-- EXCHANGE OF VISITS AMONG THEIR MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND SO FORTH.

THE UNITED STATES IS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT MOST OF THESE VOLUNTARY MEASURES SUGGESTED IN HELSINKI IN 1975 HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO MEASURES MADE MANDATORY BY THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. IN THIS REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE HELSINKI CBM'S, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT APPROPRIATE TO POINT OUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE VOLUNTARY, AS WELL AS THE MANDATORY, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN A TRUE MEASURE BE TAKEN OF A STATE'S COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OBJECTIVES ESTABLISHED IN THE FINAL ACT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE VALUE OF THE CSCE PROCESS DOES NOT LIE IN ATTENDING MEETINGS OR IN PUTTING HIGH-SOUNDING WORDS ON PAPER. RATHER, THE MEASURE OF OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS PROCESS IS THE RECORD OF OUR COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS IN EACH INCREMENTAL STEP TOWARDS BUILDING GREATER SECURITY IN EUROPE. AT THE HEART OF THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES OF THE FINAL ACT WAS THE HOPE THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR RUDIMENTARY OBLIGATIONS AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES WOULD CONSTITUTE A RELIABLE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH TO BUILD FUTURE, MORE AMBITIOUS AGREEMENTS. IN STOCKHOLM, WE MADE A "LEAP OF FAITH" BY APPROVING A NEW, MORE DEMANDING SET OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES, WHILE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CBMS OF THE FINAL ACT REMAINED IN QUESTION. SINCE THE NEW REGIME AGREED IN STOCKHOLM WILL ONLY TAKE EFFECT IN JANUARY, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITH THESE MEASURES WILL WARRANT EVEN MORE AMBITIOUS STEPS WITHIN THE

SECURITY BASKET OF THE CSCE IN THE FUTURE. WE WILL HAVE TO MONITOR THE RECORD OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES AND TAKE STOCK FROM TIME TO TIME IN THE COURSE OF OUR VIENNA DELIBERATIONS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE FINAL ACT'S CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IS AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES OF THIS BODY. EACH OF THE STATES SITTING AROUND THIS TABLE HAS AN OBLIGATION TO EXPLAIN ITS RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ITS REPRESENTATIVES ESTABLISHED IN HELSINKI ELEVEN YEARS AGO. EACH OF US ALSO HAS THE RIGHT TO ASK FOR AN EXPLANATION FROM STATES THAT WE BELIEVE HAVE NOT LIVED UP TO THE STANDARDS OF OPENNESS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES EMBODIED IN THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE FINAL ACT. MY DELEGATION WILL BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS BOTH SIDES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD.

THE FACTS OF WHAT WE INTEND WHEN WE ESTABLISHED THE CBM PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT ARE CLEAR. WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF HOW EACH PARTICIPATING STATE HAS MET THE AGREED STANDARDS.

REMARKS BY
AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. FROWICK
ON
U.S. POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA

IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY "S"
DECEMBER 2, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation has recurrently been asked by the Soviet delegation and other Warsaw Pact member state delegations to comment on U.S. actions with respect to Nicaragua. Yesterday, for example, the distinguished representative of Bulgaria raised this question in a heated manner in the course of the debate. We cannot help but note that such requests for comment invariably have arisen from efforts to divert attention from our debate here in Vienna on the tragedy of Afghanistan. Thus, we well recognize that what we have been dealing with is an orchestrated diversionary tactic aimed at obfuscating the grim situation confronting the people of Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, today my delegation wishes to pause long enough to present an American view of the unfortunate situation in Nicaragua and of United States' policies toward Central America. This is a portrait of reality -- a priority here of which our Czechoslovak colleague has just emphasized the importance. We agree that the point of departure of all our discussions should be realism.

In many ways, there are significant similarities involving the use of force between the national struggles in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. In both cases, the Soviet Union is attempting forcibly to help place in power a totalitarian political leadership which is opposed by masses of the people. But there is one big difference: in Afghanistan, large-scale Soviet armed forces are carrying the brunt of the war to the Afghan people. In Nicaragua, a civil war is under way. There is no

United States expeditionary force waging war in Nicaragua.

A Betrayed Revolution

A central issue at stake is the current overall crisis in Central America, responsibility for which lies squarely on the shoulders of the Sandinistas who have waged a campaign of systematic repression at home and subversion against all their neighbors. The Sandinistas have betrayed their stated revolutionary goals, and their own people as well as their neighbors know it. It has become abundantly clear that the Sandinistas have had no more intention to keep their promises of respect for pluralism and genuine democracy than has the Castro regime in Cuba. They have even betrayed the ideals of the Nicaraguan rebel leader Sandino, whose legacy they falsely claim. Sandino was a genuine nationalist who opposed communism and, in fact, broke ranks with the Salvadoran leader Farabundo Marti over this very issue.

Subversion of Neighbor States

During the revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 -- interestingly enough the same year that Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet forces -- the Sandinistas pledged to pursue a policy of nonalignment. They promised at first not to export their revolution. But in reality they moved steadily and determinedly to ally themselves with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Gradually they began to speak of dedication to "a revolution without borders" -- a formulation that defies the concept of inviolability of frontiers. Already by 1980, the

Sandinistas were actively supporting Marxist guerrillas seeking to overthrow the Government of El Salvador. Evidence to substantiate this support is massive and compelling; it includes statements from former guerrillas and great quantities of captured documents as well as captured weapons and munitions.

In 1983 and 1984, the Sandinistas were busy participating in attempts to infiltrate subversive agents into Honduras, as captured agents themselves admit. President Azcona of Honduras has said: "As long as there is a totalitarian regime in Central America that has expansionist ambitions and is supported by an enormous military apparatus...the neighboring countries sharing common borders with the country that is the source of the problem will be under constant threat." We also have evidence that the Sandinistas have supported terrorists in Costa Rica, where their agents have been directly involved in assassination attempts. In Colombia, especially well known is the Nicaraguan connection with weapons used by the M-19 movement in the bloody attack on the Palace of Justice in Bogota.

Soviet Military Aid

These destabilization efforts in Central America have been generously supported by the Soviet Union and its partners. With Soviet aid, the Sandinistas have built up the largest army in the history of Central America -- 10 times the size of Somoza's. They have been able to equip it with fleets of combat helicopters, battalions of tanks and armored vehicles, and scores of artillery pieces and rocket launchers. In fact, Nicaragua has become an armed camp.

Internal Repression

Mr. Chairman, just as the Sandinistas have betrayed their neighbors, all of whom welcomed the initial Nicaraguan Revolution against Somoza, they have, even more importantly, betrayed the Nicaraguan people themselves who believed in the Sandinistas' promises of democracy and freedom. The Sandinista regime has been steadily tightening its grip over the entire society -- in a pattern of takeover and attempted consolidation all too reminiscent of the Eastern European situation in the early post-World War II period.

Utilizing its ubiquitous secret police -- also 10 times the size of Somoza's -- and its network of Cuban-inspired "block committees," the Sandinista leadership has created a climate of fear and intimidation that far exceeds the worst excesses of the Somoza regime. These excesses have included arbitrary detentions, physical and psychological abuse of prisoners, and even summary executions.

According to the Human Rights Office of the Organization of American States, there are some 2,000 Nicaraguan prisoners who have been tried or are awaiting trial by the so-called anti-Somocista tribunal -- the Nicaraguan version of "people's courts" -- whose conviction rate is a solid 99 percent. The OAS report notes that these prisoners enjoy no presumption of innocence -- on the contrary; they have very limited access to defense counsel; and they face judges of whom "impartiality, fairness, and independence of judgment are seriously compromised." To accomodate these developments, the number of prisons has increased from one during the Somoza period to eleven under the Sandinistas.

As for the beleaguered trade unions, they are now denied the right to strike. Instead, they are told it is their revolutionary duty to produce more for the State.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the Sandinistas claim that they and no one else have been given a mandate to rule Nicaragua. From whom did they obtain such a mandate? Not from free, nation-wide elections. Not from the hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans who participated in the 1979 revolution, praying that it would bring genuine democracy to Nicaragua, but many of whom subsequently decided to flee from the country. Many escape because the Sandinistas have persecuted the genuinely democratic political parties that played a substantial and even noble role in the revolution. But large numbers of others have stayed in the country to take up arms again, this time against a far more all-pervasive totalitarian system, to fight for the democracy and freedom they thought they had won in 1979.

Among the tragic results of all this is the fate of the respected and influential newspaper La Prensa. It may be recalled that the assassination of La Prensa's publisher, Senor Chamorro, in 1978 was the event that ignited the revolution. This past June, La Prensa was closed down in a particularly significant step by the Sandinistas to stamp out a free press. But the Chamorro family is still trying to do its best to draw international attention to the realities of the Sandinista regime.

Internationally respected Cardinal Obando y Bravo has spoken out about those realities. He had negotiated the release of Sandinista leaders from prison during the revolution, and then turned against the Sandinistas for their betrayal of pledges of democracy and freedom of expression. He summarizes the situation clearly: "To view the Sandinista regime as a democratic government legitimately constituted, which seeks the welfare and peace of the people and enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority, is not true." To accept this description as valid would be tantamount to ignoring "the mass exodus of the Miskito Indians, the departure of tens of thousands of Nicaraguan men and women of every age, profession, economic status and political persuasion. It is to ignore the most terrible violation of freedom of the press and of speech in the history of our country, the expulsion of priests, and the mass exodus of young people eligible for military service."

The pattern of Sandinista activity that I have just described, Mr. Chairman, is one that is all too familiar to our European colleagues sitting around the table. It is the classic pattern of a Soviet-style political takeover.

U.S. Policy

The United States continues to seek a negotiated settlement to the Nicaraguan conflict. We favor a peaceful settlement of this dispute, to use the CSCE lexicon. We have consistently supported the Contadora process in its quest for a regional solution. As I stated yesterday, our policy remains fully consistent with the 21 points of the Contadora Document of objectives, agreed to by the four Contadora Group Countries and the five Central American countries, including Nicaragua, in September 1983. The United States has stated categorically that it will abide by a comprehensive, verifiable, and simultaneous implementation of that document of objectives. But only full realization of all 21 points, including true national reconciliation and democratization in Nicaragua, can lead to lasting peace in Nicaragua.

The Struggle is Global

Mr. Chairman, I said at the outset of my remarks that I regard the initiatives of the distinguished representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to shift our attention to Nicaragua essentially as a diversionary move designed to distract attention from Afghanistan, where the same kinds of political dynamics are seen that are at work in Nicaragua. Elsewhere too the struggle between totalitarianism and freedom goes on -- within Cambodia in S.E. Asia, for example, Ethiopia in E. Africa, and other trouble spots around the globe.

We could devote a great deal of time and energy to debating all these contests in various parts of our planet. But I suggest that we adhere to the complex issues on our agreed agenda.

STATEMENT BY
AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ON
PRINCIPLE NINE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
DECEMBER 3, 1986

Mr. Chairman, today I would like to address one of the more broadly cast principles of the Helsinki Final Act. I am referring to Principle IX, which calls for cooperation between the participating States in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and places special emphasis on the provisions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The aim of this cooperation, according to Principle IX, is "to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighborly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice."

Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation firmly believes in cooperation between States, and desires, as Principle IX clearly stipulates, that all citizens may contribute to this cooperation and enjoy the benefits thereof. We believe that this cooperation must be mutual and must be in conformity with all the principles of the Final Act; cooperation in one area cannot be divorced from serious violations of other principles of the Final Act. For instance, the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces and the illegal internal exile of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andre Sakharov were violations which compelled the United States to respond -- both in the name of human decency and in support of our CSCE process.

Principle IX is very demanding with respect to a signatory state's obligations to its citizens in developing co-operation between States. It states clearly that "governments, institutions, organizations and persons" -- I repeat, "and persons" -- have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of the aims of cooperation.

Therefore, the United States delegation deplores the sad fact that the opportunities for institutions, organizations and persons, as individuals, to participate in these efforts have been severely constrained in certain signatory States.

Mr. Chairman, over the past ten years, we have all become too familiar with the fate of a group of Soviet citizens who took these words about the role of organizations and individual persons seriously and established independent groups to monitor their government's compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. At the moment, at least 37 of these brave individuals are either in labor camp, prison, or internal exile. We have heard from the Soviet government that these persons are "criminals" who have been prosecuted for breaking Soviet laws. Is Anatoly Koryagin a "criminal" for having protested the abuse of psychiatry by the medical profession in collusion with the State? Is Father Alfonsas Svarinskas a "criminal" for having having defended Roman Catholicism against the atheistic nihilism imposed by force on his native Lithuania?

In most civilized countries, these persons, and others like them, would probably be honored as reformers and promoters of social justice -- not thrown into a jail cell.

To the best of our knowledge, Mr. Chairman, approximately seventy-five Soviet citizens joined Helsinki Monitoring Groups following the signing of the Accords in 1975. Only a handful, no more than half a dozen, have avoided prosecution or forced exile. I am reminded of a question asked by the

British writer Francis King at the Budapest Cultural Forum. "Why is there such a high rate of criminality among Soviet writers?". I would like to put the same question to our Soviet colleagues with regard to the Soviet Helsinki Monitors: "Why is there such a high rate of criminality among private individuals who wish to monitor their government's implementation of the Helsinki Accords in accordance with their right under Principle IX?"

Recently, the only potentially positive note regarding these courageous men and women is the unconfirmed report that Anatoliy Marchenko may soon be released. We hope our Soviet colleagues will be able to confirm it. We also hope they will confirm that Mr. Marchenko will be permitted to live in the country of his choice, whether it be the Soviet Union or elsewhere.

Mr. Chairman, in the United States official institutions were established shortly after the Final Act was signed with legal mandates to monitor and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Accords and other universally recognized human rights standards. We think that our official Commission on Security on Cooperation in Europe and the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs do fair, objective and useful work. Those who do not agree with us are free to criticize -- and frequently do.

My delegation has noted the recent establishment of an officially sponsored Soviet Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor implementation of the Helsinki Accords. An Administration for Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs has also been set up within the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Given these official Soviet institutions' professed concern for human rights, I would like to ask our Soviet colleagues what they have done, or are prepared to do, to protect the private Soviet citizens and groups that have been working for many years to monitor implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the Soviet Union. This should be their primary task.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to official institutions in the United States there is also a private, independent organization called "Helsinki Watch" that monitors implementation of the Accords. This organization has had no counterpart in the Soviet Union since the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group was forced, under pressure, to disband in late 1982.

Mr. Chairman, I hasten to add that the private "Helsinki Watch" organization does not hesitate to criticize the United States government when it judges that United States implementation of human rights standards is less than adequate. There are many other private organizations and individuals that are also highly critical of United States Government practices. And yet, I am unaware of any members of these groups who are currently in labor camp, prison, or internal exile for having signed a document criticizing U.S. implementation of the Helsinki Accords.

Mr. Chairman, another Soviet citizens' group whose activity clearly falls under the provisions of Principle IX is the "Group to Establish Trust between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.", founded in Moscow in June 1982. This group of peace activists has sought to establish and maintain contacts with citizens of the West in order to promote trust and understanding. The members have emphasized that they are not placing themselves in opposition to official Soviet foreign policy, but merely wish to supplement the peace process with their own efforts. Among their proposals are open televisions discussions between Soviet and American citizens, a travel exchange program for students, a pen pal program, the opening of a Soviet cultural center in Washington and an American Center in Moscow, creation of a joint Soviet-American medical center, and regular Soviet-American space flights.

Instead of welcoming such initiatives, the Soviet government has responded to the "Trust Group"s initiative with an iron fist. Members have been detained, imprisoned, fined, subjected to house arrest, and forced to emigrate. The secretary of the official Soviet Peace Committee has referred to independent peace marchers in the Soviet Union as "drunks, anti-socials, provocateurs working for the CIA." All the incidents of harassment and persecution experienced by the "Group of Trust" are too numerous to mention. In one case, five independent peace activists collected 300 signatures in May 1984 calling upon the governments of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to resume arms talks. As a result they were detained by the police, and one of them was eventually sentenced to fifteen days jail for "hooliganism". In May 1986 several members of the Group collected signatures in Moscow's Gorky Park on an appeal calling upon the Soviet government to review its nuclear energy program. After a half hour and thirty signatures, seven members and some bystanders were detained by the police.

Other Trust Group members, including young women such as Irina Pankratova, Olga Kabanova, Natalya Atyulyonok, and Anetta Fadeeva, have been subjected to involuntary psychiatric confinement for varying periods of time. At last word, Viktor Smirnov and

Nina Kovalenko were thus confined to psychiatric hospitals. Their espousal of an even-handed approach to peace issues is apparently regarded by Soviet authorities as evidence of mental illness. For attempting to help organize a "peace march" in August 1984 to commemorate the victims of Hiroshima, long-time human rights activist Kirill Popov was placed in a psychiatric facility for three months, and the following year received six years strict regime camp and five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Group members Aleksandr Shatravka and Vladimir Brodskiy were expelled after serving labor camp terms for peace activities. Another "Group of Trust" member, Larissa Chukaeva, was sentenced in April 1986 to three years general regime labor camp for "dissemination of anti-Soviet slander".

In addition, these independent peace group members have been forcibly prevented from meeting with their colleagues from abroad. Anti-nuclear activists from the West, whose activities are applauded by the Soviet press as long as they do not take place on Soviet territory, have been repeatedly harassed, and their movements restricted when they have attempted to visit or interact with independent peace activists in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to the various Helsinki Monitoring Groups established in the Soviet Union, persons basing their actions on the human rights provisions of the Final Act have formed groups and issued appeals in other Warsaw Pact countries. Among the most noteworthy of such independent activities have been those of the underground Helsinki Committee in Poland. The original Committee was founded in 1979 and essentially dissolved after arrests in the aftermath of martial law. A new Committee was created and, although it cannot operate openly, it has been able to keep the outside world informed about violations of human rights during the martial law and subsequent periods.

Signers of the Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, including members of the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS), also continue to work despite constant harassment and intimidation. They operate under difficult circumstances even as many courageous Czechoslovak citizens -- including Herman Chromy and Jiri Wolf -- remain in prison for their peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression.

Today, those of us concerned about human rights developments in Central and Eastern Europe are watching carefully to monitor the fate of 122 citizens of four Warsaw Pact countries who recently issued a joint communique on the thirtieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. Let me quote from their appeal, which reflects so many Helsinki promises:

> "We proclaim our common determination to struggle for political democracy in our countries, for their independence, for pluralism founded on the principles of self-government, for the peaceful unification of a divided Europe and for its democratic integration, as well as for the rights of all national minorities. We emphasize our mutual reliance on the efforts of all of us to achieve, in our countries and in the whole world, a better life that is free and decent."

Mr. Chairman, the United States views it as a positive sign that these individuals were able to contact each other -- although not without difficulties -- and to bring their aspirations to the attention of the outside world. We salute them for courageously acting upon their Helsinki rights guaranteeing that they have a positive and relevant role to play in contributing to the achievement of CSCE's aims. We fervently hope that their efforts, complemented by our own, will transform their vision of Europe's future into reality.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Warsaw Pact Compliance
With the
CBMs of the Final Act

Delivered to Subsidiary Working Group "S"

By Ambassador Robert H. Frowick

Monday, December 8, 1986

Mr. Chairman:

The United States believes that the debate thus far in this subsidiary working body has been both informative and useful in our review of compliances with the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) of the Final Act. There remain, however, several questions, within my delegation, on implementation by Warsaw Pact member states. These questions are being posed in an earnest effort to clarify facts that are essential to our deliberations. I will also express our concerns about the effectiveness of the CBMs and our expectations for the future.

Mr. Chairman:

Since the notification of major military maneuvers is the only CBM generally expected from the outset in 1975 to be regularly implemented -- though on a voluntary basis -- it is fitting that we begin with a detailed review of the record of compliance with this measure. It calls upon each participating State to notify all the other CSCE states of any maneuvers of over 25,000 troops (including amphibious or airborne troops) at least twenty-one (21) days before the commencement of the maneuver.

The United StateS is pleased to note that, after a thorough review of our records, no indication could be found of any State failing to provide at least a twenty-one day notification of a major military maneuver since we concluded our deliberations in Madrid. We do, however, harbor concerns about the methods used to give those notifications. While the Final Act only calls for notifications to be given "through usual diplomatic channels", we have noted a significant disparity between the procedures employed by the Western and NNA States on the one hand and those used by the Soviet Union on the other. NATO, the NNA and indeed all other Warsaw Pact States uniformly give notifications of exercises in diplomatic notes to each of the CSCE signatory states. In rather sharp contrast, the Soviet Union gave only Ministry of Defense (MOD) notifications to Military Attaches of participating states. We would be interested to know why this is the case.

Mr. Chairman:

My delegation was also interested to note that the German Democratic Republic failed to make a notification of the unnamed Soviet exercise, of 25-30 July 1983, which took place on GDR territory shortly before the end of the Madrid meeting. Likewise, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia did not make notification of the unnamed Soviet maneuver of 28 June - 5 July 1984. Even though the Soviet Union did make a notification of these maneuvers, they are the only examples, since 1981 of host countries failing to give notification of major maneuvers. We are, therefore, compelled to ask, "Why?"

Mr. Chairman:

The CBM on major maneuver notifications further indicates that each notification include:

a. The maneuver designation,

b. the purpose of the maneuver,

c. the states involved,

d. the type or types of forces engaged,

e. the numerical strength of forces engaged,

f. the area of its conduct, and

g. the estimated time frame of its conduct.

Mr. Chairman:

When our delegation reviewed the East's compliance with these requirements, we noted the following anomalies:

- The designation of notifiable exercises was uniformly provided by the NATO and NNA states; however, the Soviet Union failed to provide a maneuver designation in the notifications of 7 out of 8 exercises it has notified since January, 1981. One of its exercises (25-31, May 1985) was notified by Czechoslovakia but similarly without designation and constitutes, for Czechoslovakia, the only case of nondesignation out of 4 notifications. Neither of the two exercises was notified by the GDR. And Bulgaria's single notification since 1981 also failed to meet this requirement.
- The notifications for the Bulgarian exercise Tarcza 82 and the Czechoslovak maneuver Tarcza 84 failed to note the specific states involved. Only the fact that forces of the Warsaw Pact would be

used was notified in each case. The fact that not all members of the Pact participated renders this response incomplete.

- Especially noteworthy and disconcerting is the fact that the numerical strength of the forces employed has been uniformly provided by all participating states, with the conspicuous exception of the Soviet exercise of 4-12 September, 1981 (ZAPAD 81).

Mr. Chairman:

The area covered by a notified exercise was considered an important factor in developing the confidence building goals of this measure. Yet, even here, Warsaw Pact implementation has generated many questions. While the notified area of operation of NATO and NNA maneuvers reflected their true area of maneuver, many of those given by the members of the Warsaw Pact were too large and ambiguous to be meaningful. In particular:

- The area given for the unnamed Soviet exercise of 4-12 Sept 1981 was a combined region embracing the Belorussian and Baltic Military Districts with a land area approaching 150,000 square miles. This constitutes an area three times the size of Czechoslavakia;
- The Bulgarian maneuver - Tarcza 1982 was notified as having an area of operation covering the whole state of Bulgaria or 42,823 sq. miles;
- The unnamed Soviet exercise of 29 June-4 July, 1983, had a notified maneuver area of approximately 90,000 square miles;

- The Czechoslovakian maneuvers Tarcza 84 and Druzba 86 were both notified as having maneuver areas covering the entire land mass of Czechoslavakia or 49,371 square miles;
- The unnamed Soviet maneuver of 28 June-5 July, 1984, had a notified area that included parts of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia and totaled approximately 50,000 square miles; and
- The unnamed Soviet maneuvers of 10-17 February 1986 were notified in an area of almost 65,000 square miles.

The area of operation notified for each of these exercises was many times larger than comparable NATO or NNA maneuver areas and appears to far exceed the area required for the force structure given in the notification. We would like to know why such huge areas were reported.

Finally Mr. Chairman: Why was Czechoslavakia the only State to fail to provide the exact date of an exercise? Tarcza 84 was notified as taking place at the "beginning of September" without specific dates.

Beyond the CBM on prior notification of major maneuvers in the Final Act is a series of voluntary actions which, if adhered to, would have greatly enhanced openness and thereby increased confidence. The invitation of observers is of obvious value to each of our participant states. Yet unlike the NNA and NATO member states, that have regularly invited observers from the Warsaw Pact countries, the latter rarely issue invitations in return. Druzba 86 was my country's first invitation to any Warsaw Pact member state's maneuver in the 1980's. The fact that the Warsaw Pact had fewer exercises does not explain this painfully low level of compliance. That experience best symbolized the ambiguity of the Warsaw Pact's overall approach to implementation of the CBM's of the Final Act.

Even in cases where optional CBMs were implemented, the Warsaw Pact imposed severe limitations. Among the most telling examples is the treatment of NATO member states observers invited to exercise Berezina in 1978, where they were denied use of their own equipment and then provided with faulty binoculars. As noted by our Italian colleague, even the percentage of Warsaw Pact exercises issuing observer invitations was far lower than that of the West.

Last week, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands commented on the most recent example, the Czechoslovak exercise, "Druzba 86". Though the exercise took place over a five (5) day period, invitations were extended for three (3) of these days and observation was limited to only three (3) hours. Observers were initially refused use of their personal binoculars, tape recorders, and cameras. Only after a protest were quality binoculars provided. In addition, the observers were denied access to participating troops, unit commanders, and the operation's command post. Command briefings provided them failed to cover such vital information as the operation's size, geographic extent, and the origin of participating troops. The observers were also not informed about the equipment being used, nor were they provided a list of attendees, by country, or provided with a copy of the operation's scenario.

Yet, Druzhba '86 was an improvement for Western observers over their earlier experiences in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Chairman:

Like observations, the voluntary measures to notify smaller scale maneuvers have enjoyed a broad application among the NATO and NNA states; however, here again the Warsaw Pact countries have seen fit to notify only one smaller scale exercise under the Final Act - Dnestr 83. Mr. Chairman, this factor is all the more important because time and again the Soviet representatives have used the excuse that their maneuvers were below the threshold of major maneuver notification to justify the low number of observer invitations issued by Warsaw Pact States. We must therefore ask why? If the Warsaw Pact is sincerely interested in the spirit as well as the words of CSCE, why were more notifications of and observer invitations to their smaller scale operations not forthcoming?

Mr. Chairman:

The drafters of the Final Act recognized that after decades of difficulty and distrust between the competing socio-political systems of this continent, real security could not be simply declared, as if by caveat, at Helsinki. Their objective was to enhance the tenuous security being maintained in Europe by military deterrence by putting into effect a modest evolutionary system of building confidence a step at a time. This could easily have been achieved through a reasonable implemention of the Final Act. Confidence does not, however, evolve in a void. It is perforce a product of experience. The Confidence Building Measures provided the CSCE participating states represented around this table with an opportunity to generate eleven years of positive experience with the Final Act's admittedly rudimentary reporting obligations. Unfortunately, our review of Warsaw Pact compliance has clearly shown that, to date, the Final Act CBM's represent an opportunity largely wasted.

Mr. Chairman:

In an undesired way our experiences of the past eleven years have indeed provided us with "confidence" in Eastern intentions.

-Confidence that the East wishes to comply with only the minimum requirements;

-Confidence that the Warsaw Pact States will locate and exploit any loopholes in the text of any accord or translation thereof for their own benefit; and

-Confidence that compliance with CBM's will, as the Soviet representative has admitted, vary with the prevailing winds of political fortune.

Mr. Chairman:

Given the mixed balance sheet of our experiences with the Final Act CBM's, our assessment of the Stockholm document - as we have repeatedly made clear -- is conditioned on one overiding concern: implementation.

Continuation of the narrow, legalistic interpretation accorded the Final Act CBMs by the Warsaw Pact is not acceptable. To build security in Europe requires that we really act together to build openness and that we implement our commitments in good faith -- not just when it suits the political objective of the moment.

Mr. Chairman:

A good first step toward improving the atmosphere of implementation and compliance would be frank answers to the questions we have raised here today. We sincerely hope that the Warsaw Pact countries can help us to understand how their record is consistent with the Final Act. We await their response.

STATEMENT BY

AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE

U.S. DELEGATION

ON PRINCIPLE VII OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

"S" WORKING GROUP

December 11, 1986

Mr. Chairman, during the course of our debate on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, my Government and other Western Governments have been critical of East Bloc performance in the area of human rights. We have deplored the imprisonment of Helsinki Monitors. We have castigated Eastern emigration policies. We have decried the lack of religious freedom in most Eastern states. In response, Eastern Governments have raised their own charges of alleged Western human rights abuses. They have accused us of racism and of insensitivity to the plight of the homeless and the poor. Both sides have been frank in their exposition of what they see as wrong in the way the other side treats its people.

In musing on all this, Mr. Chairman, it occurred to my delegation that if a Soviet citizen were to write or to say the things that we and other Western delegations have been saying during the course of our debate, he would undoubtedly find himself doing seven years of labor camp followed by five years of internal exile for violation of Article 70 of the RSFSR criminal code, which makes "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" a criminal offense. On the other hand, were a citizen of any Western country to write or say what the Eastern delegations have been saying here, the very worst thing that could happen to him is that he might be ignored. Mr. Chairman, hard as it may be for our East Bloc colleagues to understand, we in the West believe that one of the triumphs of Western civilization is the fact that persons so disposed can speak their minds and express their views without fear of harassment or prosecution by the state.

Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act has committed every nation represented here "to promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and fundamental freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development." The West fought hard for the inclusion of Principle VII in the Helsinki Final Act. We did so, not because we sought to use it to embarass any of the participating states, but because we hoped that over time it would encourage them to change their repressive internal policies.

While it would be wrong for us to claim complete success in this venture, we can rightly claim that exposure of Eastern human rights violations through the Helsinki process has built considerable pressure for reform. Ample evidence for this can be found in recent Soviet behavior. As someone who has seen something of the CSCE process, I have witnessed a gradual change in Soviet official attitudes toward the human rights debate. From the sullen stonewall of the Belgrade Conference characterized by the bogus claims of intervention in internal affairs, we have now reached the point where the East appears to be enthusiastically engaging in a human rights debate, and some Eastern countries, but not always the Soviet Union, are actually offering some minimal response to Western concerns. In the realm of real-life implementation, although Soviet gestures have been largely superficial and incidental, the fairly steady stream of high-profile case resolutions has clearly been aimed at satisfying worldwide concerns over Soviet human rights violations.

We hope that with continued Western encouragement, genuine change will come. We are confident that it will come. Until it does, however, we shall be compelled, in forums such as this, to read out the tale of Soviet and East European non-compliance with Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union has much to do to bring its internal behavior into compliance with Principle VII. In an important sense, it has everything to do. Consider the Soviet Constitution. Soviet officials frequently proclaim that the Soviet Constitution guarantees to Soviet citizens all the civil and political rights traditionally associated with Western democracy. Let's consider this claim.

According to several key provisions of the Soviet Constitution, the Communist Party, acting through the Soviet government, decides what the Soviet people can and cannot do. The only civil or political right a Soviet citizen has, therefore, is the right to do whatever the Communist Party says he can do. And that, Mr. Chairman, is no right at all.

In the Soviet Union, a small group of individuals exercise complete political control over the state. As in all dictatorships, the leaders of the Soviet Union can do what they please without the checks and balances necessary to blunt their absolute rule. In Stalin's time, this absolute power was abused to a vastly greater extent than is the case today. Millions of Soviet citizens were executed, and millions more were starved to death in the Ukrainian famine.

Today, political control is exercised, not through mass terror, but through a series of statutes which make criminal the performance of actions that in the West are considered normal political behavior. The most prominent among these are Article 70 and Article 190.1 of the RSFSF Criminal Code. Article 70, the statute concerning so-called "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," provides for sentences of up to 10 years in labor camp and five years in internal exile for activities intended to harm the Soviet state. Article 190.1, concerning "anti-Soviet slander" provides a 3 year labor camp sentence for activities which simply harm the Soviet state. Most of the 37 currently incarcerated Soviet Helsinki monitors, including Anatoliy Koryagin, Mart Niklus, Ivan Kovalev, Vytautas Skuodys and Iosif Zisels, were convicted under one or the other of these two Articles. Anatoliy Marchenko, whose tragic death in Chistopol Prison has cast a pall over our Meeting, had been sentenced most recently under Article 70.

Let me emphasize that none of these individuals were accused of violent acts, or of conspiring to overthrow the Soviet state. They were accused, rather, of saying many of the same things about the Soviet regime that I have been saying here today. In my country, and in the other Western countries represented here, equally critical remarks are made by our citizens about our governments all the time and no one pays it any mind. We call it freedom of speech. I would remind our distinguished Soviet colleagues that it was one of the fundamental political freedoms their government agreed to encourage and promote when it signed the Helsinki Final Act.

Helsinki monitors are not the only Soviet citizens who have been victimized by Articles 70 and 190.1. Many Soviet religious believers, including Iosif Terelya, Gleb Yakunin and Alfonsas Svarinskas, have also been imprisoned under these statutes. In accepting inclusion of Principle VII in the Final Act, the Soviet Union agreed to "recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience." But despite a passing mention in the Soviet Constitution, religion in the Soviet Union is strongly discouraged and tightly controlled.

In addition to those Articles, a series of other statutes, including Article 142, on the violation of laws on separation of church and state; Article 143, on obstructing performance of religious rites; and Article 227, on infringement of the person and rights of citizens under appearance of perfoming religious ceremonies, are used against religious believers. Most of the 400 religious prisoners in the Soviet Union have been convicted under these statutes. Soviet authorities also require religious congregations to register and they can and frequently do refuse them registration. An entire demomination, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, has been refused registration. Sunday schools are illegal in the Soviet Union. Jews are imprisoned for attempting to teach Hebrew in the sanctity of their own homes. Clergymen cannot lead religious processions. Religious believers are made fun of in the Soviet media and discriminated against in education and employment. Yes, there are some churches. There are even religious ceremonies in the churches. But this, in itself, constitutes only the barest minimum of what by any realistic standard can be considered religious liberty.

Mr. Chairman, I have been arguing that the Soviet Union, not only in practice, but even in its Constitution, and in its statutes circumscribes civil and political rights, and, therefore, is in fundamental violation of Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act. Now, on the basis of what I have said, one might be tempted to conclude that although Soviet laws do not permit the freedom of expression and worship that we take for granted in the West, at least Soviet authorities are constrained by these laws in their treatment of Soviet citizens.

Mr. Chairman, nothing could be further from the truth. The fact of the matter is that Soviet authorities routinely frame innocent persons on criminal charges they know to be false in an effort to discredit these persons and their cause. A number of Jewish cultural activists, including Aleksandr Kholmianskiy, Yuliy Edelshtein, Iosif Berenshtein and Alexsiy Magarik, have been dealt with in this manner since the conclusion of the Madrid Conference. As we all know, this treatment is not restricted to Soviet citizens. Nicholas Daniloff, an innocent American journalist, was framed on instructions from high political authority in the Soviet Union.

The point I am making, Mr. Chairman, is that all Soviet laws can be ultimately irrelevant. Soviet authorities can and do frame innocent persons. Soviet authorities send a world-renowned and respected Nobel prize winner, Andrei Sakharov, and his wife into involuntary internal exile under conditions that can only be described as heartless and uncivilized. Soviet authorities can and do send sane persons to insane asylums. Soviet authorities can do whatever they want. In the Soviet Union the absolute rule of law does not prevail.

Just as the Soviet Union takes pride in its Constitution which supposedly guarantees all the rights of man, so the Soviet authorities like to recount how well their country respects the rights of national groups and ethnic minorities. The reality, unfortunately, is otherwise. There is ample and irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union has adopted a deliberate policy restricting the circulation of newspapers and journals and television broadcasts in non-Russian languages. The Soviet government has recently amended certain laws which have resulted in the weakening of the status of non-Russian languages, particularly in the legal sphere.

The deliberate policy of population resettlement of both non-Russian and Russians is also a telling index of governmental intentions - a policy which has caused considerable anger and pain among the non-Russian peoples.

Soviet repression against Ukrainian activists has been particularly severe. Although Ukrainians account for 20 percent of the Soviet population they comprise 40 percent of all Soviet prisoners of conscience. Since May 1984, four leading Ukrainian activists, Oleky Tykhy, Yuri Lytvyn, Valery Marchenko and Vasyl Stus, have died while serving 10-year camp terms.

Popular hostility to Kremlin policies of Russification is perhaps most intense in the three Baltic states, where since 1983 young Balts have been jailed for raising the flags of their independent countries and leading activists in all these states have been arrested and imprisoned.

One minority which has had a particularly tragic history continues to be perceived, despite the fact that its members have a relatively high rate of assimilation, as a threat to the dominant culture. The reason I say threat is because I can think of no other reason why the Soviet government acts as it does towards members of the Jewish minority. Mr. Chairman, there are approximately 2 million Jews in the Soviet Union, yet there is no Jewish education, no Jewish schools, nor schools in which Jewish subjects are taught. Hebrew is taught only at a handful of Soviet academic institutions and at the only remaining yeshiva in the USSR. Private courses in Hebrew and Jewish culture and history are suppressed and the teachers harassed and criminally prosecuted. There are only two Jewish periodicals published in the entire USSR.

This lack of opportunity for cultural expression is accompanied by anti-Semitism, which is often barely hidden behind the code-word of anti-Zionism. This anti-Semitism in the official media serves only to exacerbate the problem of discrimination of Jews in employment and education. It makes a mockery of all the high-sounding constitutional rhetoric with which our Soviet colleagues have attempted to convince us of their respect for the rights and dignity of men.

Mr. Chairman, in my remarks to this point I have been concentrating on Soviet violations of civil and political rights in contravention of Principle VII. But I am also mindful of

Soviet and East Bloc emphasis on social and economic rights and I would like to say something about their failure in this area as well.

Yesterday, as you know, we heard an endless, grossly exaggerated recitation of statistics presented by our Czechoslovak colleague purporting to prove how badly American citizens live. These statistics, by the way, were based entirely on figures officially or publicly published in my country, as the Czech representative so proudly observed. Published facts dealing with the harsh realities of Czechoslovak society and economy are not so easy to come by. As a matter of fact, much of the best literature of any sort written in Czechoslovakia is not published in that country. The authors of these unpublished treatises, both in Charter 77 and outside it, are hounded, harassed, imprisoned and otherwise intimidated.

But let us now consider the Soviet Union. Soviet officials are also fond of criticizing poverty and unemployment in the West. Much is made of how many citizens live below the so-called poverty line, which is a statistical line set by our own government. Soviet spokesmen are tireless in demanding that we do something about this. Well, Mr. Chairman, the average Soviet citizen lives beneath the U.S. poverty line. What does the Soviet Union intend to do about that? U.S. Department of Labor statistics show that a U.S. family with an unemployed worker earns about 20,000 dollars a year. Even allowing for the income differentials in our two countries, it can be safely said that a Soviet family with that kind of income would number among the Soviet elite. What does the Soviet Union intend to do about this?

Chronic shortages of the most basic commodities require the average Soviet family to spend hours daily standing in queues. These shortages have led to pervasive public corruption and a flourishing black market. Soviet housing is the most cramped in the industrial world, with two persons for every room compared to two rooms for every person in the West. Young people must wait years to get housing of their own. The Soviet health care system is so grossly inadequate that during the past twenty years infant mortality has increased by over 25 percent and male life expectancy has fallen by more than four years.

Mr. Chairman, there is much more we could say about this subject, and much more we will be prepared to say during the course of our meeting. As our debate continues, my delegation will make no attempt to paper over the very real problems we face in the West. Our countries are not as prosperous as we would like them to be, nor do all our people live as well as we would like them to live. But when it comes to a comparison of East and West there is no comparison. We in the West have managed to provide for our people a level of freedom and prosperity unmatched in human history. Can there be better proof of this than the thousands who have flocked to my country and other Western states from the East in recent years and the thousands, perhaps millions more who would like to do so, have tried to do so, but have not been able to do so -- and have been persecuted for wanting to do so. Whatever our own problems, this is something we must not forget. It is something we will not permit our Eastern colleagues to forget, as we consider our respective records in implementing Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY

AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. FROWICK

PRINCIPLE VIII
EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION

December 12, 1986

Thank you Madame Chairman,

Today, I will address United States' perceptions of the record of implementation of Principle VIII on Equal Rights and Self-Determination. This is a Principle to which the United States has always attached great importance.

Indeed, President Woodrow Wilson is commonly considered to be the principal author of this concept, which he championed at the Versailles Conference following World War I. It is a concept drawn from the roots of American political experience, beginning with our own War for Independence in the 18th Century. Given American political tradition, it is almost inevitable that President Wilson should have advocated a European peace settlement founded upon national self-determination after the devastation of World War I.

Here in Vienna, we are still dealing with fundamental and far-reaching political problems stemming from World War II. Those problems, including the still unresolved question of a divided German nation, will ultimately require due respect for the principle of national self-determination.

These thoughts are among considerations that enter into the United States' evaluation of the implementation of the Self-Determination Principle -- a clearly stated precept which takes but 12 lines of the Final Act.

It begins with the statement that "The participating states will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination", noting that this will be achieved in conformity with purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and relevant norms of international law. This pledge represents a solemn commitment to honor the aspirations for national self-determination inherent in all our countries. It is not a formulation lightly to be dismissed or ignored.

Our text also holds that "By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their political, economic, social and cultural developments." If this commitment subscribed to at the highest level of authority by all 35 participant states in 1975 were really honored, both security and cooperation in Europe would be of a substantially higher order than is presently the case over 11 years after the Helsinki summit meeting.

Now what is the reality that confronts all of us in this Conference in the Europe of the late 1980's?

-- On one side stands the Atlantic Alliance of 16 democracies, including the North American democracies of the United States and Canada. The member states of the Alliance all face a great range of challenging, increasingly complex problems as we near the end of the century. But who can plausibly deny that national self-determination is a viable concept throughout the Alliance?

-- The Neutral and Nonaligned participant states also display resolute support for the concept of national self-determination, knowing that it is fundamental to the continued exercise of their independence in world affairs.

-- Only in the East is respect for this vital principle persistently undermined -- by the Soviet Union.

How else can we interpret either the reality of Soviet hegemony or the doctrine of limited sovereignty that has been laid out authoritatively in the pages of Pravda? In an earlier statement, I called attention to the Pravda article of September 25, 1968, which offered a doctrinal justification for the crushing of Czechoslovakia's short-lived experiment in "socialism with a human face".

The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union attempted to downplay the significance of that article as well as its author, Sergei Kovalev, making use of what we heard was the so-called "free press" of his country. Let me quote from the article:

> "The sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot be counterposed to the interests of world socialism and the world revoluntionary movement...In the Marxist conception the norms of law, including

> the norms governing relations between socialist countries, cannot be interpreted in a narrowly formal way, outside the general context of the class struggle in the present-day world...The formal observance of freedom of self-determination in the specific situation that had taken shape in Czechoslovakia would signify freedom of 'self-determination' not only for the people's masses and the working people but for their enemies...Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle and the laws of social development...The class approach to the matter cannot be discarded in the name of legalistic considerations."

Madame Chairman, there is no interpretation we can possibly give to this formulation, widely known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, other than that of a justification for effectively denying the right of national self-determination. The United States emphatically rejects any doctrine of this kind.

Like many other countries represented here we have condemned the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and Moscow's attempt forcibly to turn that previously nonaligned country into a member of the so-called "socialist commonwealth". Here too, the Soviet Union would deny a neighbor nation its right to self-determination.

We and our Allies have criticized the Soviet Union's threatened use of force against Poland in the early 1980's to thwart the efforts of the Solidarity movement to create a free trade union movement and the overall effort of the Polish people to gain a greater measure of national self-determination.

Similarly, the United States has never recognized -- and never will -- the illegal incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into the Soviet Union. Our position on this issue is as firm now as it was 46 years ago, when our Government cited the use of force and the absence of freely given consent as reasons for this position.

Madame Chairman, we have previously stressed in this body our understanding of the Soviet Union's determination to secure its frontiers, especially after the terrible suffering its people endured during World War II. No-one denies the Soviet Union the right of self-determination for itself. But we cannot accept in perpetuity the Soviet Union's attempts to prevent, through the use or threat of force, smaller contiguous nation-states similarly to enjoy the benefits of self-determination. For denial of this basic right inevitably provokes an unstable political situation wherever it occurs. Such instability is not in the longterm interest of any of us, including the Soviet Union.

The Helsinki Final Act in particular and the CSCE process in general represent potentially the most effective instrument available for permitting a steadily growing satisfaction of national aspirations within an evolutionary process capable of ensuring stability among our 35 countries. Let us collectively do our utmost to use this instrument fully to honor the precepts set forth in Principle VIII.

Thank you, Madame Chairman.

STATEMENT

BY

CLARENCE A. HUDSON

TO SUBSIDIARY WORKING GROUP 'S'

December 17, 1986

Mr. Chairman:

This afternoon's meeting is the final session of Subsidiary Working Group "S" dedicated to the review of compliance with the security aspects of the Final Act. It is, therefore, fitting and proper that we discuss the results of this initial phase of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting. My delegation considers the thorough review of our compliance with the standards of conduct set down in the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document to be a most important element of this or any other CSCE follow-up meeting. Among other things, this period affords us the opportunity to:

- exchange opinions on the interpretation of existing CSCE accords;

- inform other delegations about problems we are experiencing with compliance and actions we are taking to eradicate them;

- note constructive criticisms of other delegations about United States compliance together with any recommendations for improvement; and

- evaluate the level of commitment -- as demonstrated by compliance -- of each participating state to the provisions set out in the Final Act and subsequent CSCE documents.

My delegation, therefore, strongly rejects the assertion of some states that a thorough and frank compliance review looks to the past at the expense of the future. As has often been noted, the CSCE is an ongoing process whereby we have an opportunity, through a series of well planned and executed steps, to enhance the security of this continent. Since real security is the product of experience, and not fiat, the review of our collective experiences under the Final Act is absolutely essential for the progress of CSCE. The Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were developed to provide participating states with the opportunity to take the critical first steps toward developing a level of mutual confidence that could be the precursor of more ambitious future endeavors. The advent of the Confidence-and Security-Building Measures has made our review all the more appropriate. For we must take stock realistically of implementation to date of agreed CSCE security measures in order to judge how best to work together, in the period immediately ahead, when the results of the Stockholm negotiations take effect.

Mr. Chairman:

While the comments during our debate in this subsidiary working body have often been heated, a close examination of their content has shown a lack of real communication. We are pleased that the majority of participating states have engaged seriously in our dialogue. Unfortunately, however, many of our Eastern colleagues have failed to respond directly to concerns cited by my delegation -- as well as other delegations -- except through the use of apparently previously prepared responses. Too often these responses were inappropriate to issues being discussed and served only to obfuscate the real issues. We can all recount hours of, often repetitive Eastern interventions in which the arms race, nuclear issues, the ABM Treaty, or the unratified Salt II agreement took precedence over a reasoned discussion of compliance with the CBMs of the Final Act.

On December 15, my delegation presented a candid and thorough review of United States compliance with each of the Confidence Building Measures of the Final Act. Our delegation then stood ready to answer any and all questions. Indeed, most other delegations likewise thoroughly reviewed their compliance.

My delegation earlier had delivered a clear and concise assessment of compliance, by Warsaw Pact member countries, wherein we pointed to specific and objective examples of non-implementation. The conclusion of our analyses was that Eastern compliance with the spirit of the Final Act was unsatisfactory. The East has challenged neither our observations nor our conclusions. During one significant interchange, however, the Soviet delegate made clear that his country's level of implementation with the CBMs has remained dependent upon the prevailing winds of political fortune.

Our own experience with the Warsaw Pact has not been unique. Virtually every other Western delegation at this table has also been frustrated in attempts to obtain responses to questions on Compliance by Warsaw Pact member states. Reactions at one point led to statements that the Soviet Union would answer questions only when it sees fit and that it "could not care less" about the well documented concerns of some delegations around this table. We regret this attitude of refusal of dialogue.

Mr. Chairman:

New CSBM'S approved in Stockholm come into effect next month and offer us all a fresh opportunity constructively to advance toward significant improvements in the security of Europe and strengthening of confidence among all CSCE participants. As many representatives around the table have emphasized, the proof of what we have really accomplished at Stockholm will come in how well we carry out the agreements we reached there. Some delegations have suggested that the more explicit requirements of the Stockholm measures -- such as mandatory observations, on-site verification, lower notification thresholds, yearly calendars, and so forth -- will obviate many of the compliance problems we have been discussing in this review period.

But let us be honest with ourselves. All of us know that the Stockholm document might also be exploited if a State wishes to minimize its performance under the CSBM's. In the final analysis we will face much the same choice under the Stockholm measures as under the measures of the Final Act. We can minimally fulfill our obligations only to the letter and use every available opportunity to escape requirements;

or we can fulfill our obligations in the spirit of the agreement and do all we can equitably and reciprocally to enhance stability and stimulate increased confidence.

During the remainder of this Follow-up conference, my country will closely monitor the implementation of the Stockholm measures. We reserve the right to raise in this body any questions we may have about compliance with either the spirit or the letter of these obligations.

Mr. Chairman

The CSCE process at its inception was a shining star of hope for people throughout Europe and indeed the whole world. Mankind yearns for peace and freedom, but true peace and true freedom depend on the willingness of us all to translate our commitments into reality.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
ON PRINCIPLE TEN OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT
IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY 'S'

DECEMBER 18, 1986

Mr. Chairman, in Principle X of the Final Act, the participating States agreed to fulfill in good faith their obligations under international law and to implement their CSCE commitments. In many of our statements during this implementation review phase of the meeting, the United States delegation has emphasized violations by certain Eastern states of those CSCE principles and provisions which relate to the human dimension of the process. We have focused on grave problems which threaten the credibility of the entire process.

Today, however, I wish to touch upon a few issues related to Principle X, in particular, with reference to compliance with international treaty obligations.

The United States is often accused of failure to ratify certain international human rights instruments. In response, I would point out that the Final Act itself contains a comprehensive set of commitments in the field of human rights. We should focus here on their implementation, recognizing that each state has the sovereign right, in the words of the first CSCE principle, "to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties..."

It is true that our Senate has not given its advice and consent to ratification of the International Covenants on Human Rights. As we all know, these covenants are basically an elaboration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in treaty form. We, nevertheless, share with all other CSCE participants a political commitment, contained in the Helsinki Final Act, to apply the standards of the Universal Declaration in our states. We noted that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in his opening plenary statement at this meeting also spoke out strongly in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as other United Nations documents.

The United States record in this regard is open for anyone to see and criticize. We have a free press and an independent judiciary which ensure that basic standards of human and civil rights are met. The fact that some states have undertaken an additional legal obligation under the Covenants does not diminish the right and responsibility of all participating CSCE states, including the United States, to review the record of CSCE implementation.

I do not intend to undertake a detailed comparison of various human rights records. Let us look for a moment, however, at one of the basic human rights contained in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights--the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own.

We noted with interest the information supplied in the plenary by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, to the effect that during a two-week period, 98 Soviet citizens received permission to emigrate to the West; more than 300 were granted permission to visit the West and 45 persons with children were granted permission to leave so that families would be reunified. This makes for a total of about 450 departures to the West, both permanent and temporary. I assume that a somewhat larger number of persons are permitted to travel to Eastern countries.

In keeping with the Helsinki Accords, the United States does not put any obstacles in the way of anyone wishing to leave the country. Counting air travel alone, about 169,000 U.S. citizens leave the country in any two-week period according to the latest available statistics. That is more than 1000 times the Soviet figure although, admittedly, it includes departure to all destinations. Furthermore, our Census Bureau estimates that about 160,000 citizens emigrate freely from the United States annually, an average of 6,000 for any two-week period. About four times that number, around 24,000, enter the United States in any two-week period as persons authorized to establish permanent residence. Perhaps our Soviet colleague could tell us the corresponding figures for the Soviet Union.

Turning to other aspects of Principle X, I would recall the remarks of Secretary Shultz during his opening address at this meeting. International agreements are important, he said, and whether they concern arms control or human rights, they should be complied with. They should not be abandoned for frivolous or transitory reasons.

The modern community of nations exists under a framework of international law. This framework includes agreements and treaties covering the allocation of the radio spectrum, the delivery of international mail, and the formation of free trade unions for the defense of workers' interests.

If anyone wants to listen to a foreign radio station in the United States, that person can do so. If someone wants to send mail to U.S citizens from any spot on the globe, the United States Postal Service delivers it to their homes. We have no jamming transmitters -- because they are illegal under international law and repugnant to our principles of individual freedom. Our police authorities do not confiscate international mail -- again, because it's illegal under international law and repugnant to our political principles. If workers want to form a new trade union, no authority will prevent them from doing so.

Sadly, the Soviet Union has demonstrated little respect for these commitments and obligations. Jamming is, indisputably, a fact of life for Soviet citizens. And if a Soviet citizen is sent mail or packages from abroad, there is a strong chance they will be intercepted by the authorities. If the letter or parcel is received, but its contents raise political or religious questions, then interrogation, threats and even imprisonment could follow.

In the question of trade unions, the creation and tolerance of genuinely free trade union organizations in the Soviet Union and most of Eastern Europe is out of the question. All efforts in this direction have been ruthlessly stamped out.

In concluding, I would note that in a number of statements our Eastern colleagues have emphasized the provision of Principle I which includes each state's right to choose its political, social, economic and cultural system -- and to determine its own laws and regulations.

Mr. Chairman, Principle X makes it clear that "in exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their own laws and regulations," the participating States will not only comply with their international legal obligations -- they will also implement the provisions in the Final Act. In other words, Mr. Chairman, the Final Act commits participating states to make sure that their laws do not violate any of the Final Act's provisions -- including, of course, those of Principle VII and Basket III. It is thus perfectly justified, indeed necessary, for us to use this implementation review phase of the meeting to point to legislation, regulations and practices that are inconsistent with our common commitments. We call upon the Soviet Union and other defaulting states finally to implement these commitments if they genuinely wish to see the Helsinki process as a whole move forward. Selective implementation of our commitments and unbalanced progress in one or two areas will not suffice. The Helsinki process, in the long run, cannot survive such insincere and half-hearted treatment. The Vienna meeting, in the short run, will be profoundly affected by it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. FROWICK
ON
U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES

"S" GROUP
DECEMBER 19, 1986

Today I wish to discuss my Government's implementation of all the CSCE principles. The United States is a peace-loving state; we fulfill our obligations under the UN Charter as well as our CSCE commitments. Our alliances are solely defensive. We neither covet nor threaten the territory of any other nation. We stand for peace and freedom.

In asserting that the United States Government fulfills its commitments under the first six principles -- that is, concerning respect for sovereign equality, non-use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-intervention in internal affairs -- I feel obliged to respond to those few delegations that have accused us of failure to do so. Their accusations have focused on two major issues: direct use of U.S. military force, particularly in Libya and Grenada; and indirect support for groups opposing incumbent regimes in such countries as Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Each of these allegations can be dealt with in a few sentences, if we consider pragmatically the context of our activities and recall that article 51 of the UN Charter provides for the right of states to individual and collective self-defense.

In the case of Libya, the chairman of my delegation has already pointed out the facts: A single U.S. military reaction was a measured and appropriate response to a longstanding pattern of murderous state-sponsored terrorism directed inter alia against United States targets. My Government regarded our reaction as justified in the face of repeated insidious "armed attacks" of either Libyan terrorists or Libyan-supported terrorists. We regret that some states inaccurately characterized our action as a violation of CSCE principles and repeat our desire to work together in order to combat state-sponsored terrorist acts. We should recall our Madrid Concluding Document pledge "to take effective measures for the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, both at the national level and through international cooperation." The United States has long made clear to the international community that it stands ready to take a very active role in such cooperation.

The United States engaged in a military action on Grenada along with six Caribbean nations to rescue that island's population, as well as American citizens who were in danger, from the anarchy that prevailed after the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop by a well armed group of political extremists in October 1983. Our forces acted in keeping with a regional self-defense pact and at the specific request of the sovereign authority on the island. U.S. combat forces were greeted with a great sense of relief by nearly the entire indigenous population of the island -- as well as the people of the surrounding Eastern Caribbean island states. Our forces withdrew within two months, and the people of Grenada soon exercised their right to choose a democratic government through free elections.

We have already provided this working body with a comprehensive survey of the dispute in Nicaragua. We reiterate -- as our Canadian colleague has also done this morning -- our readiness to resolve disputes by peaceful means. But as long as the repressive regime in Managua refuses to engage itself in serious efforts to resolve differences peacefully with its own people as well as with its Central American neighbors, we will support the democratic resistance in Nicaragua as a concrete manifestation of our steadfast commitment to respect for human rights, pluralism, and democracy throughout the Americas.

One specific criticism of U.S. involvement in Central America relates to our alleged "withdrawal from the World Court." Let me comment on this point: the United States remains committed to the rule of law in international affairs and has not turned its back on the World Court -- despite our deep conviction that the Court acted improperly in ruling on the Nicaragua case.

Mr. Chairman, it is not enough to claim that, just because Article 36 (6) of the Court's statute says that it may decide disputes concerning jurisdiction, that the Court indeed did have jurisdiction in this particular dispute. No court, including the International Court of Justice, has the legal power simply to assert jurisdiction where there is no basis for that jurisdiction. In our view, the absence of any foundation in either law or fact for the Court's assertion of jurisdiction in this case is clear. Look at the language and the negotiating history of the statute of the International Court of Justice. Look at the consistent interpretation of these instruments by the Court, the Security Council -- not the General Assembly, incidentally -- and by member states.

It is sometimes forgotten that Nicaragua was able to bring its case against us because the United States had previously accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court -- a voluntary step taken decades ago in the hope that others would follow. However, the fact that the United States withdrew its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction last year should not obscure the fact that many of our critics have never subjected themselves to such compulsory jurisdiction.

Having responded to the most frequently voiced allegations regarding U.S. implementation of Principles I - VI, let me now turn to Principle VII -- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Mr. Chairman, non-implementation of Principle VII human rights commitments by Eastern states has been well documented by Western delegations during this meeting. In turn, my country has been accused by some of violating this principle. Such allegations fall into several discrete categories. First is the allegation that the United States is guilty of massive violations of "economic and social rights." My delegation has already had occasion to refute these charges in considerable detail. I refer to Ambassador Zimmermann's statement in plenary on December 12.

A second line of attack alleges that we violate the civil and political rights of our citizens. The charges range from mass sterilization of Puerto Rican women to routine interference with the personal privacy of our citizens. As our French colleague pointed out on one occasion, some of these allegations are potentially serious charges. But they are rarely presented with the sort of documentation that would allow a reasoned discussion. Aside from the economic and social issues we have addressed separately, the specific "violation" of Principle VII of which the United States is accused usually comes down to our failure to ratify certain international human rights instruments -- an issue which my delegation addressed in some detail yesterday in this working body.

My delegation has already addressed the issue of equal rights and self-determination of peoples under Principle VIII and we have heard the often repeated criticisms of the U.S. record on the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas. Let me simply remind our critics that the peoples of these commonwealths regularly exercise the right to freely determine their political status through genuine and fair elections.

Principle IX, on Cooperation among States, has already been the subject of a statement in which my delegation pointed out substantial differences between East and West. We recognize and respect in practice the role of organizations, institutions, and persons in pursuing the aims of the CSCE process; non-governmental activities here in Vienna during this meeting have again highlighted the positive role of unofficial involvement in this process. Suffice to say that we place no obstacles in their way. Indeed, in stark contrast to others, we welcome and encourage the active involvement of diverse persons and groups in monitoring implementation of the Helsinki Accords by all participating States. The recent death of Anatoliy Marchenko attests to the fact that many continue to be denied this right.

Finally, regarding Principle Ten -- about which my delegation spoke in this body yesterday -- I can only reiterate my Government's seriousness about fulfilling in good faith its obligations under international law and its CSCE commitments. We acknowledge that problems -- some serious and very challenging -- do exist. We do not deny our imperfections, but we face them and seek to overcome them through concrete action.

Mr. Chairman, amid charges and countercharges, it is easy to lose sight of the human dimension of the CSCE process. For The Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document set forth a code of conduct not only for relations among sovereign states, but also for relations between governments and their citizens.

Yesterday I had the privilege to witness the memorable reunion of Rimma Bravve, a Soviet cancer patient, with her family after 10 years of separation. We welcome the resolution of this case by the Soviet Government. We are deeply pleased to learn the news that today Andrei Sakharov and his wife have been granted permission to return to Moscow. We look forward to positive concrete actions in respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms on a sustained basis in the future.

From its inception, the United States has recognized the central importance and inherent dignity of the individual. This recognition, reflected in our Declaration of Independence and enshrined in our Constitution is based upon the belief that individuals are "created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." These words, rooted in Western political tradition, are as relevant for us today as they were for our forefathers more than 200 years ago. Together with the premise that our Government derives its power from the people, they form the foundation of democracy in my country. Americans profoundly believe in Thomas Jefferson's political philosophy that "the will of the people is the only legitimate foundation of any government."

We have attempted here today to respond in a responsible manner to those questions which have been raised concerning our record of implementation. We would have preferred that all present had similarly confronted the questions asked of them about the complex and difficult issues facing each of us in the period under review.

In this final session of our group before the end of Round I, my delegation is of the opinion that we have had a full and frank -- if sometimes heated -- debate and that this was a necessary if difficult process in our efforts to assess realistically where we have been since 1975 so that we may collectively move toward a truly constructive East-West dialogue in what could be a promising period ahead of us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BASKET II STATEMENTS

OPENING STATEMENT - BASKET II
SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY

We find ourselves in Vienna eleven years after our heads of government signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. That document set out a number of principles and provisions designed to achieve increased security, dignity and well-being for the people represented by those governments. These principles and provisions are the manifestation of the basic security and rights which every individual we represent should enjoy.

The purpose of the Basket II provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document is to ensure conditions favorable to the development of East-West commercial activity. Those conditions must of course be based on economic soundness. The Final Act and the Madrid Document indicate clearly that economic relations can be extended and enhanced only if they allow a clear examination of market opportunities and are sufficiently attractive to business representatives. Governments cannot force these representatives to carry on transactions which do not make economic sense.

Specifically, we are concerned about the areas of business facilities, contacts between seller firms and end users, the timely publication of a wide range of economic and commercial information, and lowering the severity and frequency of demands for compensation. It is essential that these areas show improvement if we are to make East-West trade attractive to businessmen in the West. Closed societies, where there is a lack of access to end users and where statistics and other commercial information are inadequate, ensure that East-West trade will continue to stagnate. Openness and a free flow of information and people hold the hope of genuine expansion of economic intercourse between East and West. It is important that we keep in mind that it is up to individual states to help create conditions in which economic transactions can flourish.

We need to examine Basket II in terms of overriding real benefits to those people living in the 35 CSCE states. In Vienna's first round, our primary objective will be a thorough review of implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. There have been, at best, modest improvements since Madrid. In a number of the commitments made in Helsinki and Madrid, there have been steps backward. Therefore, our first task is to focus on existing provisions and the need to increase compliance with them. Any new initiatives should be designed to enhance existing commitments.

While the work of this group focuses on the provisions contained in the Second Basket, we need to consider Basket II issues within the context of the CSCE as a whole. The Final Act recognized, and the Madrid Document reaffirmed, that security, economic ties, human rights and contacts among people are all related to each other. The participating states emphasized the importance of the implementation of all the provisions and the signatories' respect for all the principles of the Final Act as being an essential basis for the development of cooperation between them in the fields of economics, of science and technology and of the environment. The U.S. Delegation believes strongly that the CSCE process cannot be implemented selectively, and we will work to strengthen the Basket II provisions on the basis of balanced progress in all aspects of the CSCE process. Concrete steps which improve implementation in other areas of the CSCE would go far to support constructive progress in Basket II.

We would like to commend the work done under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe. The ECE has played a significant role in the multilateral implementation of the Helsinki provisions. However, unilateral and bilateral measures are also required if we are to see improved compliance with Basket II provisions and renewed growth in East-West trade.

We must keep in mind that the encouragement of cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology and the environment brings with it certain responsibilities. We should focus on the practical, concentrating on those areas where we can achieve real results. In the end, if we are to succeed, these results must be mutually beneficial.

This is especially true with respect to the environment. We are constantly reminded of the dangers we face. It is, therefore, important for both health and safety reasons that we address ways to improve cooperative efforts in the area of environmental protection. A cleaner, safer environment is a critical element in the overall social well-being and our citizens' quality of life.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. delegation feels that the major emphasis in Basket II, as elsewhere, should be to improve compliance with existing commitments. There are few areas where compliance does not need to be addressed. Business contacts and access, as well as publication and dissemination of commercial information, deserve special attention. At the same time, Basket II cannot be looked at in isolation; it must be evaluated in the context of the entire CSCE process.

Some have called Basket II the "forgotten basket". We do not see Basket II as forgotten; the U.S. Delegation certainly does not intend to forget it. The United States would like to see progress made in the fields of economics, science and technology and the environment. We feel that improvements in these areas can and should occur. For example, the United States is committed to healthy growth in non-strategic, non-subsidized East-West trade, based on mutual benefit and comparative advantage. Such trade is an important element in our overall relations. By addressing the issues mentioned above, we can work together to help create the conditions making growth in that type of trade all the more likely. We are equally sanguine that improvements in the environmental area will provide benefits to all parties in the CSCE process. We would hope that in these areas and elsewhere we can move in a positive direction.

U.S. STATEMENT ON COUNTERTRADE

SWB-E

November 21, 1986

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

During the course of this group's work in this first week, we have had a fairly general discussion of Basket II issues. The focus has been primarily on the basis for economic cooperation in the context of our overall relations with each other. We have listened carefully to the discussion and have considered it useful. The United States remains convinced that progress in Basket II to date has been hampered by the lack of progress in other fields covered by the CSCE. The relationship between implementation in all areas of CSCE -- both principles and provisions -- is a fundamental, underlying theme of the CSCE process. As such, the U.S. Delegation takes issue with previous statements which asserted otherwise. The U.S. Delegation will discuss this further in a speech on U.S. bilateral trade relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union later in the meeting.

I would now like to turn to a specific issue within Basket II: compensation transactions in all their forms. These transactions are also known by the broader term of countertrade. This issue is very important, and we believe that it deserves greater attention here in Vienna and at the ECE in Geneva. Compensation trade, in our view, is an important topic not only because demands for compensation trade cause significant problems on both the micro- and macro-economic levels, but also because the causes of compensation trade reflect some of the underlying difficulties in trading with non-market economies. These include the lack of a hard currency; the inability to generate adequate hard-currency reserves through the export of competitive goods; and, for long-term transactions, the desire to insulate a centrally planned economy from cyclical fluctuations in demand. In other words, compensation trade is an attempt to sidestep free trade.

Mr. Chairman, as the CSCE signatories noted in Madrid, compensation trade practices have become an increasing phenomenon in East-West trade over the last decade. They also noted that problems are created by this linkage of purchases and sales. On the micro-economic level, compensation trade is detrimental to small- and medium-sized firms. The size and complexity of demands for compensation lessen and even eliminate the ability of such firms to participate in East-West trade, because they cannot afford the lengthy negotiations and lack the capability to market the products received as payment, especially when these products are of a totally different category or type than that in which the firm usually deals. Countertrade can also lead to profitibility problems, particularly when the items received as payment are grossly over-priced in the deal or if they are of such poor quality that they are difficult to market at any price. Furthermore, contrary to CSCE commitments in the field of business facilitation, those who insist on countertrade demands prevent business negotiations from being carried out effectively and expeditiously. In short, compensation transactions increase the risk of participating in East-West trade without providing any advantages relative to regular trading methods, and are therefore a less preferred way of doing business.

On the macro-economic level, countertrade accentuates bilateralism in East-West trade, contrary to the aims of the international trading system. By specifying quantities and prices for the goods received as payment, countertrade creates an imbalance of supply and demand, thereby causing market disruption.

Making matters worse, along with the increased frequency in demands for compensation mentioned in Madrid, there has been an increase in the severity of these demands. In some countries, counterpurchase ratios may go as high as 100%, particularly if the items being sold are not given high priority in the buyer's foreign trade plan. Furthermore, the Soviet Union and many of the countries of Eastern Europe give preference to companies who first engage in general purchasing activity. While this might be considered a sign of flexibility by some Eastern countries, it also represents a form of discrimination against certain firms, especially those which are smaller or new-to-market.

Finally, we note that the Madrid Concluding Document states that a useful role can be played by compensation transactions when concluded on a mutually acceptable basis. We fully agree with the statement made yesterday by the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom that the imposition of rigid conditions or demands for compensation at very late stages of a negotiation cannot be considered appropriate or mutually acceptable. The continuation of such demands can only hinder the further growth of East-West trade.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

U.S. STATEMENT ON BUSINESS CONTACTS AND FACILITIES
SWB-E
NOVEMBER 24, 1986

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Last Friday, the U.S. Delegation made a statement on the problems created by countertrade in East-West trade. Others spoke on the topic as well, and I believe that we really began to have a dialogue rather than just reading prepared statements. I hope that such dialogue will continue throughout the remaining work of this group.

However, I would not say that Friday's dialogue was complete. The distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union told us that a distinction was to be made between long-term industrial compensation deals and short-term counterpurchase transactions. He asserted that the Soviet Union engages in the long-term deals, which, he claims, do not cause problems. Finally, he argued that if these deals were so bad and unprofitable, Western companies would not participate in them.

We agree with certain points made by the Soviet delegate but note that they do not make the problems mentioned in our statement any less true. For example, we agree that short-term, counterpurchase deals cause problems not found in long-term deals, but that does not mean that both types of countertrade do not have common problems or that long- term deals do not have their own, unique problems. Long-term deals can lead to bilateralism in trade and often do not allow for changes in market forces over time. Prices stipulated in contracts may eventually differ greatly from changing world market prices, sometimes with little possibility for price renegotiation. Furthermore, specified quantities of resultant product to be delivered may create excess supply.

Although Soviet foreign trade organizations are known to make demands for compensation in short-term deals and to discriminate against foreign companies who have not previously purchased Soviet products, we agree that many countertrade deals between Western firms and their Soviet counterparts are more of the long-term variety. This is not true, however, in most of the countries of Eastern Europe and particularly in Romania, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. We were not addressing the Soviet Union alone when we spoke on the problems of countertrade.

We also fully agree with the Soviet delegation that Western firms are not under any obligation to accept the terms of a countertrade deal and that countertrade is not unique to East-West trade. At the same time, the frequency and the severity of countertrade demands generally are greater in East-West trade than elsewhere. Furthermore, when we speak of countertrade in East-West trade we are not speaking of instances where it is in both sides best interest to mutually exchange goods, as is usually the case in transactions that take place elsewhere. Instead, we are speaking of countertrade demands imposed by one side on the other, often close to the conclusion of business negotiations. This quite often places Western firms in a position of accepting less than desirable terms. While those who run centrally planned economies must be frustrated over not being able to produce a sufficient amount of goods which are competitive in Western markets, they must be relieved that their foreign trade monopolies are also monopsonies, permitting them to play competing Western firms against each other in order to obtain higher counterpurchase ratios.

As a final point on countertrade, many Western companies have learned to deal with Soviet and East European countertrade demands. Some even have learned to take advantage of the situation by becoming clearing houses of sorts for goods received as payment. This is a prime example of the ability of the market forces to work even when faced with trading methods which directly oppose them. Nevertheless, countertrade increases the risk of participating in trade without providing any advantages relative to regular trading methods. While the Soviet delegate may try to argue that countertrade is not the problem we say it is, he certainly has not provided us with any reasons why it is a better way to trade. And, while some Western firms nevertheless have engaged in countertrade, we do not know how many others, particularly small- and medium-sized firms, have been denied the opportunity to take advantage of potential sales because of excessive countertrade demands. In short, countertrade contravenes free trade, and is not the preferred way of doing business.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn to another important topic in East-West trade: business contacts and facilities. As the Swiss Delegation and we noted last week, business persons cannot be forced to engage in commercial exchanges which are not attractive to them. In this regard, the environment in which they work is very important. If business relationships are to prosper and develop in the long term, the ability to establish solid contacts with the people who will use the product they wish to sell, as well as with other persons who are involved, must exist at all stages of the transaction. Moreover, business representatives need appropriate facilities. Suitable housing and office space, properly functioning telecommunication equipment, and the ability to enter and leave a country on several occasions as well as to travel freely within that country are all very important.

These necessities are available and even taken for granted in many parts of the world, but they were seriously lacking in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union when the Final Act of the CSCE was being negotiated in the 1970s. In these countries, huge bureaucracies acted to slow down and inhibit business deals from being made as foreign trade organizations and other governmental bodies served as middlemen between sellers and end-users. The ability to establish and maintain representation officies was difficult and, in some countries, even non-existent, as the authorities tried to keep foreign businessmen under strict supervision with no more contact than was needed. Furthermore, limitations on the ability to communicate with the oustide world and on the ability to move about within a country, particularly in the Soviet Union, was detrimental to the business environment.

As a way to overcome these problems, the participating states included in the Helsinki Final Act, and again in the Madrid Concluding Document, provisions on business contacts and facilities. The U.S. Delegation fully acknowledges and welcomes the fact that, since Helsinki and, to a lesser degree, Madrid, there have been improvements by some countries in these areas. In particular, there have been increases in the number of modern hotels built during the last decade. Some countries have constructed new international trade centers, where more and better office facilities are offered. A smaller number of countries have made reforms in their national foreign trade rights, sometimes giving these rights to enterprises and eliminating the need for a foreign trade organization. These are positive moves which have helped to improve the situation, albeit modestly, and we are hopeful over possibilities and recent announcements for further changes along these lines.

However, Mr. Chairman, the overall picture is still far from adequate, as some things have not changed in the eleven years since Helsinki, and some of the improvements just mentioned have been carried out in such a way that they have brought new problems that need to be addressed. For example, the ability to obtain accreditation in most non-market economy states can still be difficult. The process in establishing an office is cumbersome and frought with bureaucratic delays. And while the quantity and quality of office space has improved, Western firms have been forced to relocate to new trade centers and often must pay tremendous rents and service fees in hard currency. Beginning in late 1984 and early 1985, for example, there was an increase in the number of complaints by Western firms over miscellaneous fees imposed on them by Sovincenter, the organization that operates the International Trade Center in Moscow. Rents for non-accredited companies increased 150-300% in June 1985. In the absence of other office options, these companies had no choice but to pay the higher prices if they wished to stay in Moscow. This proved especially difficult for smaller firms. Non-accredited firms continue to have problems in meeting their needs for office equipment, vehicles and basic support services.

A similar problem has developed in Bulgaria. A trade center was opened within the last year, providing new facilities to foreign firms. However, existing leases for established facilities were broken arbitrarily and Western business representatives were forced to relocate. Rents for the new office space are exorbiant. As a result, the number of firms with offices in Bulgaria, already small, may decline.

Although support services are reportedly very good, strict access controls and high rents in the trade center in the G.D.R. also have inhibited, or even prevented, firms from establishing offices. With firms being pressured to move into the Center whether they like it or not, they complain that their activities are now more closely monitored, and visitors to their offices are frequently questioned by receptionists at the Center.

There are more U.S. firms with offices in Romania than in the other East European countries, but the level of permanent American staff in these offices has fallen in recent years. Major causes have been deteriorating living conditions and higher costs of doing business in Romania, particularly in terms of rents and telecommunication services. The apparent view of Western business as a bottomless well of hard currency has discouraged new businesses from locating in or visiting Bucharest.

There is no doubt that there has been a general increase in contacts between the Western business community and their counterparts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The private trade and economic councils have been particularly helpful in this respect. Such councils exist between the U.S. business community and all Eastern countries except Bulgaria; a bilateral council with that country was disbanded as a result of budgetary considerations in December 1982. Other contacts, including those with governmental trade officials at various levels, have generally continued, particularly at trade fairs. These contacts help give Western business representatives a somewhat better orientation of the market and economic trends in the non-market economy countries, which is helpful given the lack of specific economic and commercial information published by these countries. In some of these countries, however, trade officials, enterprise managers and the public as a whole are prohibited from discussing economic and business trends with foreign officials or business representatives.

While these general contacts are good, they cannot replace the contacts needed during the course of a specific transaction, from the exploratory, planning and design stages to installation assistance and after-sales servicing. Access to individuals who are knowledgeable on the details of a specific deal are, with the exception of a few East European countries, non-existent or, at best, minimal. This is particularly true in terms of access to end-users, those working on-site at an enterprise or store that will use the product or will sell it to the consumer.

Access to these individuals is important in order to gain knowledge of exact enterprise needs or consumer tastes. While contacts with these individuals seems to be so logical and beneficial to both sides, foreign firms wishing to do business in the countries with foreign trade monopolies usually must do so through foreign trade organizations which are the only bodies permitted to negotiate export and/or import contracts.

Reorganizations of the foreign trade bureaucracies in some countries, such as that done in the G.D.R., have attempted to change this poor situation, but their effect generally has been insignificant. Some countries do allow visits to model plants and enterprises similar to the ones involved in the deal; others grant access to protocol rooms of the plants actually involved. What is needed, however, is access to the production lines of those enterprises actually puchasing the machinery. Without such access at all stages of a transaction, including after-sales servicing, negotiations are often unreasonably drawn-out and complicated, and the actual result of the deal may be much less than desired. It should also be mentioned that whatever contacts exist may often be worse for companies not selling or buying items which are given priority in foreign trade plans.

Mr. Chairman, many other problems face Western business representatives wishing to do business in the Eastern countries. Communications with colleagues at the home or branch offices in the West are often difficult. For example, direct-dialing telephone service was suddenly cut-off in the U.S.S.R. in 1982 and was fully restored to the Western business community in Moscow only within the last year. Some telephone problems still exist, such as delays on incoming calls. Entry visas are sometimes granted after considerable delay, and, in a few countries, representatives of foreign firms, like all citizens from the West, may be required to exchange a specified amount of hard currency each day for the length of their stay.

when this occurs, unspent local currency cannot be reconverted into the original or any other Western currency but must be either forfeited or deposited in a special account for use upon the visitor's return. In addition to these difficulties, in the G.D.R. business representatives continue to have problems with customs regulations which sometimes prevent them from bringing sales literature into the country. Also, in the U.S.S.R. restrictions on travel within the country can cause difficulties for the Western business community.

It is true that some companies can overcome these obstacles and find business in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that is not only possible but profitable. However, they are usually larger companies who can absorb these absolute costs and, through contacts established during years of doing business, often are able to find ways to minimize them. The rest are not so lucky, and some have pulled out of the market or are contemplating doing so. Others resort to indirect business negotiations by dealing with Soviet and East European trade organizations with offices in the West. Small- and medium-sized firms and new-to-market firms have a particularly difficult time in finding profitable business relationships they know exist. Thus, real possibilities for trade expansion go unutilized.

In short, we see a rather mixed record in terms of improvements in what is otherwise a very bleak picture regarding business contacts and facilities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some positive things have happened, but they have been mostly marginal in effect. It is our hope that new efforts which have appeared on the horizon will bring more effective change. If so, the day-to-day conduct of East-West trade may become increasingly similar to those elsewhere in the world, where foreign firms can operate without restrictions which are illogical and unnecessary. As the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany stated in plenary on November 14, it does seem to be a self-evident precondition that business persons should find the working conditions they need in order to perform their job. Such working conditions not only serve the interests of the companies; they also serve the interests of those Eastern countries which create them. Improved business contacts and facilities is a common interest that will serve as an important contribution to the development of East-West trade.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. STATEMENT ON BASKET II:
U.S. TRADE RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

SWB-E

NOVEMBER 26, 1986

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today I would like to make a brief statement on the involvement of the United States in East-West trade as well as comment on several of yesterday's interventions. A study of U.S. trade relations with the states participating in the CSCE, and with the world as a whole, would reveal that free trade is a basic premise of U.S. international economic policy. Based on the strong economic performance of the United States, increased levels of world trade have helped to lead the economic recovery of a number of nations in the last few years. Though protectionist pressures in the United States have become stronger recently as the U.S. trade deficit has grown, we will continue to fight those pressures and to push for a more open world economy.

U.S. trade policies and practices can also be viewed in very positive terms in relation to the Basket II provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. In our view, there is much more that can be done by all of the CSCE signatory states, including the United States, to improve compliance with these provisions. However, the economic provisions of the CSCE are designed to create conditions for the conduct of trade that have always existed in the United States to a greater extent than anywhere else.

There are virtually no limitations on foreign companies in terms of business contacts and facilities. The United States does not consider economic and commercial information, regardless of whether it reports positively or negatively on the state of the economy, to be a state secret, and no other government produces more economic and commercial information than that of the United States. In short, the U.S. Government allows, to the greatest extent possible, market forces to do the work. This, we believe, produces the best economic results.

Yesterday, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union gave as an example a transaction involving a lathe. This was a unique transaction, Mr. Chairman, not an everyday occurrence. What we are concerned about are potentially tens of thousands of transactions which are affected by the difficulties encountered by Western businessmen in dealing with non-market economies. Problems of business contacts and facilities, lack of economic and commercial information, and countertrade demands all slow down the process of East-West trade. We have thousands of individual decision-makers whose jobs would be easier if there were improved Eastern compliance with the Basket II provisions of Helsinki and Madrid.

Reliance on market forces, however, does pose certain constraints on what we can commit ourselves to do to increase East-West economic cooperation. Although the complexities of the modern world make it impossible to completely separate the government from private trading activity, the U.S. Government probably has less control over economic activity than almost any other government. Therefore, while the United States is fully commited to honoring the pledges it made in the Basket II sections of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, it cannot force economic activity to take place. Ultimately, economic factors will decide the level of East-West economic cooperation, and the United States cannot be expected to intervene in private trading activity in order to increase the level of trade beyond what the market forces allow.

To the extent that the U.S. Government does involve itself in trade, its goal is to ensure that trade activity does not significantly oppose or threaten overall U.S. foreign policy goals, including the security and economic well-being of its citizens. Contrary to what some delegations seem to believe, trade policies that take these overriding interests into account, including controls on the export of strategic goods and technologies, is not a violation of the Basket II provisions. Every state maintains the right to determine its trade policies in light of its interests and in consideration of other aspects of bilateral relationships, and we should not sit here and pretend that only certain states exercise this right. We all do, but it is more apparent in the United States and in other open societies, where laws are openly debated and made known to the public. In closed societies, the state also places controls on trade, but, since their economies are centrally planned, the controls can easily be hidden in internal, administrative measures that are never made known to the public. It is illogical for some delegations to point to the advantages of state control of foreign trade, and then to argue that controls do not exist.

Several delegations have taken note of the sentence of the first paragraph of the Madrid Document's Basket II section, in which the participating States consider that the full implementation of all the provisions of the Final Act and the full respect for all the principles contained therein are an essential basis for the development of economic and other fields of cooperation. We only repeat it here, because we take this thought seriously. We cannot but take into consideration the serious lack of implementation of the Final Act in critical areas when determining our trade policies. Some may disagree with this approach, particularly if it affects them directly. Our ultimate goal, however, is true security and cooperation among states as envisaged in the Final Act. Promoting a balanced approach in implementing the Helsinki and Madrid principles and provisions will bring us closer to that goal.

Here, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a short comment regarding the statement of the distinguished representative of Poland. As I noted noted 1st, everyone present is aware of the reasons for certain actions which were taken in 1981 and 1982 with respect to Poland. However, I would refute the supposition that those actions were the cause of the economic difficulties faced by Poland. By outlawing freely established trade unions and imposing other controls on workers, the Government of Poland bore the major responsibility for the drop in industrial production and the inability of Poland to trade in world markets. Also, Poland's debt problems were caused not by restrictions on credits but by obtaining more credits than its economy could manage.

Turning to developments in U.S. bilateral trade relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, I would note that following several years of negative factors in international economic and financial markets and increased political tensions, many positive steps have been taken since the conclusion of the Madrid Meeting in 1983. Beginning October 1, 1983, for example, a new five-year grain agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union went into effect. Unfortunately, despite a recent effort to further promote grain sales, the Soviet Union has not fulfilled its commitment in wheat purchases for the last two years of the agreement.

Nevertheless, other new developments continued to appear.

In April 1984, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. International Fisheries Agreement was renewed, providing the legal basis for Soviet fishing in U.S. waters. Also renewed in 1984, for another ten-year period, was the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. Under this agreement, the first high-level bilateral trade talks between the two countries in six years took place in Moscow in January 1985. A result of these talks was the resumption of the inter-governmental U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission in Moscow in May 1985. This year's session is being held next week in Washington.

In December 1985, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige again travelled to Moscow to attend a session of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council. Both Baldrige and General Secretary Gorbachev spoke at the session, which was attended by over 400 American business representatives. Also during 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an accord for the resumption of direct air service between Moscow and Washington.

There have been devlopments in U.S. trade relations with the countries of Eastern Europe in recent years as well. For the most part, the developments have been in form of high-level visits and, for Romania and Hungary, meetings of bilateral commercial commissions. Following the shattering in 1981 and 1982 of what were rather developed trade ties, U.S. trade relations with Poland have slowly but steadily improved in recent years. Agreements have been reached on the rescheduling of the Polish debt to the U.S. Government. In addition, a ban of Polish fishing rights in U.S. waters was lifted in January 1984, and landing rights for the Polish airline LOT were restored.

Despite these and other improvements in U.S. trade relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in recent years, U.S. trade with these countries has not increased significantly. Total trade turnover between the United States and these countries went from less than $4.8 billion in 1982 to $6.5 billion in 1984, an increase of about 37%, before falling by almost 20% to $5.3 billion in 1985, due mainly to the Soviet non-fulfillment of its commitments under the grain agreement. These values continue to remain well below the peak year for U.S. trade with these countries, 1979, when total trade turnover reached $7.5 billion.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, there has been a general improvement in trade relations between the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since the Madrid Meeting, contrary to some of the allegations made yesterday. Continuing economic problems, however, in particular the plunge in oil prices and the inability of the non-market economy countries to generate hard currency, will restrict the growth of East-West trade. We must be realisitic about what we can achieve here to facilitate this trade. I believe that practical steps to correct the problems in Basket II implementation will help improve the situation, while placing the blame for economic difficulties on other parties will not.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION
U.S. STATEMENT
SWB-E
NOVEMBER 28, 1986

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

DURING OUR DEBATE, THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN RAISED. ON WEDNESDAY AND AGAIN TODAY, THE DELEGATE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY PRESENTED A VERY ACCURATE PICTURE OF THE PROBLEM, AND WE FULLY AGREE WITH HIS ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED FOR A FREER FLOW OF INFORMATION. SUCH A FLOW CERTAINLY WILL BE TO THE BENEFIT OF BOTH SIDES.

THE RESPONSE OF THE DELEGATES OF SOME OF THE EASTERN STATES TO WESTERN STATEMENTS HAS BEEN AN INTERESTING ONE. IN AN ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THE CALL FOR QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THEIR ECONOMIC STATISTICS, THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT A LARGE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION IS PROVIDED THROUGH STATISTICAL YEARBOOKS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THROUGH BILATERAL COMMERCIAL COMMISSIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY CLAIM THAT THE SIMPLE EXCHANGE OF AN UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT OF INFORMATION DURING THE COURSE OF A MEETING WHICH USUALLY OCCURS FOR A FEW DAYS ONCE A YEAR CONSTITUTES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI AND MADRID PROVISIONS ON ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION.

PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE RELEVANT PROVISION OF THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO SEE WHAT IS SUPPOSED TO BE DONE. IT READS, IN PART: "THE PARTICIPATING STATES DECLARE THEIR INTENTION TO ENSURE THE

REGULAR PUBLICATION AND DISSEMINATION, AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION COMPILED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FACILITATE THE APPRECIATION OF MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND THUS TO CONTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY TO THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION." TO THIS END, THEY STATED THEIR INTENTION TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE COMPARABILITY, COMPREHENSIVENESS AND CLARITY OF THEIR STATISTICS BY ADOPTING SPECIFIC MEASURES LISTED IN THE MADRID DOCUMENT. I BELIEVE THAT THESE WORDS INDICATE -- AND I THINK MANY OTHERS WOULD AGREE -- THAT THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IS CALLING FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN WHAT CAN BE DELIVERED DURING THE COURSE OF A MEETING OF A COMMERCIAL COMMISSION.

ONE OF THE MORE INTERESTING MEASURES LISTED IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF ACCURATE STATISTICS IS THAT EACH CSCE STATE MUST STRIVE TO HAVE ITS ECONOMIC AND TRADE STATISTICS NO LESS COMPREHENSIVE THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED. THIS PROVISION REFLECTS THE NEED TO ADDRESS A DISTURBING TREND: NOT ONLY HAS THERE BEEN LITTLE IMPROVEMENT IN THIS AREA, THERE HAS ACTUALLY BEEN A DETERIORATION IN THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE. DURING THE LATE 1970S AND THE EARLY 1980S, WHEN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES BEGAN TO WORSEN, INFORMATION ON PROBLEM SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY IN MOST OF THESE STATES WAS SUPPRESSED OR, PERHAPS IN A FEW INSTANCES, ADJUSTED TO GIVE A MORE POSITIVE PICTURE. SINCE MADRID, PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE DATA HAS CONTINUED TO DISAPPEAR FROM

REGULARLY PUBLISHED STATISTICAL SERIES. THAT WHICH IS PUBLISHED IS CONSISTENTLY PLAGUED BY OVEREMPHASIS ON AGGREGATE STATISTICS, OMISSION OF DETAIL AND IMPRECISE DEFINITIONS. FURTHERMORE, IT USUALLY BECOMES AVAILABLE ONLY AFTER CONSIDERABLE DELAY AND IS OFTEN FOUND TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS DATA.

IN ADDITION, SOME DELEGATIONS HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT INTEREST RATES ON LOANS FROM WESTERN BANKS. AT THE SAME TIME, OFFICIALS IN THEIR COUNTRY ARE UNWILLING TO PROVIDE ENOUGH INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR COUNTRY'S EXTERNAL FINANCIAL AND FOREIGN TRADE POSITION TO PERMIT WESTERN BANKS TO ASSESS THE RISK OF PROVIDING SUPPLIER FINANCING. THIS LACK OF INFORMATION ON EXTERNAL FINANCES CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEBT CRISES EXPERIENCED BY SOME OF THESE STATES.

AT THE WORKING LEVEL, INFORMATION IS EVEN MORE RESTRICTED. OFFICIALS ARE OFTEN PRONE TO HIDE NEGATIVE INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY FROM WESTERN BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES WITH WHOM THEY ARE NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS. IN BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, THERE ARE LAWS AND REGULATIONS PROHIBITING THE TRANSMISSION TO A FOREIGNER OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION CONSIDERED A STATE SECRET. INFORMAL CONTACTS OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC OFFICIALS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS AND BUSINESS RESPRESENTATIVES FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE OFTEN CLOSELY MONITORED. THIS ACTS TO CONSTRICT WHAT ARE ALREADY MINIMAL OFFICIAL CONTACTS IN SOME EASTERN STATES.

LOOKING AT THE INFORMATION ISSUE IN BROADER TERMS, I HAVE NOTED THAT SOME OF THE DELEGATIONS FROM THE EASTERN STATES HAVE SPOKEN ON POSSIBLE REFORMS IN THEIR ECONOMIES. WHILE I DO NOT KNOW WHAT ECONOMIC INFORMATION MIGHT BE PASSED ALONG IN CHANNELS THAT WE IN THE WEST NEVER SEE, I WONDER HOW OFFICIALS IN THESE COUNTRIES CAN ACCURATELY ASSESS PROBLEMS IN THEIR ECONOMIES AND PROPOSE SOLUTIONS TO THEM IF THEY DO NOT HAVE THE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS TO DO SO. I DO NOT WISH TO REPEAT WHAT MY COLLEAGUE FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SAID ON WEDNESDAY ABOUT THE NEED FOR A FREER FLOW OF INFORMATION IN A DECENTRALIZED ECONOMIC SYSTEM, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT HIS WORDS ARE IMPORTANT AND DESERVE FURTHER ATTENTION.

ECONOMIC REFORM NEEDS TO BE PARALLELED BY A REFORM IN INFORMATION POLICY. SUCH A REFORM WOULD NOT ONLY HELP WESTERN BUSINESS PERSONS AND TRADE OFFICIALS ASSESS MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND THUS FACILITATE EAST-WEST TRADE, IT WOULD ALSO BE A FIRST STEP TO IMPROVING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THUS THE CONDITIONS FOR TRADE EXPANSION. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASKET II PROVISIONS ON ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, AS WELL AS WITH OTHER SECTIONS OF THE FINAL ACT DEALING WITH THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION, WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO ACHIEVING THAT END.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

U.S. SUMMARY STATEMENT
SWB "E"
NOVEMBER 28, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ON WHAT HAS BEEN SAID IN TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS AND, MORE GENERALLY, ON THE WORK OF THE THIS GROUP DURING THE TWO WEEKS DEVOTED TO TRADE.

I MUST ADMIT, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT I AM NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH OUR PROGRESS SO FAR. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF PROVISIONS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH WOULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST TRADE. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION AND THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS THIS NON-COMPLIANCE HAS ON POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANDED TRADE.

HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT HAD A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO THE SPECIFIC ISSUES WE HAVE RAISED; ONLY A PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEEDS OF NON-MARKET ECONOMIES AND A CALL FOR THE OTHER PARTIES TO LOOK AT THEIR OWN HOUSE. WE NOTE THAT MUCH NEEDS TO BE DONE BY ALL PARTIES, BUT WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED MORE DIRECT ATTENTION TO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS.

SPECIFICALLY, WE HAVE SPOKEN ON COUNTERTRADE, BUSINESS FACILITIES, CONTACTS WITH END-USERS AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS AND INFORMATION. WHILE THE SOVIET AND SEVERAL EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS HAVE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT COUNTERTRADE EXISTS, THEY HAVE REFUSED TO ADDRESS THE REAL PROBLEMS WE AND OTHERS HAVE IDENTIFIED. IN THE AREAS OF BUSINESS CONTACTS AND FACILITIES AND OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, WE HEAR EXAMPLES OF HOW THE GLASS IS ONE-FOURTH FULL INSTEAD OF ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS AS TO WHY IT REMAINS THREE-QUARTERS EMPTY.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS RAISED QUESTIONS ON EACH OF THE PROVISIONS WHICH FALL UNDER THE CHAPTER IN THE FINAL ACT ON COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES. BUT, TO A BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE TRYING TO DO BUSINESS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION, THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT SEPARABLE. HE OR SHE MUST FACE THEM TOGETHER AT THE SAME TIME.

THUS, PERHAPS WE SHOULD STOP AND THINK ABOUT HOW BIG A PROBLEM THESE DIFFICULTIES ARE WHEN THEY ARE COMBINED. THE CONCLUSION WE REACH IS THAT THEY ARE A TREMENDOUS PROBLEM, LARGE ENOUGH TO A BE A HINDRANCE TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST TRADE, SOMETHING WE ALL AGREE IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

AND WHEN WE LOOK AT THESE PROBLEMS COLLECTIVELY, THE QUESTION OF WHY THEY EXIST BECOMES EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. WE RAISE THESE PROBLEMS, NOT JUST BECAUSE THEY ARE VIOLATIONS OF PROVISIONS WHICH WE MUTUALLY AGREED TO IMPLEMENT, BUT BECAUSE WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY ECONOMIC INFORMATION MUST BE CONSIDERED A STATE SECRET OR WHY BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES MUST BE LIMITED IN THE FACILITIES THEY CAN USE OR HAVE THE CONTACTS THEY NEED TO DO BUSINESS SO CLOSELY RESTRICTED.

IF TRADE IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, THESE RESTRICTIONS SIMPLY DO NOT MAKE SENSE. AND IF THIS IS TRUE, THEN WHAT IS NEEDED IS TANGIBLE AND IMMEDIATE ACTION TO REMOVE THEM. SUCH ACTION NOT ONLY IMPROVES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE PROVISIONS, SUCH ACTION REPRESENTS BENEFITS TO EVERY STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE PROCESS.

IN CONCLUSION, MR. CHAIRMAN, I HOPE THAT OUR DEBATE IN THE COMING WEEKS WILL ADDRESS THE NEEDS FOR IMPROVED COMPLIANCE RATHER THAN TO SWEEP THE PROBLEMS UNDER THE CARPET.

ONE FINAL WORD, MR. CHAIRMAN. I WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO THE REQUEST OF MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE FROM CZECHOSLAVAKIA WHO ASKED THAT WE ALL PROVIDE INFORMATION ON PENDING LEGISLATION IN OUR COUNTRIES WHICH WILL AID SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES. I SUBMIT, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THIS IS THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US. WE PERMIT THE MARKET TO MAKE THE DECISIONS RATHER THAN RELY ON LEGISLATION OR REGULATIONS.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
U.S. STATEMENT
SWB-E
DECEMBER 3, 1986

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Although industrial cooperation between East and West existed before the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE signatory States saw it necessary to address the topic in a direct and detailed manner in both the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. Experience demonstrated that growth in the level and complexity of East-West trade, particularly long-term industrial cooperation, had encountered difficulties which required their attention, such as the need to avoid double taxation and to protect property rights. Since Helsinki, there have been numerous agreements addressing these and other issues, improving markedly the environment for industrial cooperation based on mutual interest and motivated by economic considerations.

Nevertheless, Western firms continue to encounter problems. Despite differences between industrial cooperation and the conventional, one-time sale or puchase of goods or services, many of these problems are very similar to those encountered in East-West trade generally. Business representatives still need suitable business facilities, and specific economic and commercial information as well as contacts with enterprise managers and contacts with other lower-level officials become even more important in complex transactions. Furthermore, these transactions often include long-term, industrial compensation, in which licenses, plant or production lines and relevant technology are paid for in resultant product.

The similarity of the problems between industrial cooperation and normal commercial exchanges were recognized in the Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document. Among other things, the participating States considered it desirable "to improve the quality and the quantity of information relevant to industrial cooperation." In addition, they noted that "the provisions adopted by the Conference relating to business contacts in the commercial and economic fields also apply to foreign organizations, enterprises and firms engaged in industrial cooperation." They also encouraged those involved in a specific project "to accelerate the conduct of negotiations for the conclusion of cooperation contracts."

I will not dwell on these issues, because the U.S. Delegation already has expressed its concerns on them in this group's discussion of trade. However, just as the signatories saw it necessary to repeat these issues, I would like to repeat at least one area where Eastern failure to comply with the Final Act's Basket II provisions relevant to industrial cooperation has had its most serious effects. The U.S. statement last Friday mentioned that the flow of information is particularly restricted at working-levels in Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union, where there are laws and regulations prohibiting the transmission to a foreigner of even rudimentary economic information. For example, the relevant law in Romania is referred to as decree number 408, and it reportedly also limits foreign access to Romanian production facilities other than "protocol rooms" or, if there is an absolute need, to selected facilities. For such access, special ministerial permission is needed and the foreigner must be under escort and wear distinctive clothing. It is hard to imagine how successful and mutually beneficial trade and industrial cooperation projects can be pursued under these circumstances.

Events in the Soviet Union and some of the countries of Eastern Europe signal new opportunities for East-West industrial cooperation, especially in those sectors which have been earmarked for accelerated growth. In several of these countries new joint venture legislation has been promulgated or earlier legislation revised in order to improve the investment climate. Taken together, these developments could encourage firms and enterprises to explore new possibilities for joint undertakings. As some of these countries are more flexible than the others in negotiating the terms of specific transactions, however, they likely will continue to reap greater benefits from East-West industrial cooperation.

As other delegations have pointed out, the economic as well as the legal framework for industrial cooperation must be improved further if possibilities for industrial cooperation are to become realities. We must all realize that, in today's international economy, the competition for investment funds is fierce. There are many countries outside as well as inside Europe which are competing. Projects must be economically sound if they are to attract investors. They must meet the test of economic rationality, addressing the two criteria of feasibility and profitability. Only then can it result in mutual benefit.

In this regard, it is extremely important that the role of equity, guarantees against expropriation, intellectual property protection and the repatriation of profits be addressed. For example, the desire on the part of some states to maintain majority control in an industrial cooperation venture will inhibit Western firms from considering such transactions. And the importance of the repatriation of profits cannot be underestimated, since the measure of a successful investment is its profitability. A firm will not invest time, money, products, or know-how if it is unable to enjoy the fruits of its investment. We welcome the efforts on the part of some Eastern states to improve legislation regarding industrial cooperation. But unless more detail is given to the repatriation of profits, the non-market economies will continue to find it difficult to attract Western investment.

We realize, of course, that industrial cooperation takes many forms, some of which I have not mentioned. Various forms of East-West industrial cooperation exist on the territory of the United States. Furthermore, cooperation in third markets is becoming an increasing phenomenon in East-West economic interaction. As other delegations have listed numerous examples of these other forms of cooperation, I will not mention them here.

Mr. Chairman, while we feel that industrial cooperation offers the potential for expanded development of East-West economic relations, we continue to be cautious. Unfavorable business conditions, a poor economic situation in many non-market economies and the lack of a proper legal framework, particularly in regard to management and the repatriation of profits, will inhibit further growth. Clarifying existing laws and adopting new laws which allow for increased flexibility on the part of some Eastern states would be instrumental in improving the current situation. Better implementation of the CSCE provisions regarding commercial exchanges would be helpful as well.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a brief comment on a statement made yesterday. The distinguished delegate of Poland spoke of the influence of the political situation on Polish industrial cooperation. We agree with some of his analysis but believe that his presentation did not fully reflect reality. For example, he speaks of politically motivated actions taken by some states in the 1980s as if they were taken for no reason at all. He fails to mention Polish violations of CSCE commitments which had a direct and negative impact on what was a very cooperative atmosphere between Poland and many other countries, including the United States. While he stated that he did not want to minimize domestic economic problems at the time, he does not take into account what the U.S. delegation said on November 26 regarding the Polish inability to manage the debt it assumed in the 1970s. He also does not state that some of this external debt was owed to the U.S. Government, which has since worked with Poland to reschedule debt payments. We share his optimism over recent improvements in the economic aspects of Poland's relations with the United States and other CSCE states, and we also hope that improved Polish implementation of other CSCE provisions will continue to make the strengthening of economic relations possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BASKET II: SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

U.S. STATEMENT
SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY "E"
DECEMBER 10, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BOTH WITHIN SOCIETIES AND AMONG SOCIETIES IS CRUCIAL FOR IMPROVING THE LIVES OF ALL EUROPEANS AND NORTH AMERICANS. SCIENTISTS MUST COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER ON AN OPEN BASIS IF IDEAS AND THEORIES ARE TO BECOME PRACTICAL, APPLIED MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY. THEY SHOULD BE FREE TO TRAVEL, INCLUDING STAYING ABROAD FOR AS LONG AS THEY WISH, SO THAT THEY CAN FURTHER REFINE THEIR THINKING AND LEARN THE IDEAS OF OTHERS. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN HELSINKI DEALT EXTENSIVELY WITH SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION IN BASKET II, AND IN THE OTHER BASKETS WITH THE CONDITIONS OF HUMAN CONTACT AND HUMAN FREEDOM THAT WOULD MAKE SUCH COOPERATION MOST EFFECTIVE.

THIS IS ALSO WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN A STRONG LEVEL OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITH ALL SIGNATORIES OF THE FINAL ACT. FOR EXAMPLE, AMERICAN SCIENTISTS ENGAGE IN COOPERATION IN MANY FIELDS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN EACH OF THE EASTERN STATES, ALTHOUGH ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXCHANGE VISITS AND INFORMATION IN SOME BILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAVE NEVER BEEN IMPLEMENTED. WE ARE NOW SEEING LESS INTERFERENCE WITH VISITS BY U.S. SCIENTISTS TO THESE COUNTRIES, AND SCIENTISTS FROM THEM ARE IN MANY CASES RECEIVING THEIR PASSPORTS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTY.

DESPITE OUR DESIRE TO FACILITATE SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, HOWEVER, HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SCIENTISTS OF OUR STATES, NOT BY THE CHOICE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUT BY THE VERY NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES CAN CREATE ALL THE AGREEMENTS THEY WANT, BUT THEY CANNOT REAP THE FULL BENEFITS OF SCIENTIFIC INTERACTION IF THEY DO NOT FIRST GUARANTEE FREEDOM TO THEIR SCIENTISTS. THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL SCIENTISTS TO PURSUE THEIR INTERESTS FREELY IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION.

UNFORTUNATELY, MANY OF AMBASSADOR ZIMMERMANN'S COMMENTS IN HIS STATEMENT ON CULTURAL FREEDOM LAST FRIDAY EXTEND AS WELL TO SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM. IN SEVERAL OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, FREE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS TOLERATED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL CONFORMS POLITICALLY. THOSE SCIENTISTS WHO DEVIATE SOCIALLY OR SEEK TO EMIGRATE FROM THEIR COUNTRY BECOME SUBJECT TO THE SAME APARTHEID THAT MARKS THE CULTURAL SCENE IN THOSE COUNTRIES.

THE LACK OF RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS -- INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS INDEPENDENT VIEWS OR TO MOVE ABOUT FREELY -- HAS LIMITED THE ABILITY OF SOME SCIENTISTS TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS ABROAD OR EVEN TO CONTINUE TO WORK IN THEIR RESPECTIVE FIELDS. IN ADDITION, IT OFTEN DISCOURAGES THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES FROM SEEKING FURTHER CONTACTS WITH OTHER SCIENTISTS FROM THAT COUNTRY. BY FAR THE BEST EXAMPLE OF THIS HAS BEEN THE REACTION OF THE WESTERN

SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY TO THE BANISHMENT OF PHYSICIST ANDREI SAKHAROV TO THE SOVIET CITY OF GORKY IN 1980. IN 1982, MORE THAN 8000 SCIENTISTS IN OVER 40 COUNTRIES SIGNED A PETITION TO SUSPEND FURTHER SCIENTIFIC CONTACT WITH THEIR SCIENTIFIC COLLEAGUES IN THE USSR IN PROTEST OF THE TREATMENT OF SAKHAROV AND THE IMPRISONMENT OF OTHER SOVIET SCIENTISTS. OF COURSE, OTHER SCIENTISTS IN THE WEST HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY CAN BEST PROMOTE THE GOAL OF IMPROVED RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS BY INCREASING CONTACTS. THOSF DECISIONS WERE MADE BY SCIENTISTS, NOT BY GOVERNMENTS. BUT IT IS SAD THAT A WESTERN SCIENTIST MUST PAUSE AND REFLECT ON THE PLIGHT OF HIS EASTERN COLLEAGUES BEFORE MAKING A DIFFICULT CHOICE ON WHETHER TO PURSUE THE CREATIVE CONTACT THAT IS SO CENTRAL TO HIS PROFESSION.

SCIENTISTS, WHO GENERALLY MAY BE MORE WILLING THAN OTHERS TO CHANGE THEIR RESIDENCE IF IT OFFERS THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH THE BEST COLLEAGUES AND EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR PARTICULAR FIELD, HAVE TRIED TO MAKE SUCH MOVES ONLY TO FIND THEMSELVES DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE THEIR SCIENTIFIC CAREERS. IN THIS REGARD, I MUST MENTION THE CASES OF ONCOLOGIST JOSEPH IRLIN, PHYSICIST EDWARD NADGORNIY AND MATHEMATICIAN MARK FREIDLIN. ALL THREE SOVIET SCIENTISTS APPLIED YEARS AGO TO GO TO ISRAEL. NOT CONTENT TO REFUSE THEIR APPLICATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION FIRED THEM FROM THEIR JOBS, CUT OFF THEIR CONTACT WITH THEIR FOREIGN COLLEAGUES, AND FORMALLY ACCUSED THEM OF TREASON. AFTER SEVEN YEARS, THE IRLIN FAMILY WAS FINALLY TOLD LAST MONTH THAT THEY WOULD RECEIVE PERMISSION TO LEAVE. WHY SO LONG? AND WHY NOT ALL THE OTHERS?

VIKTOR AND IRINA BRAILOVSKIY LOST THEIR JOBS AS MATHEMATICIANS AND COMPUTER SCIENTISTS AFTER THEY APPLIED TO EMIGRATE IN 1972 AND WERE FURTHER HARRASSED WHEN THEY TRIED TO ORGANIZE AN INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC SEMINAR IN THE LATE 1970S. VIKTOR BRAILOVSKIY EVENTUALLY SERVED THREE YEARS IN EXILE ON TRUMPED UP CHARGES AND STILL REPORTEDLY IS ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTIES IN SEEKING WORK IN MOSCOW. OTHER SCIENTISTS, SUCH AS ALEKSANDER PARITSKY AND VALERIY SOYFER, HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR DEGREES OR HAVE HAD THEM TAKEN AWAY AFTER APPLYING FOR EMIGRATION. THE LOSS TO SOVIET SCIENCE IS A LOSS THE SOVIET UNION CAN PROBABLY AFFORD, BUT ITS EFFECT ON COOPERATION IS THE NATURAL REVULSION OF THOUSANDS OF WESTERN SCIENTISTS TO SUCH PRACTICES.

LET ME NOW DESCRIBE THE SITUATION FOR SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES IN ANOTHER EASTERN PARTICIPATING STATE. THIS COUNTRY APPROVES VISITS BY FOREIGN SCIENTISTS ONLY UNDER EXTREMELY RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS. MEETINGS BETWEEN UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AND VISITING FOREIGNERS CAN ONLY BE HELD IN SPECIALLY PREPARED ROOMS, ALTHOUGH FOREIGNERS ON ACTUAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS DO HAVE MORE FREEDOM IN MOVING AROUND THE UNIVERSITY. ACADEMIC AND SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM AS WE KNOW IT ARE SO LACKING THAT MANY SCIENTISTS SEE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IN THEIR DISCIPLINE OTHER THAN IN FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS. SO MANY INDIVIDUALS CHOOSE NOT TO RETURN TO THAT UNBEARABLE SITUATION AFTER OVERSEAS TRIPS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS INCREASINGLY RESTRICTIVE IN ALLOWING ITS SCIENTISTS TO TRAVEL, WHICH IN TURN ONLY FUELS THE DESIRE FOR EMIGRATION. WITH THIS VICIOUS CYCLE, IT HAS PROVEN VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO

EXPAND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH THIS COUNTRY, EVEN WHEN THE FUNDS FOR SUCH PROGRAMS ARE PROVIDED BY THE U.S. SPONSOR.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I FULLY EXPECT TO BE CRITICIZED BY SOME IN THIS ROOM FOR INTRODUCING HUMANITARIAN ISSUES INTO THE WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION. IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO RAISE THE TEMPERATURE IN THIS ROOM. I SIMPLY WISH TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ISSUES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM HAVE A DIRECT EFFECT ON SCIENTIFIC CREATIVITY AND AN INDIRECT, BUT STRONG, EFFECT ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION. THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT STEP SOME PARTICIPATING STATES COULD TAKE TO IMPROVE SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE WOULD BE TO EXPAND THE FREEDOM OF THEIR SCIENTISTS TO ENGAGE IN A TRULY OPEN EXCHANGE WITH FOREIGN COLLEAGUES. SUCH A STEP WOULD NOT ONLY PAY IMMEDIATE SCIENTIFIC DIVIDENDS TO EACH COUNTRY; IT WOULD ALSO PROMOTE THE GOALS OF ALL THREE BASKETS OF THE FINAL ACT.

AND IN THIS REGARD, MR. CHAIRMAN, I MUST SAY THAT I WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED TO HEAR THAT THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE OF POLAND PRESENTED SUCH A NEGATIVE FICTURE OF POLAND'S SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH THE WEST. IN FACT, I BELIEVE THAT POLAND IS ONE COUNTRY WHICH CAN BE PROUD OF SUCH COOPERATION. ITS ENVIABLE RECORD WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE SIMPLEST MEANS, A POLICY THAT IMPROVED ITS IMPLEMENTATION OF BOTH BASKET II AND III PROVISIONS: POLAND ALLOWS SIGNIFICANT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ITS SCIENTISTS, AND FOR FOREIGN SCIENTISTS VISITING POLAND. EVEN AFTER FORMAL SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH POLAND WERE SUSPENDED FOLLOWING THE SUPPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY, HUNDREDS OF SCIENTISTS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES CONTINUED TO TRAVEL, MAINTAINING A STRONG WEB OF PRIVATE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTACTS. IN THIS SENSE, COOPERATION WITH POLAND CAME TO RESEMBLE MORE CLOSELY OUR COOPERATION WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES: SCIENTIST-TO-SCIENTIST CONTACT WITHOUT THE NEED FOR EVERY SUCH CONTACT TO BE APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

IN SOME OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IF THERE IS TO BE ANY SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE AT ALL. WE HAVE IMPLEMENTED SUCH AGREEMENTS FAITHFULLY, BUT OUR EXPECTATIONS HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN REALIZED. IN SOME STATES AMERICAN AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS ARE SUBJECTED TO FRUSTRATING SUSPICION AND CHAFING RESTRICTIONS IN CARRYING OUT THEIR AGREED PROGRAMS. PROFESSORS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO SEE ARCHIVE CATALOGUES, KEY TRAVEL IS PERMITTED GRUDGINGLY, IF AT ALL, AND ACCESS IS REFUSED TO ANY BOOKS AND MATERIALS NOT NARROWLY, IMMEDIATELY RELATED TO THE SUBJECT OF RESEARCH. IN MANY CASES, MORE ENERGY IS SPENT IN TRYING TO LIMIT INTELLECTUAL INVESTIGATION AND CONTACTS THAN TO FACILITATE THEM.

MOREOVER, SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION OFTEN CAN BECOME A ONE-WAY STREET. ALL BILATERAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION TAKES PLACE UNDER THE STRICT CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF MOST EASTERN STATES. SOME OF THESE STATES ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN SENDING SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO THE UNITED STATES FOR ADVANCED TRAINING, BUT SHOW MUCH LESS ENTHUSIASM FOR PROMOTING RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES. PRIVATE CONTACTS ARE RARE, ALTHOUGH EXCHANGES SPONSORED BY THE RESPECTIVE ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE PROVIDE FOR FRUITFUL COOPERATION IN A WIDE VARIETY OF FIELDS.

EVEN IF SOME COUNTRIES CHOOSE TO ERECT BARRIERS, THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO MAKING SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WORK. THE UNITED STATES HAS PURSUED SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH NUMEROUS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT AT THE 1985 SUMMIT ENCOURAGING FURTHER COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. AT REYKJAVIK THEY DECIDED TO INITIATE NEGOTIATION OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN THE AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION, MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE, MARITIME RADIONAVIGATION AND POSSIBLY ENERGY AND BASIC SCIENCE. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL OTHER AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AMONG THEM COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, HEALTH AND HOUSING. AS NOTED BY MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE YESTERDAY, THERE ALSO HAVE BEEN INCREASED POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION IN OUTER SPACE. ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL LEVEL REMAINS LOW COMPARED TO THE SIZE AND SCIENTIFIC STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET UNION, OUR RECENTLY SIGNED EXCHANGES AGREEMENT WILL BRING OUR BILATERAL SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION TO ITS HIGHEST LEVEL EVER.

IN ADDITION, SEVERAL UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE BEEN SIGNED OR RENEWED WITH EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. I ESPECIALLY WELCOME A NEW MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE CONCLUDED THIS YEAR WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WE HOPE THAT AN ACTIVE EXCHANGE PROGRAM WILL LEAD TO EVEN GREATER CONTACTS OUTSIDE THAT PROGRAM.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THERE ARE MANY POSITIVE EXAMPLES OF SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ROMANIA, AND SO I LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO THE REMARKS OF THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE FROM ROMANIA MONDAY. I AGREE WITH HIM, AS NOTED EARLIER IN MY STATEMENT, THAT THERE IS A LINK BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION AND THE IMPROVED ECONOMIC CONDITION OF MANKIND. BUT I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT UNDER THE 1979 AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION EXCHANGE VISITS IN 1986 HAVE OCCURRED AT ONLY HALF THE RATE OF 1985. ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH VISITS AND INFORMATION IN SOME FIELDS OF THE AGREEMENT HAVE NEVER BEEN IMPLEMENTED. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ROMANIA HAS LOST INTEREST IN ITS SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.

ON THE MULTILATERAL LEVEL, MR. CHAIRMAN, CSCE SIGNATORY STATES RECOMMENDED THAT THE ECONOMIC COMMISION FOR EUROPE (ECE) STUDY "POSSIBILITIES FOR ... SPONSORING CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, AND STUDY AND WORKING GROUPS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH WOULD BRING TOGETHER YOUNG SCIENTISTS ..." AT THIS YEAR'S SESSION OF THE ECE'S SENIOR ADVISERS FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS TURNED DOWN A U.S. PROPOSAL TO HOLD AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON HOW THE ECE COULD ENCOURAGE CONTACTS AMONG YOUNG SCIENTISTS. MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS IS NOT THE WAY TO ENCOURAGE COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN AND REMAINS A STRONG ADVOCATE OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MAKE A TREMENDOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROSPERITY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE

OF ALL NATIONS. EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND DATA, ON EQUITABLE TERMS, CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ACCELERATED BREAKTHROUGHS AND COST SAVINGS ON BOTH SIDES. COOPERATION CAN STRENGTHEN MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENHANCE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR CULTURES AND SOCIETIES.

I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON ORDINARY SCIENTISTS, RESTRICTIONS ON DISSIDENT SCIENTISTS, AND RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THESE ARE THE PRIMARY OBSTACLES TO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION. REALISTICALLY, I DO NOT EXPECT GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE IGNORED THE HELSINKI HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS FOR ELEVEN YEARS TO CHANGE OVERNIGHT IN THE NAME OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS. THIS IS A PITY BECAUSE IT PLACES UNILATERAL LIMITS ON WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH FORMAL AGREEMENTS. BUT WITHIN THE LIMITS THOSE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE SET FOR THEMSELVES, THE UNITED STATES WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO FOSTER BOTH GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED AND PRIVATELY SPONSORED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

BASKET II: THE ENVIRONMENT
U.S. Statement
SWB "E"
December 15, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

The United States is deeply concerned about the environmental problems which we, the states represented here in Vienna, all face. The United States has been in the forefront among the world's nations in recognizing -- and acting upon -- these problems and continues to devote significant resources to their solution. We believe it is important both to intensify our own individual efforts and to work together with other participating states, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

On the unilateral level, for example, following the passage of the Clean Air Act, emissions of sulfur dioxide declined 28% from 1973 to 1983. Over the past 15 years, approximately $70 billion has been spent on stringent motor vehicle emission controls, which have substantially improved the air quality of our cities. We do not count this as a loss to our economy, since these controls have more than paid for themselves in the improved health of our citizens and in the stimulus they gave to technological innovation. U.S. laws regulating pesticides, industrial chemicals and toxic wastes -- originating in or before the 1970s and continually amended to reflect scientific advances -- have served as models for other countries.

The United States cooperates with over 70 countries through 275 bilateral agreements which either are wholly environmental in scope or which have significant environmental components. The United States also contributes funds or support in kind to 70 specialized environmental or natural resource programs carried out in 40 international or regional organizations, such as the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature.

Our commitment to the environment is reflected in U.S. participation in some 20 international treaties, ranging from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The United States participates actively in key multilateral organizations which deal with environmental issues, including UNEP and the Economic Commission for Europe. In addition, we work on environmental problems in such other international organizations as the International Maritime Organization, World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization, and many others.

I could go on expanding this list, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to focus instead on some specific issues in our bilateral efforts. Regarding our relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the past three years have witnessed resumption of high-level contact under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection. After a hiatus of nearly seven years, the Environmental Joint Committee met in Moscow in November 1985. Notwithstanding the absence of Joint Committee meetings, considerable accomplishments have been realized in cooperative research since 1979. A work plan for 1986 was developed which included new joint projects on topical issues such as hazardous waste management, groundwater pollution, and low and non-waste technologies. This week the Environmental Joint Committee is meeting in Washington.

Despite considerable overall progress in the environmental realm and greater apparent openness toward international environmental cooperation, Soviet customs practices and visa policies continue to constrain the execution of even long established bilateral projects. On several occasions over the past three years, laboratory notes, reprints of Soviet articles, and other materials legitimately obtained in the USSR have been confiscated from departing American scientists by Soviet customs officials. Individual Soviet scientists are still excluded from delegations visiting the United States.

In October 1984, an Interior Department employee and long-time participant in exchanges under the Environmental Agreement was denied a Soviet visa and slandered by name in _Izvestiya_ in a way that could only have a chilling effect on the ability of Soviet specialists to deal openly with American colleagues. Incidents such as this, on top of the routine difficulty in communicating with Soviet counterparts and the stultifying controls on access to Soviet facilities and data, reflect negatively on Soviet performance in environmental cooperation.

Mr. Chairman, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently exploring possibilities for resuming bilateral cooperation with Poland along the lines of an earlier agreement which lapsed in 1982. Last month this U.S. initiative was advanced during an EPA delegation visit to Poland, and the two sides also were able to identify several areas in the field of pollution control technologies -- both air and water -- where cooperation is possible. The delegation included two representatives of American industrial associations involved in the manufacture and sale of pollution control equipment.

Environmental authorities in Hungary have indicated interest in technical contacts with EPA, and the aforementioned EPA delegation met with their counterparts in Budapest a few weeks ago. There was an informal understanding that the two sides would be more responsive in areas such as the exchange of data. We also look forward to participating in the International Hazardous Waste Conference to be hosted by Hungary in October of next year.

As I noted earlier, Mr. Chairman, the United States supports a number of existing multilateral efforts, such as those in the ECE and the IAEA, in the area of environmental protection.

We will continue to promote cooperation in scientific research and exchange of data; to develop internationally accepted guidelines or principles (such as a protocol for the reduction of nitrogen oxides); and to harmonize regulatory measures.

At the same time, we feel that greater efforts by all participants in the CSCE process -- especially in the area of greater public involvement -- are required if we are to overcome these problems. We note the statement made by the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union on Friday, in which he cited examples of ecological education for the younger generation. We welcome these efforts. However, we feel that a society more open to criticism is better able to address the problems of the environment. A better informed populace is a start; however, if those individuals are permitted to discuss the problems openly, there will be a greater possibility of solving them.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize the deep concern in the United States about environmental problems. Recent opinion polls show that an overwhelming majority of Americans support stronger laws and regulations to make the environment safer and cleaner. We in the United States believe that our present environment can be protected and improved, first by learning as much as possible about the problems, and then by developing and enforcing effective methods to reduce pollution. We aim to accomplish this environmental effort without disrupting economic progress, which all our citizens want and deserve. In general, our regulations require producers to internalize the cost of damage to the environment and give incentives to find the most cost-effective way to minimize that damage. Although consumers pay marginally higher prices as a result, they remain supportive of such regulations because of the dramatic progress they have seen in recent years.

Mr. Chairman, the United States will continue to play its full role in international organizations and, on a unilateral and bilateral basis, in the historic enterprise on which we are all embarked - the attainment of a better environment that we and our descendents can enjoy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BASKET III STATEMENTS

OPENING SPEECH: BASKET THREE

BY

AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE

U.S. DELEGATION

NOVEMBER 18, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

As we begin our work on the Third Basket, I would like to set out my delegation's views and concerns regarding implementation of its provisions. In the three years since the conclusion of the Madrid Conference it is clear that, to one degree or another, serious impediments continue to retard the free flow of people, information and ideas within and among the signatory states. Although some barriers have been removed by a number of participating countries, still other barriers have been erected since Madrid.

In an age of jet planes and excursion rates that shrink the Atlantic Ocean for hundreds of thousands of American travellers to Europe each year; in the era of Eurailpasses; of direct dial telephones that permit our people, as the advertisers say, to "reach out and touch someone" in Europe; at a time of videocassettes; and satellite communications that deliver European commentators into American living rooms with a flick of a TV remote control unit, the Western observer would get the impression that the participating states have been rocketing toward our Helsinki goals with the accelerating speed of technology.

But in the Eastern half of today's Europe, on the eve of the 21st century, the interruption and monitoring of telephonic communication continues and elaborate jamming facilities create electronic barriers to human contacts. During our discussions, as we hail the scientific advances that promise to bring us closer together, we must remember that the tools of science are only helpful when they are applied to serve mankind and free us from age-old restrictions, not when they are used to perfect the instruments of popular control.

Other barriers built by Eastern governments are less sophisticated but sadly effective. Barriers that are crude in their simplicity keep us apart. A high concrete wall bars the normal flow of Berlin's inhabitants. Restrictive policies violate the fundamental right to freedom of movement. Burdensome procedures frustrate personal and professional travel beyond state borders, obstructing family visits, family reunification, binational marriage and the preservation of religious and ethnic ties with communities abroad. The need for exit visas, prohibitive exit fees, bureaucratic mazes -- these walls of paper are just as formidable as walls of concrete and electronic shields. Heavy hands sort the mail and interfere with personal correspondence, invading privacy in a manner just as repugnant to civilized man as an eye at the keyhole or an ear at the wall -- or, as in the case of the Sakharovs, a concealed television camera in a physician's examining room.

It is far easier for anyone in the West to have access to a computer than it is for a citizen of the East to have access to a typewriter or a copying machine. Books -- even Bibles -- are pawed through and confiscated at Eastern borders. Creative works are made to pass through censors before an author's thoughts can be communicated to the public. Those who independently disseminate their views are particular targets for harassment and prosecution. Foreign journalists, whose job it is to write about the societies in which they live and work, can be snatched off the street and held hostage to government intrigues. Travel for professional reasons and East-West cultural and educational exchanges are subject to stringent constraints by Eastern governments. The unhindered sharing of the fruits of the rich and varied regional, minority and national cultures of Europe -- full and vigorous participation in the currents of European life in all its aspects -- are still a distant dream for half of the continent.

Mr. Chairman, in 1703, Peter the Great, to quote the famous words of Pushkin, "broke a window through" to Europe. Today, 270 million citizens of the Soviet Union still must peer through a small window onto the rest of Europe -- a window -- not even a door, for that would imply more freedom of movement than the overwhelming majority now enjoy. Other windows, and, I am pleased to say, some doors, have been opened for citizens of a few Eastern Bloc countries. The Helsinki process has helped to open them. Our challenge and our commitment here in Vienna is to open many more windows and many more doors without latches and locks to guard the insecurities of some. We need to use scientific breakthroughs to unfetter our minds, widen communication, disseminate information of all kinds. We must be open to new ways of cooperating with one another, open to changes that will increase opportunities for our peoples to interact and break down suspicions.

Mr. Chairman, a seemingly new word has entered into our Vienna vocabulary. That word is openness (glasnost'). It is a welcome word, but it is not really new to the Helsinki process. Actually, it was first introduced by human rights activists in the USSR to describe the character and methods of their work. The monitors made no attempt to conceal their activities, in fulfillment of the relevant and positive role that persons, organizations and institutions -- as well as governments -- are supposed to play in the CSCE process. Their term, glasnost', now has been adopted by others, and, we sincerely hope, it will be used in the same sense in which originally it was meant.

I recall another expression, voiced repeatedly at the Madrid Meeting by our delegation: "words and deeds". The phrase juxtaposed word and deed in an effort to underscore the importance of implementation to the continued credibility and viability of the Helsinki process. This phrase too has been adopted by many delegations. Let us hope that the original significance of this evocative language will not be lost.

Let us not permit our discussions in Vienna to take on the absurd quality of Alice's conversation with Humpty Dumpty in their looking-glass land. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less."

The Helsinki Third Basket means neither more nor less than a commitment to free the flow of people, ideas and information; neither more nor less than the obligation to find humanitarian solutions to outstanding problems; neither more nor less than freedom of movement, expression and lively exchange of cultural and educational information. By this, we can achieve improved understanding, confidence and security.

In our approach to these important Basket III deliberations, my delegation will not lose sight of these goals, nor will we forget the distance that must be crossed in order to reach them. To bridge this distance -- the gulf between word and deed -- to overcome the barriers to true openness will require more than a few gestures. It will require concrete and consistent action.

Without such action, Mr. Chairman, there is little hope for progress in any area of our Helsinki process.

Thank you.

STATEMENT ON EMIGRATION AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION

BY

AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE

U.S. DELEGATION

NOVEMBER 24, 1986

During an earlier, darker period of our history, lasting for many hundreds of years, the social system known as feudalism reigned over much of the European continent. As we all know, wealthy landlords ruled over vast manors and the great masses of common people were bound to the land. This meant that they had no general right to leave the manors on which they lived, and could do so only with the permission of their landlords.

Today, of course, feudalism is a relic of the past. However, in certain areas the sway of the manor was particularly long-lived and has been a very long time in the passing.

This has been particularly true when it comes to the movement of peoples. Although no one today is bound to a manor, in certain states strict control over the movement of individuals still persists.

In the Soviet Union, for example, citizens do not enjoy the basic right to leave their country. They can seek permission to leave, but the authorities decide who can and cannot leave. In practice, permission is seldom granted and then primarily on the narrow grounds of family reunification. Since only a very small percentage of Soviet citizens have close relatives abroad the opportunities for ordinary Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union are virtually non-existent. And even in the area of family reunification, a dismaying number of persons on a variety of pretexts have long been denied permission to join loved ones abroad.

During the past year--in the run up to our meeting here in Vienna--there have been some signs of change from the Soviet Union in this area. Beginning with the Geneva summit a year ago, the Soviet authorities have resolved, or at least promised to resolve, an unprecedentedly large number of "problem" - or long delayed - divided family cases. Since Geneva, for example, they have promised to resolve almost 100 U.S. such cases in all. We understand that they have also promised to resolve outstanding cases from other Western countries.

The Soviet Government has also created a Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs Administration in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, designed, we are told, to improve the resolution of problems in a humanitarian way. Here in Vienna, the Soviet Foreign Minister has called for a conference in Moscow to discuss humanitarian cooperation in all its aspects. Furthermore, as our meeting opened, Soviet authorities released the text of newly published regulations on Soviet entry and exit procedures.

These developments have been accompanied by numerous, well-publicized statements, from General Secretary Gorbachev on down, concerning Soviet interest in humanitarian cooperation and in resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit. The Soviet Union, in the space of one short year, has given the world to believe that something important is going on in this area - something that will lead to a truly humanitarian approach to the principles and provisions of the Final Act.

While it is too early to make a final judgment on what these developments portend, we must keep our attention on actions and not merely on promises of things to come. In this spirit, let me make the following observations.

The total number of persons permanently exiting the Soviet Union has not increased appreciably, if at all, during the past year. Jewish emigration, for example, traditionally the largest component of Soviet emigration, is running near the record low level of 1984, when only 894 were permitted to leave. There has been no sign of movement whatsoever in the cases of the approximately 11,000 Soviet Jews who have previously applied and been refused. Nor does there yet appear to be any real hope of emigration for the 370,000 additional Soviet Jews who have sought the invitations from abroad required as the first step in the Soviet emigration process.

We have also seen no evidence to indicate that first-time applicants for exit permission on the basis of family reunification are being processed more liberally than in the past. So far as we can determine, Soviet authorities continue to refuse exit permission to many first-time applicants on exaggerated and arbitrary ~~illegitimate~~ security grounds, or because some estranged family member allegedly doesn't want the applicant to leave, or because of the "current state of bilateral relations."

The only area where we have seen progress during the past year has been in the resolution of a very limited set of "problem" divided family cases which have gone unresolved for a long time. Usually, the names of the applicant and his family are put on representation lists which are then presented to Soviet authorities.

At the time of the Geneva summit there were 181 cases on U.S. representation lists. During the year that has passed since Geneva, Soviet authorities have promised to resolve 95 of these cases, or over half. To date, in approximately 60 of these cases, exit permission has actually been granted. Although only a third of all cases on our pre-Geneva lists, this still represents the largest number of such cases resolved in so short a period since we first began presenting such lists in 1959.

While we welcome the resolution of these 60 cases, we note that 35 promised cases have not yet been resolved. Five of the 35 were promised more than ten months ago, back in January. They are the cases of Ovsep Bayramian, Manoug Dakessian, Pogos Tombakian, Meyer Khordos, Nikolay Kohut and their families. Their U.S. relatives are concerned, and we are concerned, whether the Soviet Government intends to honor its word to let these people emigrate.

The other 30 promised cases not yet resolved date back to the end of May. We hope that these cases too will be resolved in the very near future. We note, however, that one of these 30 families, that of Leonid Litvak of Tbilisi, was recently denied exit permission. We suspect that this could have been the result of a simple bureaucratic error, but we would nonetheless appreciate the assurances that Mr. Litvak and his family will be allowed to emigrate as was promised by the Soviet Government last May.

In discussing Soviet performance on emigration during the past year, I would also like to refer to the announcement made by the head of the Soviet delegation in plenary on November 21. He informed us that the Soviet Government was resolving two additional "problem" divided family cases; those of Rimma Bravve and Kaisa Randpere. My Government welcomes these decisions and hopes that they will be the first of many, many similar decisions made during the course of our meeting. This will help to add some meaning and content to the hopeful signs we have seen coming from the Soviet side. Nonetheless, we must recognize that these announcements present us with a certain dilemma. As I have already made clear, Soviet performance during the past year has been limited to the resolution of a very limited set of "problem" cases. In resolving a certain number of such cases, the Soviet authorities no doubt hope to create maximum favorable publicity for themselves at little or no internal cost. We in the West do not want to do anything which will jeopardize further such resolutions, because real human lives are at stake. But we must not allow ourselves to be enticed into neglecting the thousands of others whose lives have been diminished or destroyed by restrictive Soviet emigration policies. And while we welcome the resolution of the cases of Rimma Bravve and Kaisa Randpere, we must not forget that they should never have been refused in the first place.

While progress in this area is a step in the right direction, it still falls far short of Soviet practises in the 1970's when tens of thousands of individuals were permitted to emigrate every year.

I would like to now comment briefly on the newly published Soviet regulations on the granting of exit and entry permission, released with considerable fanfare from the Soviet side. We have done a preliminary study of the text and, like our colleague from the United Kingdom, we are concerned how the new regulations will work out in practise. At the same time, we, of course, welcome the fact that the Soviet Government has made public some of its regulations on this vitally important subject.

Our own first impression is that these regulations essentially codify previously existing practice. We would appreciate any comment or explanation on the regulations that the Soviet delegation might care to offer. We will, of course, withhold making final conclusions until we learn more and see how the lives of individual human beings are affected.

Of course, the major question on everyone's mind when it comes to these new regulations is, will they result in increased resolution of emigration cases from the Soviet Union. If not, they can hardly be regarded as a further step forward. If they will only result in a minor increase in emigration then they can only be regarded as a minor step forward. Let me, therefore, put the question that is on everyone's mind. Will these new regulations result in more liberal emigration from the Soviet Union and by how much and in what categories or areas?

At the same time we assess the prospects for positive developments in one area, we must not forget others. We will not forget the many other Rimma Bravves and Kaisa Randperes whose cases have not been resolved. Nor we will not forget the 11,000 Soviet Jews who have been refused exit permission, or the 370,000 of their brethren who also wish to leave. We cannot be truly satisfied until the day comes in the Soviet Union when every man, woman and child who wishes to leave the Soviet Union is allowed to do so, just as they are permitted to do in the overwhelming majority of our participating states.

I would like to express our hope that the Soviet Union will undertake the fundamental reforms needed in this area. There is a bold new leadership in the Soviet Union, which has already expressed its intention to undertake significant internal reforms. Our hope is that when it comes to the subject of emigration, this new leadership will not content itself with mere promises and rhetoric, but will undertake the basic steps necessary to bring Soviet practice into accord with the Final Act and the everyday practices of the rest of the modern world.

REMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR
SAMUEL G. WISE
IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY "H"

NOVEMBER 25, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I AM PLEASED THAT WE HAVE BEGUN TO ESTABLISH A TRUE DIALOGUE IN THIS WORKING GROUP. IN ORDER TO FURTHER THAT DIALOGUE, I WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO COMMENTS FROM SEVERAL DELEGATIONS.

ON FRIDAY, THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OFFERED A THOUGHTFUL AND THOUGHT-PROVOKING SUGGESTION FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF OUR WORK. IN THE SAME CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER BRIEF COMMENTS ON HIS REMARKS.

WHILE I AGREE WE NEED A CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE OR DESIRABLE TO COMPLETELY AVOID TENSION. WHETHER OR NOT YOU USE THE TERM 'DIALECTIC', THERE IS A VALUE TO "CREATIVE TENSION". THE WHOLE EXPERIENCE OF CSCE SHOWS THAT WE MUST FRANKLY EXPLORE DIFFERENCES IN ORDER TO FIND COMMON POSITIONS.

IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT I INVITE YOU TO VIEW OUR ATTENTION TO IMPLEMENTATION BY OTHER STATES. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL NOT IGNORE OUR OWN IMPLEMENTATION, AND WILL RESPOND FULLY TO SPECIFIC CONCERNS RAISED BY ANY DELEGATION. I HOPE ALL DELEGATIONS WILL DO THE SAME, NOT MERELY FOR THE SAKE OF COURTESY, BUT WITH THE REAL DESIRE TO ADVANCE A FRANK DIALOGUE, IN ORDER TO PAVE THE WAY FOR CONCRETE IMPROVEMENTS IN PERFORMANCE.

CITIZEN TO EMIGRATE. BUT WE CAN FIND NOTHING IN THE FINAL ACT TO SUPPORT, NOR CAN WE ACCEPT, THE NOTION THAT GOVERNMENTS CAN DENY THEIR CITIZENS' EXPRESS WISHES TO BE REUNITED WITH FAMILY ABROAD, EVEN IF IT IS SUPPOSEDLY DENIED OUT OF CONCERN FOR THAT CITIZEN'S WELFARE. NOR CAN THIS LOGIC JUSTIFY THE FACT THAT APPROVAL OF ANY PARTICULAR EMIGRATION APPLICATION REQUIRES AT LEAST ONE FULL YEAR.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

YESTERDAY, THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF POLAND DISCUSSED CRITICALLY THE PRACTICES OF SEVERAL WESTERN COUNTRIES, AS HE DID IN BERN. ALTHOUGH HE COYLY DID NOT MENTION THE UNITED STATES BY NAME, I HAVE A SNEAKING SUSPICION HE HAD MY DELEGATION, AT LEAST PARTLY, IN MIND. I ONLY REGRET HE WAS TOO BASHFUL TO COME OUT AND SAY SO BECAUSE I THINK WE CAN ALL BENEFIT FROM MORE OPENNESS AND DIRECTNESS.

CONCERNING THE DELAY IN ISSUING VISAS, I ASSUME HE WAS NOT SPEAKING OF THE U.S., SINCE THE VAST MAJORITY OF POLISH APPLICANTS FOR U.S. VISITORS' VISAS RECEIVE THEM THE DAY OF APPLICATION. IN VIRTUALLY NO CASE IS ISSUANCE DELAYED MORE THAN A WEEK. WE ISSUE THOUSANDS OF IMMIGRANT VISAS YEARLY TO POLISH CITIZENS, AND COULD DO SO EVEN MORE EXPEDITIOUSLY IF INDIVIDUALS ON OUR REPRESENTATION LISTS COULD RECEIVE PASSPORTS MORE RAPIDLY. WE WOULD LIKE TO STAFF OUR CONSULATES MORE GENEROUSLY, BUT OUR BUDGETARY AND MANPOWER RESOURCES OFTEN HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING PACE WITH THE GROWING NUMBERS OF POLISH CITIZENS WHO, FOR BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REASONS, WOULD LIKE TO GO TO THE U.S., AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

FINALLY, HE NOTED THAT SOME COUNTRIES DO NOT RESPECT THE IMPLICIT PROMISE THAT A VISA GUARANTEES ENTRY TO THE ISSUING STATE. WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL APPLIES FOR A U.S. VISITOR VISA, HE PROMISES, IN WRITING, THAT IT IS NOT HIS PURPOSE TO WORK ILLEGALLY IN THE U.S. WHEN, AT THE PORT OF ENTRY, AN INDIVIDUAL CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES HIS INTENT TO WORK IN THE U.S., IN SPITE OF HIS EARLIER PROMISE, OUR AUTHORITIES HAVE NO CHOICE

I STRONGLY SUPPORT MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE'S APPEAL FOR REALISM. LET US NOT FORGET THAT THE REALITY OF CSCE IS NOT A FEW HUNDRED DIPLOMATS IN AN ELEGANT PALACE, BUT RATHER HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE, FROM PRESIDENTS TO PEASANTS. FEW OF THEM WILL NOTICE WHAT WE SAY HERE, BUT ALL OF THEM CAN BE TOUCHED BY OUR AGREEMENTS ON FAMILY, ON RELIGION, ON CULTURE. IF, FOR THE SAKE OF A CONGENIAL ATMOSPHERE, I WERE TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT HELSINKI'S VISION OF A WORLD WITH LOWER BARRIERS HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED, THAT THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS, I WOULD BE MISREPRESENTING NOT JUST MY GOVERNMENT, BUT MY PEOPLE. THEREFORE, I HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO SPEAK REALISTICALLY.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I ALSO WANT TO ADD A FEW WORDS TO THE REMARKS I MADE YESTERDAY REGARDING FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND EMIGRATION. WE HAVE STRONG CONCERNS ABOUT FAMILY REUNIFICATION AS A COMMITMENT REFERRED TO DIRECTLY IN THE FINAL ACT. YESTERDAY, THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE OF THE SOVIET UNION CLAIMED THAT THE FINAL ACT DOES NOT REFER TO EMIGRATION AND IT IS THEREFORE NOT AN APPROPRIATE TOPIC FOR THIS WORKING GROUP. I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND HIM THAT THE FINAL ACT STATES "CO-OPERATION (IN HUMANITARIAN FIELDS) SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN FULL RESPECT FOR THE (TEN) PRINCIPLES". THESE PRINCIPLES STATE UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT WE WILL ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH IS, IN TURN, UNAMBIGUOUS IN ESTABLISHING THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT OF ANY INDIVIDUAL TO LEAVE HIS OWN COUNTRY. WE SPOKE OF THE DECLINING LEVELS OF SOVIET EMIGRATION, AND OF THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF INDIVIDUALS DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO LEAVE, TO DEMONSTRATE CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IGNORES THIS FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

PROBLEMS OF EMIGRATION AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE SOVIET UNION. FOR EXAMPLE, ROMANIA ALLOWS A HIGHER LEVEL OF EMIGRATION TO THE U.S., THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ISRAEL AND OTHER COUNTRIES THAN DO MOST OF ITS NEIGHBORS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY ROMANIAN EMIGRATION PRACTICES THAT ARE UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTIVE, TIME-CONSUMING, AND IMPOSE HIGH COSTS, PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL, UPON THOSE WHO APPLY TO EMIGRATE. I SHALL RETURN TO THIS ISSUE IN A MOMENT.

BULGARIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA DO NOT RESPECT THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO LEAVE HIS OWN COUNTRY FREELY. THESE NATIONS DO RESOLVE EVENTUALLY MOST CASES OF INDIVIDUALS DIVIDED FROM THEIR FAMILIES IN THE U.S., ALTHOUGH USUALLY ONLY IN GESTURES CAREFULLY TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH POLITICAL EVENTS, SUCH AS CSCE MEETINGS. SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF INDIVIDUALS HAVE LEFT THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN LEGALLY IN RECENT YEARS. HOWEVER, THE ATTITUDE OF THE AUTHORITIES IN THOSE AREAS TOWARD FREE MOVEMENT CAN BEST BE GAUGED BY THE PHYSICAL BARRIERS THEY HAVE PUT IN PLACE, OR BY THE SHOOTING INCIDENT ON THE BERLIN WALL THIS PAST WEEKEND. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT IN VIRTUALLY ALL CASES INVOLVING CITIZENS WHO ARE PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE FROM EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE STORY BEHIND EMIGRATION STATISTICS IS, INVARIABLY, YEARS OF PERSONAL HARDSHIP.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

ON FRIDAY, THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ROMANIA OUTLINED HIS GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO HUMAN CONTACT ISSUES. I AM HAPPY TO REPORT THAT THE U.S. AND ROMANIA ALREADY CONDUCT A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE, WITHIN CSCE AND BILATERALLY, WITH POSITIVE BUT INCOMPLETE RESULTS. IN SPEAKING OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION, HE NOTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS "SPECIFIC SOCIAL AND OTHER CONDITIONS" AND "WAYS OF LIFE AND WORK" IN OTHER COUNTRIES BEFORE GRANTING PERMISSION FOR A ROMANIAN

BUT TO REFUSE ENTRY. THE BROKEN PROMISE DOES NOT ORIGINATE WITH THE U.S. SIDE. I APPRECIATE MY COLLEAGUE'S CONCERN, SINCE THE EMPLOYMENT OF POLISH NATIONALS IN THE WEST IS ONE OF POLAND'S MAJOR SOURCES OF HARD CURRENCY. I CAN ONLY ASSURE HIM THAT IN SEPARATING THOSE WHO PLAN LEGAL VISITS FROM THOSE WHO PLAN ILLICIT EMPLOYMENT, THE UNITED STATES ERRS ON THE SIDE OF LENIENCY.

PERHAPS 35 QUESTIONS IS A LOT FOR ANYBODY TO ANSWER, EVEN WHEN THEY ARE ALL CONTAINED ON ONE PAGE THAT TAKES LESS THAN FIVE MINUTES TO COMPLETE. THE QUESTIONS ASKED ON THE U.S. APPLICATION HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF RECENT CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE, AND MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I BELIEVE THAT I AM ON SOLID GROUND IN ASSERTING THAT A CITIZEN OF ANY EASTERN COUNTRY WILL SPEND LESS TIME FILLING OUT FORMS, AND CONSIDERABLY LESS TIME WAITING FOR AN ANSWER WHEN APPLYING FOR A VISA TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES, THAN HE WILL WHEN ASKING HIS OWN GOVERNMENT FOR A PASSPORT AND VISA TO LEAVE HIS OWN COUNTRY.

I WAS HEARTENED TO HEAR THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF POLAND MAKE THE UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT THAT EVERY CITIZEN HAS A RIGHT TO A PASSPORT. I WOULD HOPE THAT EACH OF HIS SOCIALIST COLLEAGUES WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE THE SAME UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT.

THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE OF BELGIUM MADE A SIMILARLY UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT LAST WEEK, DECLARING THAT EVERY BELGIAN CITIZEN HAS THE RIGHT TO LEAVE BELGIUM AND TO RETURN TO BELGIUM, AND ASKING EVERY OTHER DELEGATION TO MAKE A SIMILAR DECLARATION. I ASSURE YOU THIS IS ALSO THE CASE FOR THE UNITED STATES, AND I REPEAT HIS CALL FOR EVERY DELEGATION TO EXAMINE THEIR COUNTRY'S OWN RECORD, AND STATE CLEARLY WHETHER THIS IS OR IS NOT THE CASE.

Statement by U.S. Ambassador
Samuel Wise
to Subsidiary Working Body 'H'
November 26, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

I wish to discuss today a category of human contact of the most fundamental importance to millions of individuals in our participating states: religious contacts among religious believers, faiths, institutions and organizations as set out in the third basket.

The United States is a country that strictly separates the state from the church, and zealously guards the rights of non-believers as well as believers. Still, organized religion and personal belief flourish in my country. Name any religion that exists in the world, and I can almost guarantee you will find that faith's adherents active in the United States. Thus, religious contacts cannot be a matter of indifference to us. A broad range of contacts across borders brings challenge, inspiration and cooperation to religious individuals and organizations. For the individual, it is often a key ingredient of his devotion to God, his service to man, his perception of a higher truth or reality. The importance that people of all cultures attach to their individual beliefs is sometimes best seen in the vigorous pursuit of religious freedom in countries where religious rights are denied.

Within the last year, in at least four of the participating states, religious believers have been legally punished for the mere transporting of religious materials. For example, in Czechoslovakia in 1985, three Catholic Slovaks exercising the right they thought was guaranteed them by the Concluding Document, to exchange religious materials with other communities of believers, were sentenced to prison for attempting to import religious materials from another Eastern European country. In Romania in 1985, four individuals who possessed imported Bibles were convicted of "illegal distribution of literature". Legal import of Bibles is not currently permitted, although Romanian religious communities have confirmed the need for hundreds of thousands of Bibles for their members. We are heartened that Romania is about to begin limited domestic printing of Bibles. We hope that this step forward will lead to others.

Mr. Chairman, the Bible was the first great manifesto for personal liberation. But it is dismaying that some governments treat the most widely published book in the world as a subversive tract, threatening to national security or the social structure of the state. The Bible is merely an indispensable element of the right to belief nominally guaranteed by the constitutions of those states. Guaranteeing someone religious freedom without allowing him to read a Bible, or any other religious work important to his conscience, is a meaningless freedom. To prevent the import of the Bible is a clear example of the use of administrative measures to frustrate the philosophical principles at the heart of the Final Act.

Nor can hard currency shortages be invoked in this context as an excuse for preventing such imports. There are numerous private organizations in the West prepared to meet the palpable demand for Bibles in some countries of Eastern Europe. The authorities claim there is no "demand" for Bibles in their countries. If that is indeed the case, the authorities should certainly have no difficulty in allowing their citizens to make that choice themselves.

The exchange of information is, of course, just one example of religious human contacts. Another area is direct contact between religious believers. Most of the governments represented here, including some in Eastern Europe, permit free and unhindered travel for believers, whether they are travelling in groups or singly, as part of a private or communal mission. But others are not so generous in spirit. Bulgaria restricts the traditional religious practices of its Islamic population, more than ten percent of its citizens. Since 1944, only a handful of Bulgarians have been permitted to undertake the most holy duty of a devout Muslim, the pilgrimage to Mecca.

For members of the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) faith or Romanian Uniate faith, contacts with co-religionists are particularly difficult, since the governments in those areas have outlawed those religious denominations.

Several Slavic countries celebrated last year the 1100th anniversary of the Apostle to the Slavs, St. Methodius. We are concerned that a number of prominent Catholic cardinals were refused visas to celebrate this occasion with their co-religionists in Czechoslovakia.

The German Democratic Republic allows only organized contacts between church officials subservient to the state and western church groups and co-religionists. The principal topic of such contacts is not religious issues, but publicity for government policies. At the same time, independent religious figures, who dare to say that the goal of peace requires both East and West to rethink their policies, are supressed. Such individuals are not allowed to travel abroad, nor are they given the same opportunity to receive emissaries of religious organizations who visit the state-controlled religious bodies.

Recently, there have been some fruitful contacts between religious leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. Valuable knowledge and spiritual refreshment have been gained from such contacts. However, we are concerned that the focus of these contacts is much more narrow than is justified by the letter and the spirit of the Final Act and the Concluding Document. In far too many cases, the dialogue seems to evolve into generalized foreign policy pronouncements delivered by religious officials acting as Soviet government spokesmen. How much better it would be for mutual understanding between peoples and faiths if lay activists, local clergy, and ordinary members of congregations would have the opportunity to widen their contacts with, and their understanding of, fellow believers in other parts of the world.

With respect to religious publications and related materials, I must point out that Soviet claims as to the adequacy of these items for believers do not correspond with information we receive from believers themselves. If this were the case, why would so many believers, particularly of the Evangelical faiths, undergo such great risks to obtain religious material from abroad or even print their own. I realize that the Moscow patriarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church publishes a significant number of Bibles and other religious literature each year, but a large quantity of these items are designated for export, or for display in churches and other religious sights visited by tourists. Indeed, even a tourist visiting church services--unannounced -- at the only officially recognized working Baptist Church in Moscow would be struck by the paucity of Bibles and song books. The Soviet Government maintains that its prohibition on importing Bibles is occasioned by concern that doctrinal errors might be contained in foreign editions. Religious communities themselves are the best judges of which translations are acceptable.

Mr. Chairman, in two years, the Soviet Union will celebrate the millenium of the acceptance of Christianity by the Peoples of Kievan Rus'. The importance of this event to Christians of the Soviet Union is indisputable. We hope that the entire world will be able to celebrate this occasion to the fullest and in the most appropriate manner.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is evident that the Soviet Union, however grudgingly, acknowledges the importance that some of its citizens attach to the maintenance of their religious beliefs and ties to co-religionists abroad. It is, therefore, both painful and perplexing to see how Soviet authorities attempt to prevent those of the Jewish faith from learning about their religion, language and culture, and from developing and maintaining contacts with members of their faith in the West. The repressive measures Soviet authorities have taken and are taking are too numerous to recount in detail. Let me mention a few dismaying cases: A Hebrew-Russian dictionary by F.L. Shapiro, published legally in the Soviet Union, has been confiscated on numerous occasions from travelers to the USSR. Hebrew translations of works by Yiddish authors Sholem Aleichem and Y.L. Peretz, again both published legally in the USSR, have also been confiscated. Equally dismaying is the continuing effort of the Soviet authorities to prevent the teaching of the Hebrew language by members of the Jewish community to co-religionists who seek to learn about their religion and cultural roots.

Mr. Chairman, I could go on, but I think these examples suffice to show serious shortcomings in the implementation of the Final Act and Concluding Document commitments on religious contacts.

STATEMENT BY U.S. AMBASSADOR
SAMUEL G. WISE
IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY 'H'
NOVEMBER 27, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

The Final Act offers practical guidelines for the facilitation of contacts on the basis of family ties by committing the participating States to "favorably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families". The Madrid Concluding Document pledged them to "favorably deal with such applications." Despite these solemn commitments, a number of the participating States prevent millions of relatives from maintaining normal contact with one another.

The relationships between the United States and Eastern European countries are not only political, but familial as well. Over 20 million Americans trace their origin to Eastern Europe, 5 million of them to lands now part of the Soviet Union. Many families maintain strong family networks despite the disruption of the Second World War and the constant migration of peoples that has marked Europe both before and since the War. Ukrainians, Russians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Jews, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, and others maintain ties with parents, children, brothers and sisters in Europe. What concept is more fundamental to all cultures than that cluster of emotional bonds we express in the single word "family"? One would think that no government would stand in the way of the maintenance and nurturing of such bonds. Sadly, this is not the case.

Eleven years after signing the Helsinki Final Act, few Soviet citizens are granted permission to visit relatives in the United States -- about 1,600 a year. Even in 1979, the peak year, only about 2,300 Soviet citizens were permitted to visit their U.S. relatives, a mere trickle compared to the millions of Soviet citizens with relatives in the United States. Obtaining permission to travel for a family visit is a lengthy, costly and arbitrary procedure, deliberately designed to discourage applicants. Applications are denied for a variety of reasons, including the simple justification, "the journey is not advisable." It is extremely rare for an entire Soviet family to receive travel permission at the same time, thus denying an entire family the rare, perhaps once in a lifetime, opportunity to be together. From what we have learned so far about new Soviet regulations, it appears that Soviet authorities may issue decisions more quickly, but no Soviet spokesman, neither here nor elsewhere, has given us any reason to believe that they will issue more positive decisions. Once again, I ask: Can our Soviet colleagues here shed some light on this question - a question of vital interest to untold numbers of families and individuals in our Participating States.

Implementation of CSCE commitments on family visits are not carried out in parts of Eastern Europe as well. Most Hungarians and Poles, and an increasing number of citizens of the German Democratic Republic, are allowed to visit family members in the West, although not without some restrictions as to the frequency of visits. There are also a number of arbitrary refusals. The situation in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria is fraught with considerably more difficulties. Our government often finds it necessary to raise to a political level the cases of individuals who have applied for permission to visit families in the United States. We do not do so as a matter of routine, but only on behalf of individuals who have already been refused exit visas. Many, but by no means all, such cases are resolved following such a political step. In almost all such cases, the entire family is not allowed to travel, but a spouse or child must remain behind to ensure the return of the primary applicant.

And here, Mr. Chairman, I must interject a comment on yesterday's speech by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria. I noted with interest his call for radical changes in entry visa regulations in some countries. Hearing him describe such problems as lengthy processing delays and the necessity to enter and exit through certain designated border points, I began to think that he was talking about one of his northern neighbors. But I listened in vain for his comment on a radical proposal concerning exit visas, namely their abolition. I truly wish, for the sake of divided Turkish families, that it was as easy for a citizen of Bulgaria to obtain a passport and exit visa as he made it seem.

Mr. Chairman,

I have briefly discussed problems regarding family visits from Eastern Europe to the United States, and now turn to difficulties encountered by U.S. citizens visiting their families in the Soviet Union. Because my government does not monitor the foreign travel of our citizens, we have only estimates regarding visits made by U.S. citizens to visit relatives in the Soviet Union. The estimates we do have, however, indicate that overall more than 50,000 Americans visited the USSR in 1985, and an average of about 35,000 in the three years preceding. Among these are many Americans with relatives in the Soviet Union. These visitors are strongly discouraged by Soviet authorities from staying with their Soviet relatives in their homes. Applicants for such private visitors visas are told it can take four months or more to process their applications or are denied completely. They are encouraged instead to seek tourist visas and to sign up for expensive tours at which they can meet with relatives only at one or two points along their journey. Often, the Soviet relative is forced to travel to one of the eighty designated tour cities, sometimes daily, to meet. Such arbitrary and unfeeling restrictions by Soviet authorities often preclude the opportunity to visit places of family significance, such as the homes of relatives, an ancestral village or gravesite.

The situation is even worse for tens of thousands of Jewish residents of the United States, who have left the USSR in the last fifteen years. They are virtually always denied permission to travel to the Soviet Union, even as tourists, and even when a relative is seriously ill, where one would expect simple human decency to prevail.

In Eastern Europe, there are both positive and negative aspects to report. Thousands of American citizens readily obtain visas to visit family in Eastern Europe. However, several countries refuse visas to individuals who have dared to be critical of their former homelands. In particular, Czechoslovakia refuses visas to its former citizens who left the country without the permission of the government, or who have worked for certain proscribed Western organizations. Bulgaria, whose distinguished delegate spoke eloquently yesterday of the problem of the entry visa, frequently denies entry visas to United States citizens of Bulgarian heritage without explanation. Sometimes, these decisions are reversed on appeal by my government, sometimes they are not. Several of these countries maintain laws which, like Soviet laws, are designed to discourage close contact with visiting family members.

Mr. Chairman,

The most basic family relationship is between husband and wife. The Final Act specifically refers to marriage between citizens of different states, and establishes unambiguously that such individuals should have their requests for exit or entry permits examined favorably in a humanitarian spirit. They should not be treated as political footballs or made examples to discourage their fellow citizens from entering into binational marriages. Nor does the Final Act allow states to second-guess the decision an individual makes about a lifetime partner.

Between the Soviet Union and the United States, there are, at the present time, 16 cases of separated spouses in which the Soviet spouse has been denied permission to exit at least twice. Among these, Galina Goltzman, who resides in Moscow, and her husband Anatoly Michelson, a U.S. citizen, have been kept apart by Soviet authorities for over 30 years. Others, such as Yuri Balovlenkov and Matvey Finkel, have been repeatedly denied exit permission to join their wives in the United States since their marriages in 1978 and 1979, respectively. Even when Soviet authorities cite reasons for preventing these individuals from joining their spouses, the reasons given frequently contradict the Final Act, Soviet law, and each other. When no reason at all is given, as in the cases of Svetlana Braun and Sonia Melnikova-Eichenvald - who were refused again after this Vienna meeting began - we can only guess at Soviet motives.

We welcome the resolution of fifteen such cases in the last year. Any lessening of such human tragedy must be welcomed, regardless of the pain that remains. The pain is increased because, even as some cases are being resolved, new ones are being created. U.S. citizen Andrea Wine was married in 1985 to Viktor Faermark. In June 1986, Faermark was refused permission to join his wife in the West on grounds of secrecy, even though he has not had access to anything that might remotely be construed a state secret for fifteen years. And on November 15, eleven days after this meeting had started, Igor Logvinenko was refused permission to join his American citizen wife, Kimberley, after Soviet authorities had refused to accept his application to emigrate for over two years.

We also remain concerned about what appears to be a concerted Soviet effort to block a small number of marriages. Soviet citizen Victor Novikov and U.S. citizen Elizabeth Condon have been trying to marry each other since 1979. So far, Soviet authorities have nine times refused visas to Ms. Condon to come to Moscow to be married, and eight times have refused Mr. Novikov permission to travel to the U.S. to be married, most recently last month. Marina Vcherashnaya, whose marriage to U.S. citizen Barkley Rosser has been blocked since 1984, also lost her job as an economist immediately after their marriage application.

In most of Eastern Europe, refusal of permission to marry a United States citizen is the exception although some states are much more forthcoming than others. Our hearts go out to those who are the victims of the exceptions. Only one nation of Eastern Europe fails to meet the Concluding Document's standard of approving marriages applications in less than six months in the majority of cases.

Mr. Chairman,

Yesterday, the distinguished delegate of Bulgaria appealed for our help in gaining entry visas from the Saudi Arabian government for its citizens who wish to visit that country. Today, we telephoned the Saudi Embassy here in Vienna and were told it would gladly issue visas to Muslims from Bulgaria if they were free to travel to Vienna. I wish to point out that one of Bulgaria's neighbors on the Balkan peninsula is, like Bulgaria, a multi-ethnic society, has, like Bulgaria, a significant Islamic population, which, like Bulgaria, includes Turks and Slavs, (not to mention other groups). This nation also has no diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Yet every year, several hundred of its citizens make the pilgrimage to Mecca. The reason? That country honors the very simple standard established by our distinguished Belgian colleague - it gives its citizens the right to leave the country and to return to it. It allows them to hold passports, and it requires no exit visa. This example of travel for religious purposes validates the vision expressed by Principle Seven, that human relations are possible even in the absence of diplomatic relations.

STATEMENT BY
AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
IN THE SUBISDIARY WORKING BODY ON
COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS
ON
HUMAN CONTACTS
NOVEMBER 28, 1986

Mr. Chairman, in the opinion of my delegation, the discussions this week have been serious and frank. Most delegations have refrained from polemics and exaggeration. We have welcomed the debate and have of course participated in it actively. At the same time, we are disappointed that it has not produced more real give and take and very few real answers to questions, particularly in the case of the Soviet delegation. We can only guess at the reasons for this timidity, but it more and more appears as though the new look of openness is only skin deep. So much for "glasnost" -- at least at this meeting.

So far, our debates have confirmed the inescapable fact that implementation of human contacts commitments by a small group of Eastern states has serious shortcomings. This flawed implementation by Eastern governments means that normal contacts between millions of people either take place under highly restrictive conditions or not at all. Many delegations have spoken eloquently about restrictions on freedom of movement, particularly the denial of the human right to leave any country, that keep families separated and prevent contacts on the basis of professional, personal, religious or ethnic ties.

Limitations on these contacts can only produce unnecessary human suffering on a monumental scale. The impact on political relations between states and ultimately on security and co-operation in Europe is also overwhelmingly negative. It remains a sad irony that the Eastern states whose CSCE delegates speak vociferously in favor of peace, mutual understanding and co-operation are at the same time maintaining barriers to the kind of contacts that would promote these goals. What do the authorities of these countries fear in denying such contacts? Their people? Themselves?

Mr. Chairman, the stories of restricted human contacts have become all too familiar to those of us who have long been associated with the CSCE process. As I recall our compliance review sessions at the Madrid Meeting, where we agreed to new commitments in the Concluding Document, I would like to be able to say that things have gotten better. For some individuals, of course, they have. Families have been reunited and contacts have been established between East and West, due in no small part to the Helsinki process. We have recently had occasion to welcome resolution of a number of humanitarian cases, many involving the Soviet Union. But vastly larger numbers of people are still denied the basic right to leave their country and to maintain human contacts. Newer promises made in Madrid are flouted openly, just as older promises from Helsinki continue to be ignored. The individual stories of hardship and separation are numbingly familiar.

Many of these individual stories were aired at the Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts held earlier this year in Bern. We welcomed the opportunity offered by the Bern Meeting to look at the record, exchange views and propose solutions to problems in this field. And I am happy to say that some individual cases were resolved in conjunction with the Meeting, bringing great joy to the people directly involved.

We consider that the Bern Meeting was useful -- both for the tangible benefits it facilitated in terms of resolved cases and because it was possible to conduct the sort of thorough and factual implementation review that has continued in this working body.

In the past few days my comments on human contacts have necessarily focused on travel between countries, emphasizing restrictions on the right to leave. Before turning to another set of issues and problems, I wish to touch briefly on one small group of people upon whom travel restrictions place a special hardship. I refer to persons who are recognized as nationals of more than one state.

When such individuals reside in most participating States, including my own, the fact that they are so-called "dual nationals" is little more than a legal curiosity. If these persons wish to exercise the rights accorded to them on the basis of another nationality, including unrestricted entry and residence in another state, of course the United States places no barriers in their way. Regrettably, such is not the case for persons who live in those participating States which require exit visas and otherwise restrict the right to leave. In these countries, persons who hold the citizenship of another country and who wish to travel there for temporary or permanent residence can be prevented from doing so. They are sometimes trapped for years, even decades, by governments which regard them solely as their own citizens.

About twenty such persons are presently in the Soviet Union -- American citizens unable to depart because of restrictive Soviet practices. After spending years in the Soviet Union, some of these Americans do not have close family ties abroad -- so they may not even qualify for consideration under the family reunification provisions of the new Soviet entry/exit regulations. But experience has shown that, whatever the excuses for preventing these people from leaving the Soviet Union, such cases can be resolved rapidly whenever the Soviet Union wishes to do so.

One long-standing case was resolved recently, that of an American citizen who has been trying to leave the Soviet Union since 1935. Although it was an awfully long time coming, this is a step forward -- and we welcome it. What better time than this Vienna Meeting to take a bigger step, to wipe the slate clean -- to remove this irritant from our bilateral relations and the CSCE agenda? As was true of the binational marriage cases I discussed yesterday, the total number of these highly deserving cases is quite small. Roughly three dozen administrative decisions could resolve all current American citizen dual national and divided spouse cases, allowing these individuals to be with their loved ones and in the country of their choice.

I turn now to a somewhat different but related set of issues, involving movement and contacts within our participating States. The first point is a simple one, expressed eloquently by our colleagues from the United Kingdom and Portugal earlier this week. The right to freedom of movement guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- and incorporated by reference into the Final Act -- includes not only the right to leave and return to one's country but also "freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state." If the Soviet representative prefers to look at the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, he will note that it has similar provisions. People should not be made to feel like foreigners in their own lands. Internal passports should be abolished along with exit visa requirements.

The second point relates to contacts between persons within their own states and foreign visitors. We have been distressed to learn that since Madrid -- in contravention of the Helsinki spirit and our explicit commitments to facilitate freer movement and contacts -- some states have enacted new legislation designed to severely limit contact by their own people with citizens of foreign countries.

For example, a Soviet decree issued May 25, 1984 made Soviet citizens liable to fines for violating the so-called "rules for stay in the USSR by foreign citizens or stateless persons" and for providing foreigners with "housing or means of transportation or...other services in violation of the established regulations." The apparent intent of this decree was to further discourage contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners -- contacts which already are heavily circumscribed by a system of travel controls, closed area restrictions, and Intourist practices which keep contacts between foreign visitors and ordinary Soviet citizens to a minimum.

We are also concerned about Romanian decrees, notably Decree No. 408 of December 26, 1985, that regulate contact with foreigners. These decrees require every contact with foreigners to be reported to the police within 24 hours, and discourage Romanian citizens from offering foreigners the hospitality of their homes. They also inhibit commercial contacts by sharply reducing the ability of foreign businessmen to visit production facilities.

In the German Democratic Republic, the practice of "kontaktsverbot" is not implemented through a single law, but in a number of laws and their implementing regulations. Literally millions of individuals work in areas that are considered to involve state secrets, and therefore forbidden from virtually all kind of contact with Western citizens. The regulations extend even to workers in many non-military factories, to firemen, teachers, and even school cooks. They are not permitted to travel to the West, to speak to Western tourists, to receive mail or phone calls from the West, or even to eat at the same table in a restaurant with a Westerner. There are encouraging signs that infractions are not universally or severely enforced, and some people formally subject to the regulations have been allowed to travel to the West. Still, the existence of such regulations runs contrary to Basket Three commitments to foster human contacts.

And while I have highlighted practices of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and

Romania, I hasten to add that the practices of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia also call into question their commitments to freer contacts between their own citizens and visitors from other States. Such regulations do not promote security and cooperation, but only heighten xenophobia and distrust between peoples.

Mr. Chairman, among contacts that are essential for the free and full development of the human person are those of persons belonging to national minorities and regional cultures. In some countries, serious impediments are placed in the way of travel, the exchange of information and communication with people and communities in other countries with whom they have close affinities -- familial, cultural or religious. In the tens of thousands each year, American citizens, proud of their ethnic roots in foreign soil, make personal pilgrimages to the "old country" of their forefathers to search for names in church registers, to walk the paths that their grandparents walked, to speak to old folk who remember their parents as children. Yesterday, I described how such travel to some Eastern countries can be frustrated rather than facilitated.

Given our diverse roots, Mr. Chairman, the American people can greatly sympathize with the basic human desire and interest of people belonging to national minorities and regional cultures in other signatory states, such as ethnic Germans, Turks, Hungarians and Jews in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, to maintain close ties with historical homelands and ethnic or religious communities abroad. Too often, formidable obstacles are placed in their way, obstacles that have been heightened, rather than lowered or removed, in the post-Madrid period.

Mr. Chairman, the issues that I have addressed this week do not exhaust the human contacts agenda. Concerning youth exchanges, sports and tourism, I will only note that such contacts flourish when individuals have the right to free association and the right to travel without government approval. I guarantee that the United States will continue to place no barriers in the way of such exchanges, and urge the Eastern Participating States to adopt the same approach.

We will of course have additional opportunities to discuss a number of human contacts issues in other forums of the Vienna Meeting and in this working body, as we address problems relating to information, culture and education.

In closing, I merely wish to recall that compliance with the human contacts provisions of the Final Act should not be contingent on improvements in the international situation, a more stable peace, or nuclear disarmament. The freer movement and contacts envisioned in the Final Act will contribute to breaking down the physical and psychological barriers which sometimes divide our peoples. By permitting such contacts, the Soviet Union and its Eastern neighbors would make a substantial contribution to maintaining the peace and strengthening the security of all peoples in Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY
LYNNE ANN DAVIDSON
U.S. DELEGATION TO THE VIENNA MEETING
OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

"H" GROUP
December 2, 1986

Mr. Chairman:

Today, as we continue our discussion on the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, I would like to talk about the phenomenon of samizdat, or self-publishing, a word that has come into popular use by virtue of the human rights and Helsinki monitoring movement in the Soviet Union and that has spread throughout Eastern Europe as well. Without the knowledge gleaned from unofficial publications from Eastern Bloc countries, our implementation review and the CSCE process as a whole would lack much of its substance. Through samizdat, and its corollaries tamizdat (literature censorable at home that is published abroad) and magnitizdat (unofficially taped material), citizens in the East have access to otherwise unavailable cultural and other information. And, unofficial publishing has given the West a body of facts--painstakingly researched under nearly impossible conditions--about human rights violations in the USSR and other East European countries.

Despite Helsinki and Madrid information commitments, Soviet oppression of unofficial publishers quickened since 1979 and has intensified in the post-Madrid years. Writers, editors, printers, typists or distributors of *samizdat*, *tamizdat* or *magnitizdat*--or those merely caught with it in their possession--are all liable for criminal prosecution and can be sentenced for "anti-Soviet slander", "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" or "engaging in a prohibited trade". Despite intensified repression, *samizdat* continues to be produced, but its volume has declined in the USSR in comparison to that of the mid-70s. The *Chronicle of Current Events*, which was issued anonymously from 1968-82, has apparently been repressed out of existence. Yet, occasional issues of the independent labor union *SMOT Information Bulletin*, the Publications of the Initiative Group for the Rights of the Handicapped, and sporadic individual pieces, such as trial transcripts, accounts of religious and national repression, descriptions of official corruption, and other materials continue to reach the West. Penalties for unsanctioned publishing remain high, as a few illustrative cases show: Leningrad literary scholar, Mikhail Meylakh, received a ten-year term for distributing Western publications of literary works by the distinguished Russian writers Akhmatova, Mandelshtam and Nabokov. In February 1985 in Azerbaijan, L. Belayeva, A. Glukhov and A. Mutsologov were given lengthy labor camp terms for printing Muslim religious materials in Arabic. Felix Svetov, a prominent Soviet writer and literary critic who was expelled from the Soviet Writers' Union in 1980 for having protested the illegal internal exile of Andrei Sakharov, was arrested in January 1985 and sentenced in January 1986 to five years exile for publishing his works abroad.His wife, Zoya Krakhmalnikova, is currently in exile for having edited and published the Christian journal "Nadezhda (Hope)".

Mathematician Yuri Shikhanovich received five years strict regime labor camp and five years internal exile in September 1984 for his involvement in producing the Chronicle of Current Events. One of the charges that resulted in a seven-year camp and five-year internal exile sentence for Father Tamkevicius was his participation in publishing and circulating the Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church. When Ukrainian Helsinki monitor and Jewish cultural activist Josef Zisels was tried in April 1985, among the charges levelled was that he possessed "for the purpose of circulation" books that had been published abroad.

The phenomenon of unofficial publishing also has burgeoned in Eastern Europe. To staunch the extensive flow of unsanctioned material in Czechoslovakia, printing and photocopying equipment--except typewriters--are controlled by the Ministry of the Interior and cannot legally be obtained by individuals. Yet, despite all odds, in the past ten years in Czechoslovakia, well over 700 unoffical books have appeared. There are also many unofficial journals, including Critical Review, and three major religious monthlies and a religious book series. The Charter '77 monthly, Information about the Charter, is a special target of harassment. Security police ransacked its editor's apartment for ten hours after learning that the journal had been awarded the Jan Palach Prize for 1984 in Paris. Worker Jiri Wolf, a Charter '77 member, was sentenced in 1983 to six years' imprisonment, his second conviction on political grounds, for "subversion" because he distributed his description of prison conditions in Czechoslovakia to foreign journalists and a Western embassy in Prague. The beseiged Jazz Section has published the suppressed Nobel acceptance speech of Laureate for Literature Jaroslav Seifert and other texts that could not be printed with official sanction.

Romania has gone so far as to pass a law requiring the registration of typwriters, while use of duplicating machines is strictly limited, even though, due to severe constraints in Romania on freedom of speech and press and harsh repressive measures, samizdat is almost non-existent. The few samizdat publications in Romania are chiefly those produced by the Hungarian minority.

In Hungary, a greater range of unofficial information is tolerated than in other East European countries. Nevertheless, in recent years there have been more incidents than previously of harassment against unofficial publishers in the democratic opposition, such as contributors to and editors of Beszelo (The Speaker) and Hirmondo (Messenger). None have been imprisoned, but there has been aggressive police action in some cases.

In Poland, samizdat traditionally has been the vehicle of the democratic opposition and the independent cultural movement. Even under martial law, samizdat flourished. At the same time, repressive or restrictive measures taken against independent culture included the introduction of a range of severe prison sentences for all forms of independent publishing and dissemination of information. Since the formal lifting of martial law in July 1983, official propaganda efforts linked independent publishers with "Western centers of subversion" and large numbers of people engaged in unofficial publishing were arrested and imprisoned. They are now, I am pleased to say, free, and, I hope, will remain so. Today, in Poland an estimated 50 underground publishing houses reportedly produce hundreds of periodical titles and books in circulations of 2,000-2,500 copies each. In addition to printed matter, unofficial cultural circles produce tapes and videocassettes, calendars and postcards.

Mr. Chairman, without the efforts of the courageous men and women in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who run high risks to produce unofficial publications, the world would have known little about the extensive violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, both individual and collective, of Russian and Crimean Tatar, of believer and non-believer, Ukrainian and Jew, Polish worker and Czech intellectual, of peasant and Nobel Laureate. Samizdat authors write the histories of peoples that the Soviet and some East European governments would have the world forget; document inhumane acts about which they would have the world remain ignorant; appeal to the United Nations and to the CSCE for the rights of people whom the authorities would consign to oblivion in prisons and camps.

As we continue our work on information, let us not forget their contribution and their continuing sacrifice. For knowing and acting upon Helsinki and Madrid information provisions, these men and women suffer to publish the truth. Let us, who now know it, act upon the burden of our knowledge and work to set them free.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.6

STATEMENT
BY
AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE, DEPUTY HEAD
OF THE
U.S. DELEGATION
TO THE
VIENNA MEETING OF THE CSCE

"H" Group, December 4, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

Yesterday in plenary, Ambassador Zimmermann offered the U.S. Delegation's views on personal and mass communication, with respect to interference with the mails and telephones and radio jamming. Today, I will speak about such information issues as the East-West flow of printed and broadcast information and cooperative measures in the information field. I will begin with a few remarks about my own country.

The U.S. is wide open to criticism because we are an open society. We make no attempt to restrict the flow of information or our citizens' freedom of expression. We are a society that exposes itself by choice to the views of other countries, a society that encourages travel by its citizens throughout the world, where they are free to compare our record -- for better or worse -- with that of any other nation. Our citizens have ready access to a world of information. Our government does not jam radio signals; our authorities do not confiscate books at borders. We do not censor, nor do we imprison artists and authors for the content of their creative works. In the strict sense of the word, we do have samizdat in the United States, because any enterprising and energetic citizen can publish whatever he likes himself. There simply is no need for underground literature in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, with respect to the subject of East-West information flow, I must report that progress in this field remains very limited. We recognize that the modest gains recorded just prior to the Final Act's signing in 1975, and particularly those following the onset of detente, have been retained. Steps taken in the immediate years following the Final Act's signature -- such as measures facilitating multiple entry and exit visa issuance to journalists -- have long ago been noted. But the Helsinki process must continue to register steady improvements over time in the information and in other fields, if it is to be seen as a viable undertaking by the public at large. The failure of the CSCE process to produce consistent results in the information area is especially glaring. After all, the world press is in the information business.

Mr. Chairman, implicit in the CSCE information provisions is the recognition that the nature of a country's state system creates different challenges and impediments to fulfillment of its Helsinki and Madrid obligations in the information field.

In the West, the state does not act as a barrier to the flow of information. The United States and other Western countries do actively engage in official programs to facilitate East-West information flow, but initiatives chiefly are taken by the private sector independently of the state and are subject only to commercial constraints such as consumer demand for Eastern products and ability of Eastern parties to pay in hard currency for publications, films and other items produced in the West. By contrast, in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations, any advancement in the field of information requires the political sanction of, and action by, the government. Eastern governments traditionally have favored strengthened government control over the content and flow of information, both domestically and internationally.

A number of delegations have observed here that the volume of periodical flow between East and West remains pathetically low. Over and above the small number of U.S. newspapers and magazines which are imported into the Warsaw Pact countries, the critical factor in terms of compliance with the Final Act is the extent to which they are made available to the general public. Except for distribution of official materials, compliance by the Warsaw Pact countries remains dismal. Access of the average citizen to Western publications is virtually no better than it was at the time of the signing of the Final Act, although implementation in Hungary and Poland is relatively better than elsewhere. Observers continue to report that Western publications can be found only in the major hotels of the largest cities, usually the capital, and occasionally in the main tourist areas. They tend to be kept under the counter and are sold almost exclusively to foreign tourists who can pay in hard currency. In most Eastern countries, Western publications are held in "closed stacks" of public and university libraries. Access to them is restricted to those who hold special passes. Entry by ordinary citizens in American embassy and consulate libraries, where not prohibited by local authorities, tends to be so closely watched as to discourage use of the libraries. Only in Romania is an American library located elsewhere than on Embassy premises.

Despite new commitments at Madrid, private individuals are prohibited in most of the Warsaw Pact countries from subscribing to Western publications. Where not forbidden, the difficulties of obtaining the necessary foreign exchange for purchase poses insurmountable obstacles to potential subscribers.

Mr. Chairman, in discussion here with Western delegations about the modest book trade between East and West, the Soviet Union and other East Bloc delegations have cited statistics about the larger number of Western authors and titles published in their countries. Studies indicate that the alleged imbalance is misleading. Despite highly-competitive Western commercial markets, the availability of works by Eastern classical writers compares favorably with that of Western classics in the East. Moreover, works by exiled, suppressed or selectively censored Russian and East-European language authors (such as Nobel laureates Solzhenitsyn or Seifert) have been published in the West. As we pointed out earlier, the Western publication of works by contemporary Eastern writers could be much broader if publication were not inhibited by censorship and government control in the East.

In the West, availability of titles from the East is largely dependent on demand. In the East, tirages are so small in comparison to demand that they sell out immediately. The Soviet Union claims to be the world's largest translator of foreign books. However, such translations are highly selective,with large runs of "acceptable" authors such as Twain and London, sprinkled with occasional anodyne pieces by contemporary Western writers. As U.S. expert Leo Gruliow, a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Budapest Cultural Forum and Editor Emeritus of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press points out, when Eastern black lists are taken into account, it may be said that "the American book-buying public has access at any time to a wider range of Soviet and Russian titles than the Soviet book buyer to American."

With respect to filmed and televised information, activity in this area continues to be fostered by commercial and non-commercial distribution arrangements and contracts between competent bodies and enterprises, by co-productions, by contacts and exchanges between film libraries and institutes, among film archivists, cinematographers and scholars and by international film festivals. Audiences in Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary, Romania and Poland, increasingly are well-acquainted with U.S. and other Western films, many of which are broadcast over television. In the United States and other Western countries, museums, film institutes and universities are active in arranging not only individual showings of East European productions, but film series as well.

Concerning television, Mr. Chairman, I can report here that viewers in most East European states have gained somewhat broader exposure to U.S. television programs in recent years. We nonetheless must bear in mind that unlike radio broadcasting, where some states engage in jamming to blot out Western programs entirely, television leaves editorial control in the hands of the local broadcasters. Therefore, it is possible for authorities in the receiving Eastern country to choose among the films and videotapes offered. Officials can, and often do, edit them to the point of bowdlerization and in effect, subjected them to censorship. With some laudable exceptions, Western films and programs shown on television or in movie theaters in the East are selected either because they are totally innocuous or because they portray life in the West in a negative light; and, they are frequently edited to conform to propaganda requirements.

Mr. Chairman, we certainly acknowledge that implementation of Helsinki and Madrid provisions in the field of information has been heavily conditioned by differing interpretations of the proper role of the media in East and West. The West contends that compliance with our CSCE commitments requires the removal of artificial barriers to the free flow of people, ideas and facts as well as the unrestricted access of citizens to those ideas and facts. By contrast, the Eastern view as articulated many times at CSCE meetings, is that the State arrogates to itself the broad prerogative to protect its citizens from state-defined war propaganda, racist material or other material that is offensive to human dignity or morality.

Mr. Chairman, even accepting for a moment the general thrust of the Eastern line of argument, I still cannot see, nor can the Western public understand, how the authorities of the Soviet Union and other East Bloc countries can consider the Bible and other religious literature to fit into any of those admittedly unpleasant categories. Nor why significant portions of the works of Nobel Laureates for Literature are not made available to the citizens of their native Eastern countries. Nor why, as President Reagan said in his November 14, 1985 pre-Summit address to the American people, "...(I)f Soviet spokesmen are free to appear on American television, to be published and read in the American press, shouldn't the Soviet people have the same right to see, hear, and read what we

Americans have to say? Such proposals will not bridge our differences, but people-to-people contacts can build genuine constituencies for peace in both countries."

And, Mr. Chairman, my delegation does not see why artists such as Bashkir poet Nizametdin Akhmetov, Latvian poet Gunars Freimanis, Russian essayist Lev Timofeyev, Ukrainian poet Anatoly Lupinos, or Czech playwright and Erasmus Prize winner Vaclav Havel are imprisoned or harassed for what they have written, disseminated or presented.

The CSCE signatories expressed at Helsinki and reaffirmed at Madrid their conviction that implementation of the Final Act's information provisions would contribute to the growth of international confidence through greater openness. It therefore passes understanding, Mr. Chairman, why, eleven years into the Helsinki process, the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries continue to maintain the severely restrictive approach to information that I have described today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY
SAMUEL G. WISE, DEPUTY HEAD
OF THE U.S. DELEGATION
TO THE
VIENNA MEETING OF THE CSCE
"H" GROUP, DECEMBER 5, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN:

TODAY I WISH TO DISCUSS WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS, MEDIA ACCESS AND COOPERATIVE EXCHANGES, ALL AREAS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE WHERE THERE ARE STILL MANY SHORTCOMINGS DESPITE EXPLICIT COMMITMENTS WHICH WE ALL TOOK AT HELSINKI AND MADRID.

IN THE CASE OF JOURNALISTS, THE SITUATION IS WORST IN THE SOVIET UNION WHERE HARASSMENT TACTICS HAVE EVEN BEEN INCREASING SINCE THE MADRID MEETING. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES EMPLOY A VARIETY OF TECHNIQUES TO INTIMIDATE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. FIRST OF ALL, ALMOST ALL FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WORK IN CLOSELY-WATCHED FOREIGNERS-ONLY COMPOUNDS ASSIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENT. MANY GET CALLED INTO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ARE ISSUED WARNINGS FOR STORIES THAT DID NOT MEET WITH SOVIET APPROVAL. JOURNALISTS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE CONTACT WITH UNNOFFICIAL SOURCES OR COVER EVENTS FROWNED ON BY THE AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN PHYSICALLY BARRED BY MILITIA OR HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO QUESTIONING, TEMPORARY ARREST OR WORSE.

INDIVIDUAL CORRESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN THREATENED WITH PROSECUTION AND IMPRISONMENT ON TRUMPED-UP CHARGES, ACCOSTED IN THE STREETS, VICTIMIZED BY ACTS OF PETTY HOOLIGANISM SUCH AS TIRE SLASHINGS THAT CLEARLY WERE ORCHESTRATED BY THE AUTHORITIES, ATTACKED MALICIOUSLY IN THE PRESS FOR TENDENTIOUS REPORTING, AND TARGETTED FOR ENTRAPMENT. IN SUM, THEY COME UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE EITHER TO KNUCKLE UNDER TO THE RULES AND PRESSURES CREATED BY THE AUTHORITIES OR TO ABANDON THEIR ASSIGNMENT AND RETURN HOME.

TWO AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS WHO WERE VICTIMS OF THIS TREATMENT WERE HERE IN VIENNA COVERING THE BEGINNING OF OUR CONFERENCE, ANDREW NAGORSKI OF NEWSWEEK AND ANNE GARRELS OF THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION. IN AUGUST 1982 DURING THE MADRID MEETING, NAGORSKI WAS EXPELLED FROM MOSCOW FOR REPORTING NOT TO THE LIKING OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES. NAGORSKI LATER DESCRIBED THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS MUST LIVE IN THE USSR AS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

ANNE GARRELS, WHO SERVED IN MOSCOW FROM 1979-82, DESCRIBED HER "PSYCHOLOGICAL TORMENT" WHILE UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR HOMICIDE FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT IN WHICH A CAR SHE WAS DRIVING STRUCK A PEDESTRIAN. IN A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ENTITLED "I WAS A VICTIM", GARRELS WROTE: "EVENTUALLY I WAS CLEARED OF ANY CRIME AND SOON AFTERWARDS EXPELLED. BUT IN THE MEANTIME, I FOUND MYSELF CAUGHT UP IN A POLITICAL WILDERNESS WHERE THERE WERE NO RULES, THE VICTIM OF HINTS AND

INNUENDO...THE PRESSURE IN MOSCOW WAS MATCHED BY WARNINGS IN WASHINGTON WHERE SOVIET DIPLOMATS THREATENED THE FUTURE OF ABC'S MOSCOW BUREAU IF ABC DID NOT REMOVE ME. BLACKMAIL, PURE AND SIMPLE."

ANOTHER INCIDENT INVOLVING ANOTHER AMERICAN JOURNALIST, OCCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATION IN HELSINKI OF THE SIGNING OF THE FINAL ACT. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR REPORTER GARY THATCHER WAS DETAINED FOR SEVERAL HOURS BY CUSTOMS OFFICIALS IN LENINGRAD WHEN RETURNING TO HIS MOSCOW POST FROM HELSINKI, WHERE HE HAD COVERED THE ANNIVERSARY MEETING. HIS NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS, INCLUDING, MR. CHAIRMAN, A COPY OF THE FINAL ACT, WERE CONFISCATED. FINALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE THE RECENT CASE OF NICHOLAS DANILOFF WHOSE TREATMENT BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES IS ONLY THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF SOVIET DISREGARD FOR ITS HELSINKI PROMISES ON JOURNALISTS.

BEFORE LEAVING THIS SUBJECT, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WISH TO SAY THAT MY DELEGATION NOTED WITH INTEREST WEDNESDAY'S ATTEMPT BY THE DISTINGUISHED SOVIET DELEGATE TO DEFEND SOVIET TREATMENT OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. HE TOLD US THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD PERMITTED THE 400-STRONG FOREIGN PRESS CORPS TO TAKE 857 INDIVIDUAL TRIPS IN THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE PAST YEAR. WHEN OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUE POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THIS WASN'T VERY MANY TRIPS, HE ATTEMPTED TO RETREAT BY SAYING THAT ONLY CERTAIN TRIPS REQUIRED PERMISSION.

WELL, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE DISTINGUISHED SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IS QUITE RIGHT. ONLY CERTAIN TRIPS IN THE SOVIET UNION REQUIRE PERMISSION. THOSE ARE TRIPS OUTSIDE OF A 25-MILE RADIUS FROM THE KREMLIN. IF A JOURNALIST WISHES TO GO BEYOND THAT 25-MILE LIMIT, HE MUST SUBMIT A TRAVEL REQUEST TO THE PROPER SOVIET AUTHORITIES. IF WE ARE TO BELIEVE OUR SOVIET COLLEAGUE, PERMISSION FOR TRIPS OUTSIDE THIS AREA WERE ONLY GRANTED ON 857 OCCASIONS LAST YEAR, OR JUST OVER TWO TRIPS PER JOURNALIST. THIS STRIKES US EVIDENCE OF A RESTRICTIVE SOVIET POLICY TOWARD JOURNALISTS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FINAL ACT.

I SHOULD POINT OUT, MR. CHAIRMAN, MY GOVERNMENT ALSO IMPOSES TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET JOURNALISTS. THESE TRAVEL CONTROLS WERE IMPOSED FOR ONE REASON AND ONE REASON ONLY. IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET ACTIONS. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES IMPOSED THE CONTROLS AND WE RECIPROCATED.

JUST ONE MORE WORD, MR. CHAIRMAN, CONCERNING OUR SOVIET COLLEAGUE'S REMARKS ON WEDNESDAY. LET ME ASSURE THE DISTINGUISHED SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE THAT WESTERN JOURNALISTS, RATHER THAN BEING HERDED TOGETHER INTO ORGANIZED GROUP VISITS, WOULD BE MORE THAN HAPPY TO FOOT THE BILL FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIPS INTO THE SOVIET HINTERLAND. THAT WOULD BE A SMALL PRICE TO PAY FOR WHAT THEY DEFINITELY DO NOT HAVE NOW -- GENUINE ACCESS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS PEOPLE.

NOW MR. CHAIRMAN, HAVING POINTED TO SOME VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THIS FIELD, I WANT TO MENTION SOME HOPEFUL STEPS IN MEDIA ACCESS AND COOPERATIVE EXCHANGE.

THE 1985 U.S.-U.S.S.R. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION IN SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND OTHER FIELDS SIGNED AT THE GENEVA SUMMIT REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE FINAL ACT AND INCLUDED COMMITMENTS REGARDING FILMED AND BROADCAST INFORMATION, PRINTED INFORMATION AND PUBLISHING AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS SUCH AS EXCHANGES AND MEETINGS OF JOURNALISTS, EDITORS AND PUBLISHERS. SINCE 1982, ADVANCES IN COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY HAVE PERMITTED PARTICIPANTS IN EAST AND WEST TO ENGAGE IN LIVE DISCUSSIONS VIA SATELLITE. RECENTLY, SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE MADE THEMSELVES MORE AVAILABLE TO SOVIET AND FOREIGN PRESS ALIKE AND HAVE DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY TABOO SUBJECTS IN A MANNER THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNIMAGINABLE A FEW YEARS AGO.

COOPERATIVE GAINS IN THE INFORMATION FIELD ALSO INCLUDE INCREASED INITIATIVES UNDERTAKEN IN THE PAST FEW YEARS BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR. FOR INSTANCE, THE NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS HAVE ENGAGED IN RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES. THE CHATAUQUA TOWN MEETING, BILLED "A JOURNEY IN OPEN DIPLOMACY", THAT WAS HELD IN JURMALA, LATVIA THIS PAST SEPTEMBER, MARKED THE FIRST TIME AN UNCENSORED DISCUSSION AND EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN HIGH-LEVEL U.S. AND SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD BEEN CONDUCTED BEFORE A LARGE SOVIET AUDIENCE. ACCORDING

TO PARTICIPANT JOHN WALLACH, FORMER FOREIGN EDITOR OF THE HEARST NEWSPAPERS, FOR THE FIRST TIME U.S. OFFICIALS "GOT EQUAL TIME ON SOVIET TELEVISION, EVEN IF THE COVERAGE WAS NOT QUITE AS OBJECTIVE AS SOME AMERICANS WOULD HAVE LIKED." UNFORTUNATELY, IT MUST ALSO BE RECALLED THAT CHATAUQUA TOOK PLACE AGAINST A BACKDROP OF ELABORATE POLICE MEASURES TAKEN BEFORE AND DURING THE MEETING TO REDUCE UNSANCTIONED CONTACTS BETWEEN THE U.S. PARTICIPANTS AND ORDINARY CITIZENS. ACCORDING TO REPORTS, THIS WAS PART OF AN ELABORATE RUSE, ALONG THE LINES OF THE FAMOUS POTEMKIN VILLAGE, TO FOOL THE AMERICANS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE RECORD ALSO SHOWS PLUSSES AND MINUSES. OTHER DELEGATIONS HAVE ALREADY NOTED THAT ENTRY VISA REFUSALS AND ACCREDITATION DENIALS OR DELAYS ARE FAR TOO COMMON IN MANY OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES. THE SAME RESTRICTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION GATHERING AND REPORTING IS ALSO WIDELY PRESENT HERE TOO. THE SOVIET AND ROMANIAN GOVERNMENTS ACTUALLY HAVE PASSED LAWS DESIGNED EVEN FURTHER TO RESTRICT FOREIGNERS' ACCESS TO UNOFFICIAL CITIZEN SOURCES WITHIN THEIR COUNTRIES, WHILE BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR HAVE MERELY CONTINUED EXISTING PRACTICES IMPEDING SUCH CONTACTS.

WESTERN JOURNALISTS FREQUENTLY COMPLAIN ABOUT BUREAUCRATIC FRUSTRATION, OBFUSCATION AND MISREPRESENTATION IN ROMANIA. A LECTURE FROM ROMANIA'S NATIONAL PRESS AGENCY AGERPRES ON THE NEED FOR MORE OBJECTIVE REPORTING IS STANDARD PROCEDURE FOR ALL INCOMING WESTERN JOURNALISTS. WHILE SOME

DIFFICULTIES. DURING THE 1985 CSCE CULTURAL FORUM IN BUDPAEST, THE INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION'S PARALLEL CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH BANNED FROM A PUBLIC MEETING PLACE, WAS WIDELY COVERED BY THE WESTERN PRESS -- INCLUDING VOA AND RFE CORRESPONDENTS -- WITHOUT INTERFERENCE.

THE GDR ACCORDS FOREIGN JOURNALISTS CORRECT TREATMENT. HOWEVER, THEIR ABILITY TO REPORT ON EVENTS IS HAMPERED BY LAWS (NOT ALWAYS ENFORCED) THAT ARE DESIGNED TO LIMIT THEIR ABILITY TO TRAVEL WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL, TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS WITHOUT OFFICIAL PERMISSION AND TO RECEIVE PRINTED INFORMATION.

WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE NOT SO DANGEROUS AS ELSEWHERE, BUT ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND NEWSWORTHY INFORMATION IS SHARPLY RESTRICTED. IT IS STILL DIFFICULT FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN PERSONAL CONTACTS AND COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR SOURCES. NO U.S. JOURNALIST HAS BEEN EXPELLED DURING THE POST-MADRID YEARS, BUT A VOA CORRESPONDENT WAS DETAINED FOR TWO HOURS DURING THE FUNERAL OF NOBEL LAUREATE JAROSLAV SEIFERT IN JANUARY 1986 AND ANOTHER CORRESPONDENT'S FILM WAS CONFISCATED. TODAY, HOWEVER, MY DELEGATION JOINS OTHERS IN WELCOMING YESTERDAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA THAT ONE-YEAR VISAS FOR JOURNALISTS WILL BE GRANTED BEGINNING IN JANUARY.

WORKING CONDITIONS FOR CORRESPONDENTS IN BULGARIA REMAIN POOR AND JOURNALISTS CONTINUE TO BE HARASSED. NONETHELESS, A VOA NON-RESIDENT CORRESPONDENT HAS BEEN ACCREDITED.

JOURNALISTS EXPERIENCE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING ENTRY VISAS, OTHERS ARE ASKED TO SUBMIT SAMPLES OF THEIR PREVIOUS REPORTING AND FACE LONG DELAYS IN RECEIVING VISAS. IN 1985, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A MAJOR U.S. DAILY WAS TOLD BY ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES THAT HE WAS PERSONA NON GRATA FOR "ANTI-ROMANIAN" REPORTING. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, DURING THE DECEMBER 1985 VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ, ROMANIA ACCOMMODATED A LARGE INFLUX OF PRESS AND BROKE A LONGSTANDING POLICY BY ISSUING A VISA TO A RADIO FREE EUROPE CORRESPONDENT.

IN POLAND, SINCE THE INITIAL YEARS FOLLOWING THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, WHEN WESTERN--AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN--JOURNALISTS WERE TARGETTED IN VIRULENT PRESS CAMPAIGNS AND DETAINED OR HARASSED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO COVER STREET DEMONSTRATIONS OR OTHER OPPOSITION EVENTS, CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS HAVE IMPROVED. THERE HAVE BEEN NO EXPULSIONS SINCE JANUARY 1983, WHEN UPI CORRESPONDENT RUTH GRUBER WAS HELD FOR 23 HOURS INCOMMUNICADO. ON THE OTHER HAND, AMERICAN JOURNALISTS RARELY REPORT DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING ACCESS TO IMPORTANT SOURCES AND RANK POLAND HIGH ON THE LIST OF EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY HAS REFUSED A VISA TO THE VOICE OF AMERICA VIENNA CORRESPONDENT.

AMERICAN JOURNALISTS VISIT HUNGARY OFTEN AND HAVE NO DIFFICULTY GETTING VISAS. FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WHO SEEK TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN PERSONAL CONTACTS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL SOURCES RARELY ENCOUNTER

THEORETICALLY, ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY ARE OPEN TO JOURNALISTS, BUT THIS IS NOT SO IN PRACTICE. HOWEVER, JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE ATTEMPTED TO COVER OR REPORT INFORMATION DISPLEASING TO THE GOVERNMENT, HAVE BEEN DETAINED OR HAD THEIR VISAS SUSPENDED. VISA DENIALS ARE NOT UNCOMMON IN CASES WHERE A JOURNALIST'S REPORTING IS CONSIDERED TO BE EMBARRASSING. JUST LAST FRIDAY, A U.S. JOURNALIST, THOMAS GOLTZ OF READERS DIGEST, WAS DENIED A VISA TO BULGARIA. GOLTZ IS WRITING AN ARTICLE ON THE TURKISH MINORITY. HE WAS TOLD THAT NO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WILL BE ALLOWED IN UNTIL NEXT YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WELCOME SOME SMALL STEPS TAKEN IN BULGARIA SUCH AS THE RECENT PUBLICATION OF UNEDITED STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

OVERALL, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE PICTURE FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE IS STILL NOT BRIGHT WHEN JUDGED AGAINST THE PRACTICES IN THE WEST OR AGAINST OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. CENSORSHIP REMAINS RIFE, PENALTIES CONTINUE TO BE STIFF FOR CITIZENS WHO ATTEMPT UNAUTHORIZED CONTACTS WITH FOREIGNERS OR WHO ENGAGE IN UNOFFICIAL PUBLISHING. IT IS NOT WITHOUT REASON THAT JOURNALISTS STILL REFER TO TRAVELLING "IN" AND "OUT" OF THE U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE, BUT TALK ABOUT GOING "TO" AND "FROM" FRANCE, ITALY OR OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THIS HAS EVERYTHING TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT EASTERN SOCIETIES REMAIN FUNDAMENTALLY CLOSED, WHILE WESTERN SOCIETIES REMAIN fundamentally open. Improvements which have occurred are often rare enough as to be regarded as major news items in themselves. In this day and age it is both remarkable and sad that the residents of one half of Europe can have far more timely and accurate information about daily life and events in Asia, Africa and South America than they can about what is going on in the other half of Europe a few miles to the East.

The treatment or rather mistreatment of Western journalists is a principal reason why this is so and why the Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe remain only dimly perceived by the rest of the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY U.S. AMBASSADOR
SAMUEL G. WISE
SUB-WORKING GROUP 'H'
December 8, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

On Friday, Ambassador Zimmermann spoke in plenary on cultural freedom and its limitations and even absence in several of the participating states. He spoke of the tragic human and national consequences of the denial of cultural freedom. As we begin our discussion of culture in this body, I would recall a few of the images he painted: the cultural apartheid separating officially approved artists from independent artists; an internationally acclaimed playwright who has become a non-person in his own country; a young musical genius harrassed and professionally crippled because he dared to ask to live in another country. I would recall also that Ambassador Zimmermann spoke hopefully of possible winds of change in the area of cultural policy in the Eastern world.

Mr. Chairman, among the cultural tragedies raised by Ambassador Zimmermann, the plight of the Jazz Section is perhaps of more immediate concern to us here because there is a chance that something can be done to help its members. Seven leaders of the Jazz Section, an independent group of music lovers, are being held without the right to be visited by family or lawyers. To anyone who has followed their quiet but valiant efforts to serve as an independent source of cultural information, the charge that they were seeking private profit is patently absurd. We certainly expect that any independent court would see it the same way. We are concerned most immediately for the individuals involved: for Milos Drda, seventy-one years old, and suffering from diabetes; for Cestomir Hunak, whose heart condition has grown even more serious during his imprisonment; and for the others. The government of Czechoslovakia could serve the cause of humanitarian concern by allowing these men to see their families and to receive adequate medical care, and could serve the cause of cultural freedom by halting the persecution of this non-political cultural association.

Mr. Chairman, we have spoken before of the great debt North American culture owes to the infusion of great talent from Europe: Russian-Americans in the field of dance, Czechoslovak and Hungarian-Americans in film, Polish-Americans in literature, and countless other nationalities in countless other disciplines. But before my distinguished Soviet colleague objects that I am once again obsessed with emigration, and the draining of Europe's talent, let me assure him that I count America's culture equally enriched by those Europeans who never crossed the Atlantic. We respect and admire the cultural achievements of all nations, whether it is the culmination of hundreds of years of tradition, or the flame of genius shooting above his contemporaries. We have not let the Atlantic be a barrier to the wealth of European culture, nor will we tolerate any artificial barrier.

Governments cannot impose upon their people a thirst for culture, a hunger for the classical or the avant-garde, a taste for either opera or detective films. But governments can whet the appetite of the people for new experiences, can break down barriers that keep people from exploring the whole range of cultural opportunities the world offers. Such was the purpose behind the signing this past year of new understandings between the United States and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on cultural exchanges. Together with existing agreements, they represent a commitment to exchange the best of American culture with the best of culture from other parts of the world. My government is firmly committed to the success of such agreements, not just for the bureaucrats or a tiny cultural elite, but for the masses of ordinary people on both sides seeking cultural enrichment.

With most of the participating states, the United States has no need of cultural agreements. Cultural cooperation develops naturally. But in some states, cultural agreements seem necessary even if they do not resolve all the problems. Mr. Chairman, we will have more to say this week about the limitations of such agreements, and the necessary conditions of creation and dissemination that can make cultural enrichment for all of our peoples a reality.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
OF THE
U.S. DELEGATION TO THE VIENNA MEETING
OF THE CSCE

"H" Group, December 11, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

Today, I would like to speak about the Budapest Cultural Forum and about the interrelated problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation identified there which still stand in need of remedy.

Our delegation shares the view of others that the Cultural Forum was useful and successful in that it offered an opportunity for wide-ranging and vigorous discussion of cultural issues and problems. The presence of so many private cultural figures from a variety of cultural disciplines brought great vitality and immediacy to the discussions. Many of the cultural personalities from the United States and other Western countries spoke out eloquently in defense of their colleagues in the East who are persecuted or imprisoned for the content of their artistic works or for attempting cultural activities outside the ambit of the state.

Beyond the discussions taking place in the conference hall, other exchanges were organized in Budapest involving cultural personalities from East and West European countries, as well as from across the Atlantic. Parallelling the formal exchanges, these meetings were attended by private citizens as well as by conference delegates. The participants boldly tackled issues such as "writers and their integrity" and "the future of European culture". It was unfortunate and contrary to stated assurances, that the host government did not give full freedom to these discussions, but most planned activities were permitted to take place in one form or another. Furthermore, the authorities allowed substantial press coverage, including that provided by correspondents from Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. Organizers of the independent conference, the International Helsinki Federation, have said that without the official Forum, the parallel conference could not have taken place.

The atmosphere of the independent conference was highly charged--sparked in no small part by the concern that the proceedings might be broken up at any time by the authorities or that some of the cultural participants might suffer repercussions. By contrast, the discussions in the conference hall were more subdued and straitjacketed by the insistence of the Soviet and some Eastern delegations to adhere strictly to the formal CSCE procedures rather than permit a more freely-flowing discussion. Spontaneous discussion, obviously, was not something which these delegations wanted to see develop. This was a source of great frustration to our cultural figures, who nonetheless made efforts to engage their colleagues from other delegations informally.

Mr. Chairman, inside or outside the hall in Budapest, the same interrelated problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation were discussed by both private and official cultural figures. The critical need for greater cultural rights and freedoms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe emerged as the overriding problem in the field of culture and as the basic impediment to increased cultural cooperation. The lack of cultural freedom and pervasive censorship were seen as fundamental obstacles to fulfillment of Helsinki and Madrid commitments on culture. Countless instances were decribed in Budapest of state intrusion into every stage of the creative process and of government efforts to impede its natural fruition--official interference between the idea and the written word, the manuscript and its publication, the book and its readers, to cite only a few examples.

Individuals in Eastern states are still denied opportunities to form independent institutions and organizations in the different fields of culture. In this connection, we were encouraged by the statement on Monday of the distinguished Soviet representative that as of January 1, 1987, Soviet theaters will become independent. Unfortunately, the explanation provided the Italian delegation yesterday as to the meaning of this independence has considerably dampened our initial reaction to this announcement.

Another example of the difficulties involved in trying to form an independent cultural organization in Eastern Europe is the case of the Jazz Section in Czechoslovakia, which we and other delegations discussed the other day. We appreciate the explanation of the delegate from Czechoslovakia but we still have some different views on the subject which we have communicated to him privately. We hope that this discussion will lead to positive results. We would only observe that at our meeting, the delegate from Czechoslovakia went out of his way to praise the International Herald Tribune as an unbiased source. As the article in question states, the Jazz Section was interested not only in jazz, but in other forms of culture. As set out in the Herald Tribune article, because of the long history of harassment of the Jazz Section, we remain skeptical of the Czechoslovak government's charges of financial irregularities. In what other countries represented here would the activities described in that article lead to years in prison? And, I might add, the period of pre-trial investigation against Jazz Section leaders has been completed, contrary to the impression left by our Czech colleague, so that under CSSR law, their families should now be entitled to visit them.

The Cultural Forum also revealed that there still are severe limitations on access to and use of information, publications and materials relating to culture. My delegation and others last week addressed the problem of the inaccessibility by citizens of Eastern countries to Western publications of all kinds. We have discussed the lengths to which the many Eastern governments have gone to prevent unsanctioned contact with foreigners. In countries where typewriters must be registered to keep track not of the machines but control of their owner's writings, "creative tension" means much more than the artist's struggle with the limitations of his or her own creative powers. Jamming by Eastern states of Western broadcasts blots out cultural programming as well as news and other information. Whether the Bible is considered a sacred book or a poetic work of creative genius, it is clear that this Book of Books and other religious literature should not be made inaccessible to what is obviously a vast and interested reading public in the East.

Another area of discussion at the Forum involved the denial of adequate protection to persons belonging to national minorities and regional cultures. As was pointed out at the Cultural Forum, in many Eastern countries there is deliberate neglect or destruction of buildings of historical, cultural or religious interest, especially to national and minority groups. How else but as a threat to the continued existence of Jewish culture in the Soviet Union can we interpret the systematic arrest of Hebrew teachers and leaders of Jewish study groups?

And, Mr. Chairman, individuals who attempt to reflect and promote the unity of European culture, transcending the division of Europe, still run afoul of the authorities and are subject to legal penalty. In Eastern countries, we had occasion to point out, artistic works which are unsanctioned by the state must circulate in samizdat or tamizdat in order to reach their publics, their authors and readers incurring possible prosecution thereby. In this same regard, Mr. Chairman, it is only fitting today that I reflect on the contribution to literature in the Russian-language of Anatoly Marchenko, the Moscow Helsinki monitor of whose death we recently learned, another victim of a Soviet labor camp. Marchenko made his contribution to the body of literature of the camps, which sadly has been a part of the rich Russian literary heritage from the days of the Tsars until the present. Names such as Dostoevsky, Chernyshevsky, Bakunin, Mandelshtam and Evgenia Ginzburg, Solzhenitsyn, Pasternak and Shalamov are associated with it. Marchenko's two autobiographical books, My Testimony and From Tarusa to Chuna, were published in tamizdat. They described his fifteen years in labor camp or exile before his last fatal sentencing in September 1981 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Mr. Chairman, cultural exchanges too are still frustrated by travel restrictions. Exit permission too frequently is denied cultural figures from the East who have been invited to the West to take part in cultural programs, conferences and other events of professional interest. Too often, Eastern authorities substitute uninvited persons for those specifically requested as guests by Western hosts.

Mr. Chairman, in six weeks at Budapest, the CSCE discussed at considerable length all of these problems. We heard arguments and counter-arguments. We even discussed solutions to at least some of the problems. But we could not agree on solutions to these problems. The same problems are before us here in Vienna. We have listened with interest to the remarks of some delegations that at Vienna we have new opportunities for progress in all fields. We have heard much about openness and new cultural initiatives in the Soviet Union. Can we now expect a more flexible and forthcoming attitude from our Eastern colleagues? If that is the case, then our six weeks in Budapest one year ago may eventually pay rich dividends.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Yesterday, the Soviet delegate launched a vitriolic attack against the culture of my country. As intemperate as his remarks were, he still deserves a reply. Today, I would add a few points.

First, cultural freedom does sometimes produce material which I -- and many other Americans -- find to be offensive. But we would vastly prefer to have a society in which such material is produced than to have a society with no freedom of expression at all. Second, the alleged excesses of which he spoke in are in no way originated or supported by my government. The only role my government plays in these matters is to assure the right of free opinion and expression in cultural as well as other spheres of life. With respect to the disapproval or dislike of his government for the products of cultural media of my country, I would point out they represent the free views of the individuals who produced them--no one else. Third, the whole world knows that the campaign of hate directed toward my country in Soviet press and cultural media is totally orchestrated by Soviet authorities and is turned on or off like a spigot depending on the climate of the times. Fourth, anyone in my country who would prefer to avoid the allegedly offensive materials produced in conditions of cultural freedom in the United States may choose from a world of alternative sources of cultural or other information or to leave. The government of the Soviet Union does not dare to give its citizens the same choices. Fifth, we welcome the recognition by the Soviet leadership of the need for change in the Soviet Union as expressed most recently by Vice Minister Kovalev yesterday in the plenary. We hope that this change will extend to the area of cultural freedom for the Soviet people. The Soviet Union itself and its peoples will be much the richer for it. Sixth my delegation would appreciate the courtesy of a reply to at least some of the points which we have raised concerning problems in his country in the cultural and other spheres of the Third Basket. If, as he says, his delegation desires to make progress, he has only to address the problems of his own country as freely as he does the problems of others.

STATEMENT BY U.S. AMBASSADOR

SAMUEL G. WISE

SUB-WORKING BODY 'H'

DECEMBER 12, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

The Final Act, in the Third Basket, stressed the important contribution of national minorities and regional cultures to give concrete expression to the rights of minorities guaranteed by Principle VII. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, some participating states have actually moved backwards in recent years into more repressive activities against minority cultures.

In December, 1984, the Bulgarian militia, supported by military forces, entered major ethnic Turkish population centers in Kurdzhali region to enforce name changes. The forced name change campaign shifted northward to Turkish populations living along the Balkan Mountains near Aitos in January 1985, and then proceeded into Northeastern Bulgaria. By March 1985, all identity cards had been reissued with Bulgarian names.

Even with the name change campaign complete, other measures of the cultural assimilation campaign have continued. Publication of books and periodicals in Turkish has been halted, fines have been imposed in some areas for speaking Turkish or for wearing traditional Turkish clothing, traditional Islamic practices including circumcision have been banned. Education in the Turkish language had already been banned in the mid-1970's. In its drive to create an ethnically pure state, the government of Bulgaria has stripped away practically every outward manifestation of an entire people's cultural consciousness.

Mr. Chairman, the government of Bulgaria is certainly entitled to its opinion about events associated with the Turkish conquest of Bulgaria hundreds of years ago. It would be pointless for the U.S. delegation to take any one individual in Bulgaria and try to determine which of his ancestors twenty generations ago were Bulgarian and which Turkish, let alone do this for one million people. What matters to us is the right enshrined in the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document: the right of the individual to choose his own cultural identification. It is certain that two years ago, more than one million Bulgarian citizens identified themselves as Turks, a fact then admitted by the government. While it would not be suprising to learn that some had changed their identification over two years, in a natural process of assimilation or intermarriage, the Bulgarian claim that all one million changed their minds simultaneously strains credulity.

Mr. Chairman, all of the information I have cited here is either gathered directly by representatives of my government in Bulgaria, or supplied by independent news and human rights organizations, organizations that had no reason to be either pro-Turkish or anti-Bulgarian prior to the events of December 1984.

Mr. Chairman, the events in Bulgaria are the most dramatic, but not the only such campaign in Europe. In speaking on culture and other topics, other delegations have pointed to the Russification campaign waged in the Soviet Union. It involves a number of elements: attempts to dilute concentrations of nationalities and minorities by resettlement of Russians; dominance of Russian language books and television in the Ukraine, for example, which is eighty percent ethnic Ukrainian; and continued cultural suppression of and attempts to Russify those groups such as Germans, Poles, Crimean Tatars and others who are without their own republic. My delegation has already commented in more detail on the recent Soviet campaign against Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural interests.

The situation was expressed in a resolution adopted in 1981 at the highly respected International PEN Conference in Lyon, France, which stated, "During the last years we have received information about threats against the culture in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania including arrests of intellectuals who defend the preservation of these cultures. We ask all members of International PEN to join us in condemning this unfriendly policy, standing in such outspoken contrast to the principles of all international cultural agreements."

No multi-ethnic society, including my own, has a perfect record in coping with the diverse interests and demands of various population groups. Among Eastern European states, however, we have noticed that Hungary makes a special effort to deal realistically and positively with national minority issues. Yet in several other Eastern European countries, the cultural situation for ethnic Hungarians falls far short of international commitments.

One Eastern European country has taken major steps backward in its treatment of national minorities. Television broadcasts in the languages of the national minorities have been eliminated, and radio broadcasts greatly restricted. Publications in minority languages now consist almost exclusively of translations from the dominant language. Import of books in minority languages is prevented by customs officials.

Mr. Chairman, there is one group that still suffers discrimination and official neglect throughout Europe, too often ignored or forgotten by Western human rights advocates. I refer to the gypsy population which survived the horror of the Holocaust.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to add to my earlier comments on cultural cooperation. It has long been U.S. policy to promote cultural contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We believe that such contacts are best developed and carried out by private individuals and organizations, as is the current practice throughout the free world. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and other Eastern nations have made this impossible by insisting on maintaining close political control over exchanges and exchangees. With no choice but dealing on a government to to government basis, we have tried to make the best of the situation by negotiating the maximum number of exchange programs.

We value the exchanges made possible by such cultural understandings with Eastern European nations. We especially are encouraged that in some countries, I might mention Poland and Hungary, the cultural understandings are a firm foundation, but not the sum total of cultural exchange activites. These countries are more open to cultural exchanges arranged through private groups, whether commercial or non-profit.

At the Geneva summit in November 1985, we were able to agree to a number of people-to-people exchange programs, and to sign a new cultural exchanges agreement. In so doing, we substantially increased the amount of cultural contacts between our two countries. Our major regret in the negotiations leading up to these agreements was the fact that the Soviet authorities found it impossible to agree to our suggestions for vastly increased youth exchanges. Nonetheless, we are encouraged by the progress we have managed to achieve so far. We believe it will only be a matter of time before we move on to the really large scale exchanges that are in the best interests of both our countries. We believe, and we hope our Soviet colleagues agree, that vastly increasing the number of contacts between our two peoples is a useful way to promote understanding between our two countries.

Mr. Chairman, I must report a sad piece of news to my colleagues: the death of a distinguished United States diplomat, Ambassador Walter Stoessel. Many of you knew Ambassador Stoessel from the Budapest Cultural Forum, where he served as head of the U.S. delegation. In the course of a distinguished career, he served as Undersecretary of State, the highest position ever attained by a career diplomat. He served as our Ambassador to Poland, to the Soviet Union, and to the Federal Republic of Germany. In all of those posts, he advanced not only bilateral relations, but multilateral relations as well. If I may be allowed to quote from Ambassador Stoessel's words at Budapest, I could illustrate both his personal dedication to the goals of diplomacy, and the spirit that could move us today in our discussion of culture:

"During the opening plenary sessions of the cultural forum, all delegations expressed the hope of our nations and peoples for cultural interchange; cultural interchange which increasingly will serve as a bridge between peoples and nations; cultural interchange which will be an important factor in the building of peace and cooperation. Indeed, we believe that it is only under conditions in which freedom of cultural expression and of the human spirit flourish that true cooperation and, ultitmately, peace, can be achieved."

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY U.S. AMBASSADOR
SAMUEL G. WISE
SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY 'H'
DECEMBER 17, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

The Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document make extensive provisions for support and expansion of a wide range of educational exchanges among the participating states. Today I would like to touch briefly on selected topics involving educational exchanges between the United States and some other participating states.

Last Friday, in plenary we heard Ambassador Zimmermann's positive assessment of his children's experience in the primary and secondary schools of the Soviet Union. The United States maintains extensive contacts and exchanges with other countries in the field of secondary and higher education. These contacts are largely in the form of private programs established through direct contacts between universities or other educational institutions. Students either apply directly or through local organizations to study at American institutions, with little or no involvement of government. For example, every year thousands of foreign students come to the United States to study -- 14,000 from Japan, 5,500 from the United Kingdom, 3,600 from the FRG, 3,000 from France, and 10,000 from China, to name only a few. These students are supported by a number of publicly and privately financed scholarship and exchange programs. They are free to seek out the school, location and program which best suits their temperament and intellectual interests.

However, certain states, primarily those from eastern Europe, demand governmental involvement and organization in educational exchanges. While, from our point of view, such government involvement is not necessary, this does not stop us from establishing educational cooperation and exchanges with these states.

For example, the United States has conducted formal educational exchanges with the Soviet Union since 1958. Under the auspices of the general agreement on cultural and educational exchanges several programs have developed to exchange graduate students and young and senior faculty members. Several private academic exchange agreements also exist between American universities and Soviet institutions which exchange professors, graduate students, and undergraduate language students.

After a hiatus of several years, last year the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a new general agreement on cultural and educational exchanges. Implementation of the provisions of this agreement will bring the numbers of persons involved in these programs to the highest levels since the inception of these exchanges.

Despite these encouraging developments, there are also difficulties in our educational exchanges with the

Soviet Union. Even with the recent increase in numbers, the total number of students and scholars exchanged in any one year is still very small, especially considering the size of our two nations. The United States has been criticized with reason at this meeting for not having greater study of foreign languages, and Russian in particular. However, the Soviet side has rejected proposals by several U.S. organizations for dramatically enlarged exchange programs, including language study, with the explanation that they have neither the space nor the teachers available at this time.

Although there have been some very recent signs that access for American exchangees to Soviet archives may improve slightly, there are still great problems and imbalances with regard to access, travel about the country and contacts with Soviet citizens. Let me describe the different experiences that a typical Soviet graduate student or young faculty member and his or her American counterpart might face.

First, on what they study. It is true that the United States is forced to restrict the programs of Soviet exchange participants from time to time. But this is because the Soviet Union sends students and scholars specializing overwhelmingly in the hard sciences. Many of the programs they request involve sensitive technology with direct military applications. On the other hand, Soviet authorities refuse to accept American requests for study of even the most innocuous subjects. What can be sensitive about the topics: "Russian social and economic development and the Russian army (1700-1917)" or Anna Akhmatova's lyric poetry?" Yet American students have been refused permission to study these and similar subjects at Soviet universities.

Second is the question of access to archives, libraries, manuscript repositories and the like. In the United States such repositories are almost always open to all comers, including researchers from the Soviet Union or any other country. Not so in the Soviet Union. In fact, acceptance of an American scholar by the Soviet Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education does not guarantee access to any research materials. It has happened all too frequently that American exchange students and scholars have been denied access to archives or manuscript repositories crucial to their research with such excuses as "access is not consonant with the proposed research." Isn't this a decision that the independent researcher rather than the Soviet authorities should make, whether materials are relevant to the research he or she is carrying out?

Even if an American scholar finally gains access to a Soviet repository, the struggle is not yet over. Soviet archival authorities routinely deny foreign exchange researchers permission to examine the catalogue of what is contained in the archive. As a result, Students are forced to describe broad categories of materials they seek and to rely on the good hearts and offices of archive staffers to obtain materials relevants to their topics.

Furthermore, a foreign student or scholar in the USSR is not free to pursue research wherever it might lead. Instead, the student or scholar is limited to his proposed program of research, submitted at the beginning of his stay. Sometimes he will even be refused a book in a library because it is "not on his research theme." Direct access to the library stacks, of course, is something he can only dream of.

In addition, travel, whether related to research or simply for tourism, is severely restricted by Soviet authorities. First of all, the system of closed and restricted areas in the Soviet Union applies to foreign exchangees as well as diplomats and others. Second, even when the foreign scholar applies to visit an open area, he is often subject to the capricious whim of Soviet university officials or visa bureaucrats.

The United States has imposed some controls on the movement of Soviet academic exchangees in the U.S. in the hope of persuading the Soviet authorities to change their restrictive policies. Nevertheless, most Soviet exchange scholars usually end up travelling pretty freely during their stay in the United States. The average Soviet student will make six trips for business or pleasure during a year's stay. We are still fighting to get the figure up to two for Americans who stay a year in Moscow.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the question of contacts with other scholars, academicians and students. In addition to being able to travel to meet prominent scholars in their field, Soviet exchange scholars in the United States are generally free to call, meet and correspond with American researchers, academics, public figures, and others working in their fields of specialization. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, any such meetings, calls, and correspondence must usually be cleared and often is denied or prevented. Meetings are simply never scheduled, with the brusque explanation -- when there is any explanation at all -- that the scholar in question is "busy" or "not interested."

There are exceptions to this, thankfully. But too often the western scholar has to fight his way through a morass of red tape and bureaucracy simply to obtain a meeting or to read something which would be no problem for a Soviet exchange scholar in the West. We are for educational exchanges. But, exchanges should not be confined to carefully pre-cooked and prescribed programs which discourage intellectual curiosity and experimentation. Most of all, exchanges should be a two-way street, not just a means for one government to gain information and expertise it desires while attempting to limit the alleged "damage" caused by the presence of foreigners in its own country.

If we are to make real progress in the achievement of the aims of the Final Act in encouraging educational exchanges, expanding contacts and broadening understanding, we will need to overcome these obstacles and the paranoid suspicions which lie behind them. Scholarship everywhere should be based on freedom of inquiry. Bureaucratic restrictions and petty fears, either of foreigners or scholarship itself, should not be allowed to undermine the aims of the Final Act in the field of educational exchange.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
U.S. DELEGATION TO THE
VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CSCE
"H" Group, December 19, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

Our topic of last week, Culture, and that of this week, Education, are closely related. Passing knowledge and cherished traditions on to our children, sharing the many fruits of European civilization, is a sacred trust held by us all. In this, persons, institutions, organizations and governments play important roles.

I dare say that the educational system in my country is among the most diverse and decentralized in any participating State. While our Federal Government does play a supportive role, particularly with respect to basic research in our universities, authorities at the state and local level play the main role in establishing basic educational standards and in operating our schools. At every level of our educational system, there is a mix of public and private, secular and religious education that provides an immensely varied menu of educational options for parents and students alike.

While Americans are proud of their educational system and would trade it for no other, we acknowledge a number of problems, some of which have been mentioned here. Among these problems the relative dearth of foreign language study in the United States is certainly a serious one, especially in the context of a meeting such as this. In this regard, I recognize the validity of the information put forward by the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union concerning the study of Russian in the United States. Fortunately, I am pleased to report that the trend in foreign language study is rising, including the study of Russian. But, much more must be done.

Another matter mentioned here this week is the alleged "banning" of books in the United States. It has occurred to me that our Eastern colleagues may in fact be confused on this issue. In reading our free American press, they have perhaps come across accounts of a few local schools deciding to exclude particular books from their curricula or libraries. Such decisions do not mean the books in question are banned throughout the United States or even within a single town. There is simply no such thing as a book that is unavailable in any part of the United States because of legal or administrative restrictions. As we all know, the same thing cannot be said about some of the other states represented here including the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, a number of delegations have raised the issue of illiteracy in the United States. In conjunction with a discussion of the plight of the Jazz Section in his own country, for instance, the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia claimed last week that there are 23-27 million absolutely illiterate persons in the United States and over 60 million "functionally illiterate" persons. He asked what was being done to resolve this problem. As with so many other allegations about social and economic conditions in my country, many of which were addressed by the Chairman of my delegation in plenary last Friday, a little bit of truth has been mixed with large doses of distortions and exaggerated statistics.

By internationally accepted standards, the absolute illiteracy rate in the United States is about nine-tenths of one percent -- that is, about one in 110 individuals. The standard used to ascertain this level is one recommended by various U.S. and international agencies, and is based on the number of years of schooling completed; in 1985 the average American adult had attended school for 12.6 years, as compared to 8.6 years in 1940.

The question of illiteracy is complicated by a number of factors including definition and age levels and ethnic background. Nevertheless, we recognize we have a problem with illiteracy in the United States and we are taking steps to correct it. There are public and private efforts at every level -- federal, state and local. Recent public attention has focused on the problem, and in our democratic system such public interest will contribute to the solution.

There is also the question of bilingual education. In the United States, whether or not publicly to finance bilingual education remains a matter of great and heated debate. The controversy is not likely to be resolved during the course of our Vienna meeting, but I would point out that, in the meantime, those who wish their children to receive instruction in a language other than English have a number of options available to them. They may send their children to private secular schools or religious schools. They may organize study groups on an informal basis. They may obtain books in their native languages and teach their children themselves. In no case is permission for any of these private educational activities required by the government.

Now let's look at a few problems in some other participating States.

In some participating States, Mr. Chairman, the state provides basic educational opportunities, but there are no legal alternatives for those who seek programs for their children that go beyond or are markedly different from state-offered curricula. In one country in Eastern Europe, opportunities have steadily diminished over the past decade for minorities to educate their children in their native language in state-run schools and institutions of higher learning. There is no legal possibility for persons belonging to these minorities to establish schools or arrange for instruction on a private basis. Travel to another country or emigration are options fraught with difficulties due to restrictive passport policies and practices. Even educational materials produced in other countries in minority languages are inaccessible.

Mr. Chairman, the rise of independent universities and centers of learning is generally regarded as a precious legacy of European civilization. It is indeed tragic that one country whose institutions of higher learning have been associated with academic genius through the centuries, should, in the Helsinki years, actually have stepped backward from hard-won academic freedoms. In Poland, the new 1985 Law on Higher Education which replaced the more liberal law in effect from 1982, strengthened government controls over the academic community as a whole. The government has pressured academics who are professionally independent and outspoken in their views. As a direct result of the new law, at least 70 rectors and deans have been dismissed at universities all over Poland.

The Soviet Government does, as the Soviet representative suggested yesterday, devote considerable energy and resources to education in and study of minority languages and cultures. Moreover, we are aware of constitutional and legal guarantees that assure students the opportunity to attend a school where teaching is in the native language and offer "freedom of choice in the language of instruction." Nevertheless, Soviet authorities do not recognize Hebrew as the language of citizens of the Jewish nationality.

It is true that Hebrew and Hebrew literature, primarily ancient and medieval, are approved subjects of study in a small number of Soviet higher educational establishments, yet the Soviet authorities have introduced a virtual ban on its teaching by anyone except those sanctioned by the state. The ban is evident in the refusal to register and accept taxes from private teachers of Hebrew, the harassment and imprisonment of teachers and students of Hebrew, and the confiscation of Hebrew books in the possession of Jewish activists. In the last two years, nine private teachers or students of Hebrew have been imprisoned. And, even accepting for a moment the often-heard official argument that Yiddish is the true language of Russian Jewry, in point of fact since the 1930s the Soviet Government has virtually destroyed the Yiddish educational network. Furthermore, it has been reported that the rapid decline of the Jewish student population is about three times greater than the rate of decline of the Soviet Jewish population in general.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that this week we heard many fine and true words about the importance of education in preparing youth to face the challenges of our age. As every younger generation since time immemorial has, today's youth will insist on making their own mistakes and discovering age-old truths for themselves as if for the first time. We cannot prepare them for the world they will inherit by imposing rigid dogmas, by denying them information we do not like or that does not fit with our way of thinking. The most that we can do is to teach them to value their inherent dignity as thinking beings.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.